Clifford P. v. Saul

• Decision Date: 24 January 2020
• Docket Number: Civil No. TMD 18-2223
• Parties: CLIFFORD P., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Maryland

CLIFFORD P., Plaintiff, v. ANDREW M. SAUL, Commissioner of Social Security, Defendant.¹

Civil No. TMD 18-2223

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND

January 24, 2020

MEMORANDUM OPINION GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S ALTERNATIVE MOTION FOR REMAND

Plaintiff Clifford P. seeks judicial review under 42 U.S.C. §§ 405(g) and 1383(c)(3) of a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security ("Defendant" or the "Commissioner") denying his application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and alternative motion for remand (ECF No. 14) and Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (ECF No. 18).² Plaintiff contends that the administrative record does not contain substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision that he is not disabled. No hearing is necessary. L.R.105.6. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's alternative motion for remand (ECF No. 14) is GRANTED.

IBackground

Plaintiff was born in 1997. R. at 17. On October 22, 2014, Plaintiff's mother protectively filed an application for SSI on Plaintiff's behalf when he was under the age of 18, which the Commissioner denied initially and on reconsideration. R. at 13, 51-78, 83-94, 165-73. Upon request, Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") Anne-Marie A. Ofori-Acquaah held a hearing on May 30, 2017, in Raleigh, North Carolina, where Plaintiff and a vocational expert ("VE") testified. R. at 34-50, 95-98. The ALJ thereafter found on August 22, 2017, that Plaintiff was not disabled before attaining the age of 18. R. at 17-25. In so finding, the ALJ found that Plaintiff (1) had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since the filing date of the application; and (2) had the severe impairment of Fabry disease; but (3) did not have an impairment or a combination of impairments meeting, medically equaling, or functionally equaling one of the impairments set forth in 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1. R. at 17-25. The ALJ found that Plaintiff's impairments did not functionally equal a listed impairment because he did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that resulted in either "marked" limitations in two out of six domains of functioning or "extreme" limitation in one domain of functioning. R. at 25. Rather, the ALJ found that he had less than marked limitation in moving about and manipulating objects. R. at 22-23. The ALJ also found that Plaintiff had no limitations in acquiring and using information, in attending and completing tasks, in interacting and relating with others, and in the ability to care for himself. R. at 20-24. The ALJ found, however, that Plaintiff had marked limitation in health and physical well-being. R. at 24.

The ALJ also found that Plaintiff was not disabled from the day Plaintiff attained the age of 18 through the date of the ALJ's decision. R. at 28. In so finding, the ALJ found that, since attaining age 18, Plaintiff (1) had not developed any new impairment or impairments and (2) continued to have a severe impairment or combination of impairments; but (3) did not have an impairment or combination of impairments that met or medically equaled a listed impairment; and (4) had the residual functional capacity ("RFC")

to perform sedentary work as defined in 20 CFR 416.967(a) except he can only occasionally use his bilateral lower extremities to operate foot controls; frequently climb ramps and stairs; never climb ladders, ropes, or scaffolds; and should avoid concentrated exposure to heat and humidity. He needs to elevate his legs during the workday but this can be accommodated by normal morning, lunch, and afternoon breaks.

R. at 25.³ In light of this RFC and the VE's testimony, the ALJ found that, since attaining age 18, Plaintiff could work as an order clerk, food checker, or charge account clerk. R at 27-28. The ALJ thus found that Plaintiff was not disabled from the day Plaintiff attained the age of 18 through August 22, 2017. R. at 28-29.

After the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff's request for review, Plaintiff filed on July 20, 2018, a complaint in this Court seeking review of the Commissioner's decision. Upon the parties' consent, this case was transferred to a United States Magistrate Judge for final disposition and entry of judgment. The case then was reassigned to the undersigned. The parties have briefed the issues, and the matter is now fully submitted.

