Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp.

• Decision Date: 27 August 1984
• Docket Number: Docket No. 67917
• Citation: 353 N.W.2d 469,419 Mich. 356
• Parties: , 104 Lab.Cas. P 55,553 Kevin L. CLIFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CACTUS DRILLING CORPORATION, a foreign corporation, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: Michigan Supreme Court

Page 469

353 N.W.2d 469

419 Mich. 356, 104 Lab.Cas. P 55,553

Kevin L. CLIFFORD, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. CACTUS DRILLING CORPORATION, a foreign corporation Defendant-Appellant.

Docket No. 67917.

Supreme Court of Michigan.

Argued Dec. 6, 1983.

Decided Aug. 27, 1984.

Shanahan & Scheid, by Clark Shanahan, Owosso, for plaintiff-appellee.

Cholette, Perkins & Buchanan, by Edward D. Wells, Grand Rapids, for defendant-appellant Cactus Drilling Corp.

Clark, Klein & Beaumont, by Dwight H. Vincent, John F. Burns, Fred W. Batten, Detroit, for Michigan Mfrs. Ass'n, amicus curiae.

KAVANAGH, Justice.

The issue in this case is whether plaintiff-employee's allegation that he was discharged as a result of an absence from work because of a work-related injury constitutes a cause of action as a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.

We hold that plaintiff has not pleaded a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine and we reverse the judgment of the majority of the Court of Appeals, Clifford v. Cactus Drilling Corp., 109 Mich.App. 776, 312 N.W.2d 380 (1981), and reinstate the trial court's order of summary judgment in favor of defendant. Accordingly, it is unnecessary to address the question whether this action is barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. Sec. 418.131; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(131).

The facts of this case are adequately stated in the dissenting opinion of Judge R.B. Burns in the Court of Appeals:

"Plaintiff alleged that defendant fired him for missing work. Plaintiff further alleged that defendant had no right to so fire him since his absence from work was due to a disability arising from a work-related injury for which he had received workers' compensation benefits.

"The record reveals that plaintiff was injured on the job on December 20, 1977. He received workers' compensation benefits for a period of five weeks. He returned to work, but a recurrence of the pain caused by the injury forced him to call in sick on February 14, 1978. He was fired the next day. Plaintiff commenced suit, and defendant moved for summary judgment on the ground that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. The motion was granted by the trial court."

The employment-at-will doctrine was recently restated by this Court in Suchodolski v. Michigan Consolidated Gas Co., 412 Mich. 692, 694-695, 316 N.W.2d 710 (1982): "In general, in the absence of a contractual basis for holding otherwise, either party to an employment contract for an indefinite term may terminate it at any time for any, or no, reason". The Court went on to explain that exceptions have been engrafted onto the rule on the basis of "the principle that some grounds for discharging an employee are so contrary to public policy as to be actionable". One such exception was established by the Court of Appeals in Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976). In Sventko, the plaintiff alleged that she was discharged solely in retaliation for her filing of a workers' compensation claim. The Court held that a retaliatory discharge for the filing of a workers' compensation claim is in contravention of public policy and as such constitutes an exception to the employment-at-will doctrine.

We cannot agree, however, that an employee's protection from discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim necessarily includes protection from discharge because of an absence from work because of a work-related injury.

Certainly an employer's power to discharge an employee at will should not prevail when that power is exercised to prevent an employee from asserting his statutory rights under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. The case before us presented no evidence or reason to infer that plaintiff's statutorily conferred right to claim workers' disability compensation benefits was chilled in any way. Plaintiff made no claim that he was deprived of his legal rights under the Worker's Disability Compensation Act. Plaintiff did not allege that he was discharged in retaliation for filing a claim for compensation. Plaintiff alleged that he was fired because he missed work because of a work-related injury for which he had already received workers' disability compensation benefits. Plaintiff has stated that he has no further claim.

Reversed.

CAVANAGH, BRICKLEY, RYAN, BOYLE and LEVIN, JJ., concur.

WILLIAMS, Chief Justice.

The issue presented in this case is whether an employee who alleges that his employment has been terminated for absence due to a work-related injury has sufficiently pleaded a cause of action to withstand a motion for summary judgment. We hold that plaintiff has pleaded a public policy exception to the employment-at-will doctrine. Additionally, we hold that this action is not barred by the exclusive remedy provision of the Worker's Disability Compensation Act, M.C.L. Sec. 418.131; M.S.A. Sec. 17.237(131).

