Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corp.
| Decision Date | 12 December 1991 |
| Docket Number | 58027-8,No. 57766-8,57766-8 |
| Citation | 821 P.2d 18,118 Wn.2d 46 |
| Parties | , 7 IER Cases 29 . WILMOT; Sue Carpenter; R. Ishitani; K. Krough; D. Howell; G. King; Arnold Ulloa; Tim Corwin; Jim Pichette; Patrick M. Marshall; D. Lake; M. LeBrette; Bess Wright; R. Brown; Jim Straub; L. Thon; A. Udris; D. Hart; Robert C. Mood; Lauren Kerr; Lavina McGlenn; Todd Losh, Plaintiffs, v. KAISER ALUMINUM AND CHEMICAL CORPORATION, Defendant. Michael R. MORAN, Petitioner, v. WASHINGTON FRUIT AND PRODUCE, a Washington Corporation, Respondent. Supreme Court of Washington, En Banc |
| Court | Washington Supreme Court |
Barry E. Ryan, Spokane, for plaintiffs.
Abeyta & Nelson, P.S., Rodney K. Nelson, Yakima, for petitioner.
Winston & Cashatt, Michael F. Nienstedt, Stephen L. Farnell, Spokane, for defendant.
Lofland & Associates, Ryan M. Edgley, Yakima, for respondent.
In these consolidated cases, the primary question is whether an employee who alleges that he or she was wrongfully discharged in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim has a cause of action independent from that set out in RCW 51.48.025(2). We hold that plaintiffs may assert a wrongful discharge tort claim independently of RCW 51.48.025(2). We reverse the Court of Appeals' holding to the contrary in Moran v. Washington Fruit & Produce, 60 Wash.App. 548, 804 P.2d 1287, review granted, 116 Wash.2d 1023, 810 P.2d 1358 (1991), and answer questions certified by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington.
In Wilmot v. Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp., Cause 57766-8, the case in which the federal court certified four questions, 22 former employees of Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation brought suit in Spokane County Superior Court asserting claims for, among other things, wrongful discharge in violation of public policy and the tort of outrage. They sought a declaratory judgment as to whether a common law wrongful discharge claim could be maintained in light of RCW 51.48.025(2). The case was removed to federal court.
According to allegations in plaintiffs' complaint: all of the plaintiffs were probationary employees of Kaiser who were terminable at will. Each plaintiff was injured on the job, and each either missed work as a result of the injury or continued to work with the injury because of a company policy that employees who missed work would be terminated. Each plaintiff filed a claim for workers' compensation benefits, and all contend they were discharged in violation of public policy established by RCW 51.48.025, which prohibits an employer from discharging or discriminating against employees who file or communicate to the employer an intention to file a workers' compensation claim. None of the plaintiffs filed complaints concerning alleged retaliatory discharges with the Department of Labor and Industries as provided for in the statute.
Kaiser moved to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. Kaiser contends that RCW 51.48.025 provides an exclusive remedy for alleged retaliatory discharges in violation of the statute, and that the 90-day limitation for filing a complaint under the statute bars plaintiffs from maintaining this suit. A ruling on Kaiser's motion in federal court has been reserved pending the results of this court's resolution of the four certified questions.
In Moran v. Washington Fruit & Produce, 116 Wash.2d 1023, 810 P.2d 1358 Michael R. Moran filed suit against his former employer, Washington Fruit and Produce, asserting a wrongful discharge claim and alleging that he was terminated from his job because he filed a workers' compensation claim. Like the plaintiffs in the Wilmot case, Moran based his claim on the public policy exception to the employment at will doctrine. Also like those plaintiffs, Moran did not file a complaint with the Department of Labor and Industries under RCW 51.48.025(2), but instead asserted an independent tort claim for wrongful discharge.
Washington Fruit moved for summary judgment, maintaining in part that no claim had been filed pursuant to RCW 51.48.025(2) and that Moran had no cause of action for wrongful discharge independent of the statute. The trial court at first denied the motion, concluding that the filing provision in the statute was permissive, not mandatory. On reconsideration, the trial court granted summary judgment in favor of Washington Produce, relying on Jones v. Industrial Electric-Seattle, Inc., 53 Wash.App. 536, 768 P.2d 520 (1989) (). Because it dismissed the case based on the legal conclusion that the statute was mandatory and exclusive, the court did not reach the parties' dispute about whether Moran was discharged by his employer or whether he voluntarily quit his job. Moran appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed. Moran's petition for review was granted.
