Clifton v. Bell

• Decision Date: 22 July 2011
• Docket Number: Civil No. 2:10-CV-14264
• Parties: SCOTT MICHAEL CLIFTON, Petitioner, v. THOMAS BELL, Respondent.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Michigan

SCOTT MICHAEL CLIFTON, Petitioner, v. THOMAS BELL, Respondent.

Civil No. 2:10-CV-14264

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN SOUTHERN DIVISION

Dated: July 22, 2011

HONORABLE VICTORIA A. ROBERTS

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

OPINION AND ORDER DENYING THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS

CORPUS, DECLINING TO ISSUE A CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY,

AND GRANTING PETITIONER LEAVE TO APPEAL IN FORMA PAUPERIS

Scott Michael Clifton, ("Petitioner"), confined at the Gus Harrison Correctional Facility in Adrian, Michigan, filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C.§ 2254. In his pro se habeas petition, Petitioner challenges his conviction and sentence for two counts of armed robbery, M.C.L.A. 750.529; one count of first-degree home invasion, M.C.L.A. 750.110a(2); and being a fourth felony habitual offender, M.C.L.A. 769.12.

The petition for writ of habeas corpus is DENIED.

I. Background

Petitioner pleaded guilty to the above charges in the Oakland County Circuit Court, based upon a sentence agreement made with the trial court judge pursuant to People v. Cobbs, 443 Mich. 276; 505 N.W. 2d 208 (1993), in which the judge agreed to sentence Petitioner to fourteen and one-half to twenty five years in prison, in exchangefor Petitioner's plea of guilty to the charges. (Tr. 8/6/2007, p. 3, 6). The prosecutor also agreed to dismiss an assault and battery charge against Petitioner. (Id. at p. 4). Prior to accepting Petitioner's plea, the trial judge advised Petitioner of the maximum penalties for the charges that he was pleading guilty to, as well as the rights to a trial that he would be waiving by pleading guilty. (Id. at pp. 6-8). In response to the trial judge's question, Petitioner acknowledged that by pleading guilty, he could not later come back to court and claim that his plea was the result of any promises or threats or that it was not his own choice to plead guilty. (Id. at pp. 8-9). In response to further questions from the judge, Petitioner denied that anyone had threatened him to get him to plead guilty and acknowledged that it was his own choice to plead guilty. (Id. at p. 9). In establishing the factual basis for the plea, Petitioner indicated that he broke and entered a home in Keego Harbor, Michigan while armed with a knife. Petitioner indicated that it was his intent to steal drugs from the house. Petitioner further indicated that he used the knife to put the two victims in fear so that he could steal the drugs, as well as a telephone from one of the victims. (Id. at pp. 11-13).

On September 4, 2007, Petitioner was sentenced to concurrent sentences of fourteen and one-half to twenty five years in prison on the three charges. (Tr. 9/4/2007, p. 4).

Petitioner filed a delayed application for leave to appeal in the Michigan Court of Appeals, through counsel, in which he raised the following claims.

I. Petitioner is entitled to resentencing because the trial court improperlyscored Offense Variable 13.

II. The trial court erred when it used improper evidence in determining Petitioner's sentence in violation of the law set forth in Blakely v. Washington.

Petitioner's conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. People v. Clifton, No. 283264 (Mich. Ct. App. March 4, 2008)); lv. den. 482 Mich. 896; 753 N.W.2d 174 (2008).

Petitioner then filed a post-conviction motion for relief from judgment pursuant to M.C.R. 6.500, et. Seq, in which he raised the following claims:

I. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel when his trial counsel failed to present a meaningful defense, failed to communicate the nature of the crime charged, and coerced him into entering a guilty plea, thereby making the plea unknowing and involuntary.

II. Petitioner was denied due process because his plea was ultimately illusory.

III. The prosecutor and trial court abused their discretion by charging Petitioner with different crimes than those to which he pleaded guilty.

IV. Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of counsel on appeal when his appellate counsel failed to raise meritorious issues on appeal.

