WOODHOUSE EX REL. TAYLOR v. Astrue

Decision Date05 February 2010
Docket NumberCivil No. SKG-08-3136.
Citation696 F. Supp.2d 521
PartiesVictoria WOODHOUSE o/b/o Calvin TAYLOR, Jr. v. Michael J. ASTRUE, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Maryland

Paul Rodney Schlitz, Jr., Jenkins Block and Associates P.C., Baltimore, MD, for Victoria Woodhouse on Behalf of Calvin Taylor, Jr.

Allen F. Loucks, Office of the United States Attorney, Baltimore, MD, for Michael Astrue, Commissioner of the Social Security Administration.

MEMORANDUM OPINION

SUSAN K. GAUVEY, United States Magistrate Judge.

Presently pending before this Court are Cross-Motions for Summary Judgment concerning the final decision of the Commissioner of the Social Security Administration ("the Commissioner") to deny plaintiff's claim for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI"), pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). This case has been referred to the undersigned magistrate judge with the consent of the parties pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(c) and Local Rule 301.

This Court must uphold the Commissioner's decision if it is supported by substantial evidence and if proper legal standards were employed. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); Craig v. Chater, 76 F.3d 585, 589 (4th Cir.1996); Blalock v. Richardson, 483 F.2d 773, 774 (4th Cir.1972). A hearing is unnecessary. Local Rule 105.6.

For the reasons that follow, this Court DENIES plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment and GRANTS defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment.

I. Procedural History

Ms. Woodhouse originally filed an application for Supplemental Security Income ("SSI") on behalf of her nine year-old son,1 Calvin Taylor, Jr. (hereafter "Calvin"), on August 9, 2005, alleging that Calvin was disabled as of July 5, 2005. (R. 13, 73). The Social Security Administration ("SSA") denied plaintiff's application initially and upon reconsideration. (R. 13). Thereafter, an Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") heard the matter on April 16, 2008. As presented in a decision dated May 17, 2008, the ALJ concluded that Calvin was not disabled. (R. 13-26). The Appeals Council of the SSA denied review of the ALJ's decision. (R. 5). Therefore, the ALJ's decision is the final reviewable decision of the agency. Sims v. Apfel, 530 U.S. 103, 106-07, 120 S.Ct. 2080, 147 L.Ed.2d 80 (2000). Plaintiff seeks review of this decision by the district court, pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

II. Factual Background

This Court has reviewed defendant's statement of the facts and adopts it in full. (Paper No. 24-1, Def.'s Motion for Summary Judgment, 2-7).2

III. ALJ Findings

Children under age 18 are considered disabled if they have a medically determinable physical or mental impairment or combination of impairments that both causes marked and severe functional limitations and can be expected to cause death or that has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months. 20 C.F.R. § 416.906. In evaluating a child applicant's disability claim, the ALJ must follow a three step sequential analysis. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924.

The first step of this process is determining whether the applicant is participating in substantial gainful activity. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(b). An applicant participating in substantial gainful activity is not eligible for SSI. (Id.). Substantial gainful activity is work activity that is both substantial and the kind of work that is usually done for pay. 20 C.F.R. § 416.972. As one would expect, because Calvin was only twelve years old by the time of the hearing, in this case the ALJ determined Calvin was not engaged in substantial gainful activity. (R. 16). Therefore, at step one, Calvin was still eligible for SSI.

The ALJ then proceeded to step two— an inquiry into whether Calvin met the requirement of having a severe medically determinable impairment(s). 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(c). For an impairment to be severe, an applicant must experience more than minimal functional limitations. (Id.). Calvin took medication to treat his Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder ("ADHD"), doctors recommended further treatment, and a medical consultant opined his ADHD was severe. (R. 16). Therefore, the ALJ determined that Calvin had a severe medically determinable impairment. (Id.).

Because the conditions in step one and two were met, the ALJ proceeded to the third and final step in the claims process— determining whether Calvin had an impairment(s) that medically or functionally equaled the Social Security disability listings. 20 C.F.R. § 416.924(d). As evidenced by the briefs to this Court, the ALJ's findings as to this part of the analysis are the source of contention in this case. As such, a thorough recitation of the ALJ's findings as to this part of the process follows.

