Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co.
| Decision Date | 12 June 1992 |
| Docket Number | No. 1-91-1993,1-91-1993 |
| Citation | 230 Ill.App.3d 831,595 N.E.2d 1193,172 Ill.Dec. 523 |
| Parties | , 172 Ill.Dec. 523, Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,420 Michael CLEVERINGA, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. J.I. CASE COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
Matthew K. Szygowski, Chicago, for plaintiff-appellant.
Johnson & Bell, Ltd., Chicago (Thomas J. Andrews, Charles P. Rantis, Thomas H. Fegan, of counsel), for defendant-appellee.
Plaintiff, Michael Cleveringa, initiated this product liability action, seeking recovery for personal injuries sustained by him while using a trenching machine manufactured by defendant, J.I. Case Company (Case). Following trial, the jury rendered a verdict for defendant, and the trial court entered judgment in defendant's favor. The trial court denied plaintiff's post-trial motion, and plaintiff has appealed.
On appeal, plaintiff contends (1) the trial court erred in determining that a statement made by defendant in its answer to a third-party complaint was not an admission and should not be presented to the jury; (2) the trial court erred in refusing to apply the doctrine of collateral estoppel to preclude defendant from litigating the dangerous condition of the trenching machine; (3) the trial court erred in prohibiting the introduction of evidence of other accidents involving the defendant's trenching machine; (4) the trial court erred in refusing to allow plaintiff's supervisor to testify that the accident would not have occurred if the defendant's trenching machine had been designed with a safety switch; (5) the trial court improperly allowed the jury to consider whether plaintiff had assumed the risk of his injuries; (6) the trial court improperly instructed the jury as to defendant's duty as manufacturer of the trenching machine; and (7) the jury's verdict was against the manifest weight of the evidence.
The record reveals that plaintiff brought suit seeking recovery for personal injuries sustained during the course of his employment with Telecom Systems, Inc. (Telecom) which installed underground cable for a cable television company. The complaint alleged that Case, the manufacturer of the trenching machine, and McLaughlin Manufacturing Company (McLaughlin), the manufacturer of the boring rods used on the machine, were liable for his injuries under the theory of strict liability. Case and McLaughlin brought third-party actions against Telecom and filed contribution claims against each other.
Prior to trial, the plaintiff entered into a settlement agreement, releasing McLaughlin and Telecom from all further liability. Although Case had been involved in the settlement negotiations, Case did not participate in the agreement that was ultimately signed. The trial court entered an order, finding the settlement agreement was in good faith and dismissing all pending claims with the exception of plaintiff's claim against defendant Case. Case filed an interlocutory appeal, challenging the trial court's approval of the settlement agreement, and this court affirmed the determination of the trial judge. See Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co. (1989), 192 Ill.App.3d 1081, 140 Ill.Dec. 226, 549 N.E.2d 877.
The cause proceeded to trial solely on plaintiff's product liability claim against Case. In his sixth amended complaint, plaintiff asserted that Case designed, manufactured, marketed, and sold the trenching machine, commonly known as the Case "maxi-sneaker," with an attached "hydra-borer" which was purchased by Telecom in March 1982. The complaint alleged further that when Case sold and distributed this trenching machine, it failed to have anchor guides as standard equipment on the machinery and failed to provide a covering for the rotating auger (commonly referred to as the rod). Plaintiff asserted that while using the trenching machine on July 21, 1983, in his employment for Telecom, his apparel came in contact with a portion of the unguarded rotating auger, and his leg was pulled into the auger, resulting in personal injuries to him.
The complaint alleged that the trenching machine was unreasonably dangerous in that Case failed to (a) place adequate warnings or instructions for safe operation of the machine; (b) place safety devices on the machine for the protection of persons who would use the machine; (c) equip the machine with guards adequate to prevent persons from being injured by the rotating borer; (d) provide adequate devices to stop the rotation of the borer; (e) provide adequate warnings as to the dangers of the borer and as to the use of the borers with the machine; (f) provide anchor guides as standard equipment with the attached "hydra-borer"; and (g) provide a covering as standard equipment for the rotating auger that was to be used with the "hydra-borer" attachment. The complaint also asserted that as an employee of Telecom, he was a normal user of the trenching machine and that Case could reasonably have anticipated that he would use that equipment.
Plaintiff alleged further that while using the trenching machine, and as a direct and proximate result of the unreasonably dangerous condition of the machine, his right leg was caused to become caught in the machine and wrapped around the borer. The complaint asserted that as a direct and proximate result of the acts of Case, plaintiff's right leg was severely broken in the area between the right foot and the right knee when it was wrapped around the boring rod two to three times, breaking the bones and doing extreme permanent damage to his right leg.