I

Plaintiff, employed by defendant as a floor hand, was injured at work in December, 1977. Defendant paid workers' compensation benefits for a period of five weeks. Plaintiff subsequently returned to work for four days. However, because of an alleged recurrence of pain caused by the work-related injury, plaintiff called in sick on February 14, 1978. He was fired the next day. The parties agree that plaintiff was an "at will" employee.

Plaintiff commenced suit, alleging in pertinent part:

"5. * * * Defendant fired plaintiff for missing work.

"6. * * * Plaintiff missed work because of a work-related injury.

"7. While plaintiff's work tenure was otherwise at the discretion of defendant, the latter had no right to fire plaintiff solely for his work absence due to disability arising out of a work-related injury."

Defendant's answer raised the affirmative defense that plaintiff had failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. ¹ GCR 1963, 117.2(1). Plaintiff moved to strike the affirmative defense, citing Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976). The trial court distinguished Sventko from the present case on the facts and granted defendant's subsequent motion for summary judgment.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed, with one member dissenting. 109 Mich.App. 776, 312 N.W.2d 380 (1981). The Court of Appeals majority stated that an employee's protection from discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim necessarily included protection from termination because of an absence due to a work-related injury. The court reasoned that the contrary result "would have a chilling effect on the filing of such claims. Public policy, therefore, dictates the opposite result". 109 Mich.App. 777-778, 312 N.W.2d 380.

Defendant disagrees that there has been any violation of public policy. Defendant argues that plaintiff, who has received his full entitlement to workers' compensation benefits, never alleged that his termination was in retaliation for seeking those benefits. Defendant contends that plaintiff has failed to plead a public policy exception to the employment-at-will rule and, therefore, the Court of Appeals erred in holding that plaintiff set forth a cause of action.

This Court granted leave to appeal. 417 Mich. 1038 (1983).

II

Generally, a contract for permanent employment, or for an indefinite term, may be terminated for any or for no reason. As this Court stated in Lynas v. Maxwell Farms, 279 Mich. 684, 687, 273 N.W. 315 (1937):

"In general it may be said that in the absence of distinguishing features or provisions or a consideration in addition to the services to be rendered, such contracts [for permanent employment or for life] are indefinite hirings, terminable at the will of either party."

See also Toussaint v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 408 Mich. 579, 292 N.W.2d 880 (1980).

This common-law characterization of the employment relationship as "at will" evolved from the judiciary's unwillingness to interfere with parties' "freedom" to contract and a belief in the equality of bargaining power between employer and employee. Blades, Employment at Will vs Individual Freedom: On Limiting the Abusive Exercise of Employer Power, 67 Colum L Rev 1404, 1417 (1967). Although many workers are now protected from arbitrary discharge by collective bargaining agreements and civil service regulations which provide that employment may be terminated only for "just cause", the majority of the American work force operates under an employment "at will" relationship. Note, Protecting At-Will Employees Against Wrongful Discharge: The Duty to Terminate Only in Good Faith, 93 Harv L Rev 1816 (1980).

Many legislatures and courts, however, have tempered the harshness of the "at will" relationship by developing public policy exceptions to the doctrine. Where legislatures and courts have identified specific grounds for termination as being repugnant to a clearly expressed public policy, the employer's absolute freedom to terminate the employment is circumscribed pro tanto. See Anno, 12 A.L.R. 4th 544, 548.

In Michigan several public policy exceptions have been engrafted onto the "at will" doctrine. Most often, the public policy articulation appears in an explicit legislative provision granting employees protection from discharge. For example, an employee may not be discharged on the basis of religion, race, color, national origin or sex, M.C.L. Sec. 37.2701; M.S.A. Sec. 3.548(701), because of a physical handicap, M.C.L. Sec. 37.1602; M.S.A. Sec. 3.550(602), or in retaliation for filing a complaint under the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Act, M.C.L. Sec. 408.1065; M.S.A. Sec. 17.50(65). In these specific instances the policy of ensuring employee job security against an improperly motivated discharge curtails the employer's prerogative to terminate employment.

Additionally, the courts have shown some willingness to recognize a public policy exception...