To aid the federal court, we organize our analysis in the two cases in accord with the certified questions.
The first, and primary, question certified by the federal court in Wilmot's case is: "Does a common law cause of action exist, for discharge of an employee in violation of public policy, in addition to that provided by RCW 51.48.025, where an employee is discharged by reason of having filed, or having expressed an intent to file, a workmen's compensation claim?"
Plaintiffs in both cases maintain that they are entitled to maintain tort actions for wrongful discharge independently of the provisions of RCW 51.48.025(2). Defendant employers in both cases maintain that the statute provides the exclusive remedies for a claim of retaliatory discharge when it is alleged that an employee was discharged for having filed or communicated to the employer an intent to file a workers' compensation claim.
We hold that RCW 51.48.025 is not mandatory and exclusive; a worker may file a tort claim for wrongful discharge based upon allegations that the employer discharged the worker in retaliation for having filed or expressed an intent to file a workers' compensation claim, independent of the statute.
In Thompson v. St. Regis Paper Co., 102 Wash.2d 219, 232, 685 P.2d 1081 (1984), this court recognized "a cause of action in tort for wrongful discharge if the discharge of the employee contravenes a clear mandate of public policy." The exception is a narrow one. Thompson, at 232, 685 P.2d 1081; Grimwood v. University of Puget Sound, Inc., 110 Wash.2d 355, 367, 753 P.2d 517 (1988). We have noted that courts have found contravention of clear mandates of public policy "where the termination resulted because the employee exercised a legal right or privilege...." Dicomes v. State, 113 Wash.2d 612, 618, 782 P.2d 1002 (1989) ().
Even without RCW 51.48.025, we would acknowledge existence of a clear mandate of public policy against retaliatory discharge of employees for pursuing workers' compensation benefits and allow a tort cause of action for wrongful discharge, as have a number of other jurisdictions. E.g., Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., supra; Frampton v. Central Ind. Gas Co., 260 Ind. 249, 297 N.E.2d 425 (1973); Sventko v. Kroger Co., 69 Mich.App. 644, 245 N.W.2d 151 (1976); Krein v. Marian Manor Nursing Home, 415 N.W.2d 793 (N.D.1987); see generally Annot., Recovery for Discharge From Employment in Retaliation for Filing Workers' Compensation Claim, 32 A.L.R.4th 1221, § 4[a] (1984 & Supp.1990). As we noted in Thompson, 102 Wash.2d at 232, 685 P.2d 1081, public policy may be judicially recognized, and "[o]ne of the clearest public policy exceptions to the employment-at-will doctrine is the discharge in retaliation for filing a workers' compensation claim." (Footnote omitted.) 1 L. Larson, Unjust Dismissal § 6.05, at 6-41 (1988).
In enacting RCW 51.48.025, the Legislature expressly set out the clear mandate of public policy giving rise to the exception to the employment at will doctrine. We must decide whether that public policy supports an independent tort action even though the statute sets out a remedy for violation of the statute. We have referred to this type of question twice before, that is, "whether a cause of action exists for wrongful discharge in violation of public policy when the declaration of public policy is declared in a statute already providing a remedy." Grimwood, 110 Wash.2d at 367, 753 P.2d 517; Bennett v. Hardy, 113 Wash.2d 912, 925, 784 P.2d 1258 (1990).
As is evident from our examination of this question in this case, there is no automatic yes or no answer applicable to all cases where the statute setting forth public policy also contains a remedy. Instead, the answer depends upon the particular statute's language and provisions, and may, under appropriate circumstances, depend in part upon other manifestations of legislative intent.
RCW 51.48.025 provides:
(1) No employer may discharge or in any manner discriminate against any employee because such employee has filed or communicated to the employer an intent to file a claim for compensation or exercises any rights provided under this title. However, nothing in this section prevents an employer from taking any action against a worker for other reasons including, but not limited to, the worker's failure to observe health or safety standards adopted by the employer, or the frequency or nature of the worker's job-related accidents.
(2) Any employee who believes that he or she has been discharged or otherwise discriminated against by an employer in violation of this section may file a complaint with the director alleging discrimination within ninety days of the date of the alleged violation. Upon receipt of ...
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