A. Medical Equivalence: ADHD

An impairment is medically equivalent to a SSA-recognized impairment if it is at least equal in severity and duration to the criteria of any listed impairment. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(a). In determining whether an impairment medically equals a listing, an ALJ considers all evidence in the case record about the impairment(s) and the effects of those impairment(s) on an applicant. 20 C.F.R. § 416.926(c). In the second step of the three step analysis of the child applicant's disability benefits application, the ALJ found that Calvin had a severe impairment of ADHD. (R. 16). However, the ALJ also found that the manifestation of the severe impairment of ADHD present in Calvin did not medically equal one of the listed impairments. (R. 16-19).

A child's ADHD meets the SSA listing requirements when the child is medically documented to have developmentally inappropriate degrees of inattention, impulsiveness, and hyperactivity." 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P App. 1 § 112.11. For a finding of medical equivalence, the medically documented presence of these characteristics must also lead to a child having marked impairment or difficulties in at least two of four age-appropriate criteria (cognitive and communicative functioning, social functioning, personal functioning, and maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace). 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P App. 1 § 112.11(B); see also 20 C.F.R. § 404 Subpart P App. 1 § 112.02(B)(2) (discussing age-appropriate criteria information). Citing abundant evidence, including a treating doctor's diagnosis of ADHD, the ALJ found that Calvin's developmentally inappropriate degrees of inattention, impulsiveness, and hyperactivity met the first part of the SSA listing for ADHD in children. (R. 18). However, the ALJ proceeded to find that Calvin's ADHD had not markedly impaired his functioning in any of the four age-appropriate categories. (R. 18-19).

First, the ALJ found there was less than a marked impairment in Calvin's cognitive/communicative functioning. (R. 18). The ALJ considered that Dr. Anderson evaluated Calvin as moderately retarded and the fact that Calvin had repeated a grade. (Id.). In contrast, the ALJ also considered a May 2005 behavior evaluation recording that Calvin had no developmental delay or learning disability, his fourth grade report card showing generally satisfactory performance, and several references to two consultative examinations— those of Dr. Hirsch and Dr. Bogoian— reporting Calvin's function as age-appropriate. (Id.). The ALJ decided that "any impairment in age appropriate cognitive/communicative impairment is less than marked." (Id.).

Second, the ALJ similarly concluded that Calvin's social functioning was not markedly impaired. Although the ALJ noted that Dr. Anderson reported Calvin had no friends and viewed himself a "loner," reports by two other consultative examiners indicated that Calvin had friends he got along with. (R. 18-19, 206, 225, 240). The ALJ also cited Calvin's own testimony at the hearing about having friends and his report card showing a "satisfactory minus" grade in following rules as well as in working well independently and with others. (R. 19, 113, 253). The ALJ therefore decided that the record showed "less than marked" impairment in Calvin's social functioning. (Id.).

Third, the ALJ found that any impairment in Calvin's personal functioning was "less than marked." (R. 19). The ALJ again considered Dr. Anderson's report, referencing in particular her note that Calvin's mother reported that he was a "terrible behavior problem." (R. 19, 237). However, the ALJ further noted Dr. Anderson reported no impairment in Calvin's daily living activities. (Id.). The ALJ also considered, and found more persuasive, the fact that neither Dr. Hirsch nor Dr. Bogoian found any impairment in Calvin's personal functioning coupled with Calvin's testimony at the hearing that he did chores when he came home from school. (R. 19, 205-09, 223-28, 251). Thus, the ALJ concluded that Calvin's personal functioning was not markedly impaired. (R. 19).

Finally, the ALJ analyzed Calvin's difficulties in maintaining concentration, persistence, or pace, and found no marked impairment. (R. 19). As evidence that Calvin might have marked difficulties, the ALJ weighed a school report card that showed Calvin had to be reminded to stay on task, the conclusions of the SSA in a January 2006 decision that found Calvin was markedly impaired in his ability to attend to and complete tasks, and Dr. Anderson's note that Calvin at times forgot what he was doing when she was testing him. (R. 19, 114, 213, 238). Contrary to that evidence, the ALJ also observed that Calvin did not have unsatisfactory grades despite his reported trouble staying on task, that Dr. Hirsch reported Calvin was able to understand age-appropriate instructions, and that the SSA in August 2006 found no impairment in Calvin's ability to attend to and complete tasks. (R. 19, 113, 208, 232). Furthermore, the ALJ mentioned Dr. Bogoian's report finding Calvin was able to concentrate and able to understand, remember, and carry out simple instructions though he might have slight to moderate difficulty with detailed instructions. (R. 19, 227-28). Accordingly,...

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