The trial court denied the motion for relief from judgment. People v. Clifton, No. 07-213507-FC (Oakland County Circuit Court, September 15, 2009). The Michigan appellate courts denied Petitioner leave to appeal. People v. Clifton, No. 294818 (Mich. Ct. App; February 23, 2010); lv. den. 487 Mich. 854, 785 N.W.2d 155 (2010). ¹

Petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus on the following grounds: (i) the trial court improperly scored Offense Variable 13 of the Michigan Sentencing Guidelines; (ii) the trial court at sentencing used factors that had not been submitted to a jury and proven beyond a reasonable doubt or admitted to by Petitioner; (iii) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of trial counsel; (iv) Petitioner's guilty plea should have been set aside because it was coerced; (v) the prosecutor erred in charging Petitioner with armed robbery, in light of the fact that Petitioner did not admit to taking money from the victims; and (vi) Petitioner was denied the effective assistance of appellate counsel.

II. Standard of Review

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), as amended by The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), imposes the following standard of review for habeas cases:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim-

(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or

(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

A decision of a state court is "contrary to" clearly established federal law if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by the Supreme Court on aquestion of law or if the state court decides a case differently than the Supreme Court has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts. Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 405-06 (2000). An "unreasonable application" occurs when "a state court decision unreasonably applies the law of [the Supreme Court] to the facts of a prisoner's case." Id. at 409. A federal habeas court may not "issue the writ simply because that court concludes in its independent judgment that the relevant state-court decision applied clearly established federal law erroneously or incorrectly." Id. at 410-11.

The Supreme Court explained that "[A] federal court's collateral review of a state-court decision must be consistent with the respect due state courts in our federal system." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 340 (2003). The "AEDPA thus imposes a 'highly deferential standard for evaluating state-court rulings,'and 'demands that state-court decisions be given the benefit of the doubt.'" Renico v. Lett, 130 S.Ct. 1855, 1862 (2010)((quoting Lindh v. Murphy, 521 U.S. 320, 333, n. 7 (1997); Woodford v. Viscotti, 537 U.S. 19, 24 (2002) (per curiam)). "[A] state court's determination that a claim lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as 'fairminded jurists could disagree' on the correctness of the state court's decision." Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct.770, 786 (2011). The Supreme Court emphasized "that even a strong case for relief does not mean the state court's contrary conclusion was unreasonable." Id. (citing Lockyer v. Andrade, 538 U.S. 63, 75 (2003). Furthermore, pursuant to § 2254(d), "a habeas court must determine what arguments or theories supported or...could have supported, the state court's decision; and then it must ask whether it is possiblefairminded jurists could disagree that those arguments or theories are inconsistent with the holding in a prior decision" of the Supreme Court. Id.

III. Discussion

A. The procedural default issue.

Respondent contends that Petitioner's third through sixth claims are procedurally defaulted, because he raised them for the first time in his post-conviction motion for relief from judgment and failed to show cause for failing to raise these issues in his direct appeal, as well as prejudice, as required by M.C.R. 6.508(D)(3).

Petitioner claims that his appellate counsel was ineffective for failing to raise his claims in his direct appeal.

Procedural default is not a jurisdictional bar to review of a habeas petition the merits. See Trest v. Cain, 522 U.S. 87, 89 (1997). In addition, "[F]ederal courts are not required to address a procedural-default issue before deciding against the petitioner on the merits." Hudson v. Jones, 351 F. 3d 212, 215 (6th Cir. 2003)(citing Lambrix v. Singletary, 520 U.S. 518, 525 (1997)). "Judicial economy might counsel giving the [other] question priority, for example, if it were easily resolvable against the habeas petitioner, whereas the procedural-bar issue involved complicated issues of state law." Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 525. Because "the procedural default issue raises more questions than the case on the merits", this Court will assume, for the sake of resolving the claims, that there is no procedural default by Petitioner and will decide the merits of the claims. See Falkiewicz v. Grayson, 271 F. Supp. 2d 942, 948 (E.D. Mich. 2003)(internalquotation omitted).

B. The guilty plea claims.

Many of the claims raised by Petitioner overlap or are interrelated. For the sake of judicial clarity, the Court addresses the various issues raised by Petitioner in the chronological order they took place in the state courts, rather than in the order that they were presented in his habeas application.

Petitioner first contends throughout his various claims that his guilty plea is invalid.

A plea of guilty must be knowingly and voluntarily made. The defendant must be aware of the "relevant circumstances and...