Defendant Case filed an answer to the sixth amended complaint, denying the substantive allegations against it and raising as affirmative defenses the plaintiff's assumption of the risk associated with using Case's product and that plaintiff failed to use Case's product in the manner for which it was intended. Defendant asserted further that although anchor guides were not standard equipment on its maxi-sneaker, they were offered as optional equipment if the hydra-borer was ordered with the maxi-sneaker.
Prior to trial, plaintiff moved for partial summary judgment, asserting that (1) based upon a prior adjudication against Case, the doctrine of collateral estoppel should preclude relitigation of the dangerous condition of its trenching machine, and (2) the defense of assumption of risk should not be presented to the jury. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion for partial summary judgment, finding that the doctrine of collateral estoppel was not applicable because, in light of other judgments in Case's favor, it would have been unfair to prohibit Case from asserting that its trenching machine was not unreasonably dangerous. The trial court also found that Case would be permitted to argue that plaintiff assumed the risk of his injuries where there was evidence that he was aware that the presence of bolts on the rods increased the dangers associated with the rotating rods and that he had been warned not to place his foot near the bolts.
During trial, plaintiff attempted to introduce, as a binding judicial admission, a statement made by Case in its answer to McLaughlin's third-party complaint. The trial court excluded the statement sought to be introduced by plaintiff, ruling that it was not a judicial or evidentiary admission.
The evidence adduced at trial established that the rod involved in plaintiff's accident was connected to a maxi-sneaker, which was a multi-purpose trenching machine manufactured by Case. When equipped with a hydra-borer attachment, the maxi-sneaker was capable of boring holes in the ground beneath obstructions such as driveways and streets and was used to bore the holes necessary to lay underground cable. The maxi-sneaker did not have any safety controls which stopped the machine if the operator left it, nor did it have, as standard equipment, guides or coverings to be used with the boring rods.
Before the actual boring operation was commenced, a starting trench was dug, and the hydra-borer attachment and steel rods were then connected to the maxi-sneaker and a drill bit was placed in front of the rods. The hydra-borer attachment provided the force necessary to propel the drill bit into the earth, and the engine of the maxi-sneaker generated the power needed for the rods to bore through the earth.
Case also manufactured guide anchors which could be used with the hydra-borer attachment to control the direction and angle of a bore. Guide anchors were offered by Case as optional equipment and made it unnecessary for users to control the direction of a bore with their hands or legs. Another device sometimes used in boring operations was a T-bar. The T-bar was approximately four feet long with a T-shaped handle at the top and prongs at the bottom which were designed to wrap around a boring rod. The T-bar prevented users from coming into direct contact with the rotating rods.
The 10-foot rods used by plaintiff and his supervisor on the date of the accident were manufactured by McLaughlin, but had been modified at the request of Telecom, plaintiff's employer. In accordance with Telecom's specifications, the coupling mechanisms, which were part of the rods' design, were drilled out, enabling the users to bolt the rods together. The bolts used to connect the rods protruded from the surface of the rods. The rods were bolted together because they had a tendency to come apart underground during the boring operation if their regular coupling mechanisms were relied upon.
Immediately prior to sustaining injury, plaintiff attempted to control the direction and angle of the bore by bearing weight on the rotating rod with his right foot. When his right foot slipped off of the rod, plaintiff was unable to extricate his leg from the narrow trench in which the rod had been placed. While his foot was caught in the trench, the lace of plaintiff's right boot became entangled with one of...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Skolnick v. Altheimer & Gray
...a protective order only if no reasonable person could adopt the view taken by the circuit court. Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co., 230 Ill.App.3d 831, 848, 172 Ill.Dec. 523, 595 N.E.2d 1193 (1992). At bar, the protective order proposed by the parties and entered by the circuit court precluded th......
-
Loeffel Steel Products, Inc. v. Delta Brands, Inc.
...liability cases to testify about alternative designs that could have prevented the injury. See Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co., 230 Ill.App.3d 831, 172 Ill.Dec. 523, 595 N.E.2d 1193, 1208 (1992); McCormick v. Bucyrus-Erie Co., 81 Ill.App.3d 154, 164, 36 Ill.Dec. 429, 400 N.E.2d 1009 These cases......
-
Van Hattem v. Kmart Corp.
...necessary learning, knowledge, or practical experience to enable him to give expert testimony. Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co., 230 Ill.App.3d 831, 851, 172 Ill.Dec. 523, 595 N.E.2d 1193 (1992). Whether a witness is qualified to testify as an expert is not dependent upon whether he or she is a ......
-
Rogers v. Ford Motor Co.
...products where the injuries arise out of distinct underlying incidents.5 See Cleveringa v. J.I. Case Co., 230 Ill.App.3d 831, 848, 172 Ill.Dec. 523, 536, 595 N.E.2d 1193, 1206 (Ill.App.Ct.1992); Marlow v. American Suzuki Motor Corp., 222 Ill.App.3d 722, 736, 165 Ill.Dec. 166, 175, 584 N.E.2......