IIDisability Determinations and Burden of Proof

A. Child SSI

An individual under the age of 18 shall be considered disabled "if that individual has a medically determinable physical or mental impairment, which results in marked and severe functional limitations, and which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(C)(i); see 20 C.F.R. § 416.906. To determine whether a child has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a three-step sequential evaluation process. 20 C.F.R. §§ 416.924, 416.926a. The first step is a determination whether the child is engaged in substantial gainful activity. Id. § 416.924(b). If so, benefits are denied; if not, the evaluation continues to the next step. The second step involves a determination whether a claimant's impairment or combination of impairments is severe, i.e., more than a slight abnormality that causes no more than minimal functional limitations. Id. § 416.924(c). If not, benefits are denied; if so, the evaluation continues. The third step involves a determination whether the child has an impairment or impairments that meet, medically equal, or functionally equal in severity a listed impairment. Id. § 416.924(d). If so, and if the duration requirement is met, benefits are awarded; if not, benefits are denied.

"A child's functioning is determined by looking at six broad areas, or 'domains,' in an attempt to evaluate 'all of what a child can or cannot do.'" Woodhouse ex rel. Taylor v. Astrue, 696 F. Supp. 2d 521, 527 (D. Md. 2010) (quoting 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(b)(1)). In the domain of "acquiring and using information," the Commissioner considers how well a child acquires or learns information, and how well the child uses the learned information. 20 C.F.R.§ 416.926a(g). In the domain of "attending and completing tasks," the Commissioner considers how well a child is able to focus and maintain attention and how well the child begins, carries through, and finishes activities. Id. § 416.926a(h). In the domain of "interacting and relating with others," the Commissioner considers how well a child initiates and sustains emotional connections with others, develops and uses the language of the child's community, cooperates with others, complies with rules, responds to criticism, and respects and takes care of others' possessions. Id. § 416.926a(i). In the domain of "moving about and manipulating objects," relating to a child's gross and fine motor skills, the Commissioner considers how the child moves his or her body from one place to another and how the child moves and manipulates things. Id. § 416.926a(j). In the domain of "caring for yourself," the Commissioner considers how well a child maintains a healthy emotional and physical state, including how well the child gets his or her physical and emotional wants and needs met in appropriate ways, how the child copes with stress and changes in the environment, and whether the child takes care of his or her own health, possessions, and living area. Id. § 416.926a(k).

Impairments "functionally equal listing-level severity when they produce an 'extreme' limitation in a child applicant's functioning in one domain or 'marked' limitations in functioning in two domains." Woodhouse, 696 F. Supp. 2d at 527 (citing 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(d)). A "marked" limitation in a domain is one that "interferes seriously with [the claimant's] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities." 20 C.F.R. § 416.926a(e)(2)(i). "It is the equivalent of the functioning [the Commissioner] would expect to find on standardized testing with scores that are at least two, but less than three, standard deviations below the mean." Id. An "extreme" limitation in a domain is one that "interferes very seriously with [the claimant's] ability to independently initiate, sustain, or complete activities." Id. § 416.926a(e)(3)(i). "It isthe equivalent of the functioning [the Commissioner] would expect to find on standardized testing with scores that are at least three standard deviations below the mean." Id.

B. Adult SSI

The Social Security Act defines a disability as the inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment that can be expected to result in death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than twelve months. 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.905. A claimant has a disability when the claimant is "not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists . . . in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country." 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(a)(3)(B).

To determine whether a claimant has a disability within the meaning of the Social Security Act, the Commissioner follows a five-step sequential evaluation process outlined in the regulations. 20 C.F.R. § 416.920; see Barnhart v. Thomas, 540 U.S. 20, 24-25, 124 S. Ct. 376, 379-80 (2003). "If at any step a finding of disability or nondisability can be made, the [Commissioner] will not review the claim further." Thomas, 540 U.S. at 24, 124 S. Ct. at 379; see 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4). The claimant has the burden of production and proof at steps one through four. See Bowen v. Yuckert, 482 U.S. 137, 146 n.5, 107...