Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday
| Decision Date | 15 November 1933 |
| Docket Number | 24037 |
| Parties | The Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, Admr., Et Al. |
| Court | Ohio Supreme Court |
Jury trial - Substantial right, and not merely procedural question - Court cannot make jury-trial rule applicable in single county - Trial to jury of six jurors unless twelve demanded - Rulemaking power - Court rule yields to statute in conflict.
1. The right to a jury trial is a substantial right, and does not involve merely a question of procedure.
2. A court is not authorized, under its inherent rule-making power, to make a special rule relating to jury trial applicable in a single-county of the state.
3. Such rule of court, which conflicts with a valid statute, must yield to the statute.
In this case a personal injury action was filed in the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county. After issue joined, the case came on for trial and the court presented to the parties for impaneling a jury of six persons, to which plaintiff then and there objected, and plaintiff then and there demanded a panel of twelve jurors as provided by the Constitution and laws of the state of Ohio. The court overruled plaintiff's objections, and refused the demand of plaintiff for a jury of twelve, and ordered the trial to proceed with a panel of six jurors, to which rulings of the court plaintiff then and there duly excepted.
No waiver by the plaintiff of a jury of twelve appears in the record of the case.
A jury of six was duly impaneled, and the plaintiff then and there objected to such jury being sworn to try the issues in the case, on the ground that plaintiff was entitled to a jury of twelve, which objection was overruled by the court, to which ruling the plaintiff then and there duly excepted.
The plaintiff then presented his evidence in the case, and rested. Whereupon the court, upon motion to withdraw the case from the jury as to the defendant the city of Cleveland, and direct a verdict in its favor, granted the motion as to such defendant, the trial of the case continuing as to the defendant the Cleveland Railway Company.
Thereupon the defendant the Cleveland Railway Company presented its evidence in the case and rested, and the plaintiff presented evidence in rebuttal and rested.
The plaintiff again objected to submitting the case for a determination to a jury of six, and demanded that it be retried to a jury of twelve, which objection and demand were overruled by the court, to which ruling the plaintiff excepted.
The cause was then argued to the jury by counsel for the respective parties.
Thereupon plaintiff again objected to submitting the case to a jury of less than twelve in number, which objection was overruled by the court, to which ruling plaintiff excepted.
The court then charged the jury, and the case wad submitted to the jury. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant, and judgment was rendered fOr the defendant.
Error proceedings were prosecuted to the Court of Appeals of Cuyahoga county, which court reversed the judgment of the court of common pleas "for error in refusing demand for jury of twelve and submitting said cause to jury of six as against objection; no other error appearing in the record," and remanded the case to the court of common pleas for further proceedings.
The case comes into this court upon allowance of motion to certify the record.
Further facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs Squire, Sanders & Dempsey, Mr. R. C. Green and Mr. Henry J Crawford, for plaintiff in error.
Mr Arthur P. Gustafson, for defendants in error.
The one question presented by the record in this case is whether the court of common pleas committed reversible error in refusing the demand of the plaintiff below for trial to a jury of twelve. The court of common pleas held that the plaintiff below had waived such a jury and had consented to trial by a jury of six, pursuant to a general rule duly adopted by the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county. This rule, which was based upon "the desire of the judges to cooperate in every reasonable manner in reducing the expense of operation" of the court of common pleas of Cuyahoga county, reads in its material portions as follows:
It is conceded that if the rule is valid, it applies to the facts of this record, that no demand in writing for a greater number than six jurors was filed in accordance with the rule, and hence it is contended that under the rule the plaintiff below must be deemed to have waived a jury of twelve and to have consented to try the case to a jury of six. The Court of Appeals held the rule invalid and therefore reversed the judgment of the trial court.
It is argued by counsel on behalf of the plaintiff in error that the rule is valid. They urge that the rule does not conflict with the Ohio statutes upon waiver of trial by jury, and that if it does conflict with the Ohio statutes, those statutes cannot be used to impair the judicial power and the inherent rule-making power of the court.
Does the rule conflict with the Ohio statutes on jury waiver?
Section 11379, General Code, provides: "Issues of law must be tried by the court, unless referred as hereinafter provided issues of fact arising in actions for the recovery of money only, or specific real or personal property, shall be tried by a jury, unless a jury trial be waived, or a reference be ordered as hereinafter provided."
Section 11421-1, General Code, provides how a jury trial may be waived. It reads as follows:
Since Section 11379, General Code, sets forth that a court is authorized to try only those cases in which a jury has been waived under the statute "as hereinafter provided," and since this record shows that no waiver of jury trial was made as provided under Section 11421-1 the plaintiff in error cannot prevail unless the rule of court above quoted prevails over the statute.
The principle of the separation of the powers, executive legislative and judicial, does not help us greatly in this controversy. This record does not involve such a question as that presented in Opinion...
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Harnessing the hired guns: the substantive nature of Ohio Revised Code s. 2743.43 under Article IV, section 5(b) of the Ohio Constitution.
...guarantees the right of a trial by jury in those instances where it existed previous to its adoption). (166) Cleveland Ry. Co. v. Halliday, 188 N.E. 1, 3 (Ohio 1933) (holding that the right to a trial by jury is a substantive right, not a procedural matter); see also Wikipedia, Magna Carta,......