Cline v. DaimlerChrysler Co., Corp.

• Decision Date: 04 March 2005
• Docket Number: No. 99,581.,99,581.
• Citation: 114 P.3d 468,2005 OK CIV APP 31
• Parties: Perry CLINE, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER COMPANY, CORP., Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C., Defendant.
• Court: United States State Court of Criminal Appeals of Oklahoma. Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma

114 P.3d 468

2005 OK CIV APP 31

Perry CLINE, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, v. DAIMLERCHRYSLER COMPANY, CORP., Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, and Chrysler Financial Company, L.L.C., Defendant.

No. 99,581.

Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 3.

March 4, 2005.

Certiorari Denied May 9, 2005.

Justin Lamunyon, Lamunyon Law Firm, Enid, OK, for Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee.

Michael C. Felty, Blake D. Beeler, Foliart, Huff, Ottaway & Bottom Oklahoma City, OK, for Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant.

Released for Publication by Order of the Court of Civil Appeals of Oklahoma, Division No. 3. Opinion by CAROL M. HANSEN, Judge:

¶ 1 This case involves an action by Perry Cline against the manufacturer of his pickup truck for denying warranty coverage for engine damage the manufacturer maintained was caused by owner misuse. Cline obtained relief on one of his two claims at trial. The trial court denied Cline's request for attorneys' fees. Both parties appeal. We affirm in part, reverse in part and remand with instructions.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

¶ 2 In June 1998, Cline, Plaintiff/Appellant/Cross-Appellee, purchased a 1998 Dodge 3500 pickup from a Dodge dealership in Henryetta, Oklahoma. The truck came with a 60 month/100,000 mile express limited warranty on the Cummins diesel engine components. Defendant/Appellee/Cross-Appellant, DaimlerChrysler Motors Corporation, manufactured the truck. The engine was under warranty at all times relevant to this case.

¶ 3 In November 1999, the truck's engine began making a strange noise. Plaintiff took the truck to an authorized repair facility in Colorado the next day for diagnosis and repair. Mechanics inspected the engine and determined the noise was caused by engine connecting rod and piston wear, and "scoring" of the cylinder walls. DaimlerChrysler authorized replacement of the engine's short block, repairs were made and the truck was returned to Plaintiff.

¶ 4 A few days later, Plaintiff claims he experienced several other problems with the truck. According to Plaintiff, the Colorado dealership corrected some of the problems but did not correct others. DaimlerChrysler presented evidence the truck was returned due to a fuel gel problem which was remedied. Because Plaintiff apparently voiced his dissatisfaction with the timeliness and accuracy of the repairs performed during both visits, the Colorado dealership service manager advised Plaintiff "he should try to find another dealer that he could take his truck to."

¶ 5 Plaintiff continued to drive his truck from December 1999 through late March 2000, although he testified the truck did not run as well as it did before the problems arose. Specifically, Plaintiff contended the truck suffered from a "loss of power," would barely pull a trailer and could drive only 20 to 35 miles per hour. Notwithstanding, service records indicate Plaintiff drove the vehicle approximately 6,000 miles during that three month span. On March 25, 2000, Plaintiff inquired about trading in his truck at Johnson's of Kingfisher (Oklahoma), a Dodge dealership. The record reveals Plaintiff had driven his truck nearly 70,000 miles by that time. Johnson's sales log sheet indicates Plaintiff did not trade in his truck, having "bolted, upset at figures." Plaintiff did not speak with anyone in the service department that day about any problems with his truck.

¶ 6 Within days of visiting Johnson's, Plaintiff's truck died on a sandy rural Oklahoma road. When efforts to restart the truck failed, Plaintiff and a friend tried unsuccessfully to pull-start the truck. Plaintiff then loaded the truck onto a trailer and hauled it back to Johnson's. The mechanics at Johnson's were advised that Plaintiff had attempted to pull-start the truck. After conducting diagnostic checks and discovering the truck was subject to an outstanding recall notice, the mechanics received authority from DaimlerChrysler to replace the truck's fuel injection pump and engine control module. When those repairs failed to correct the problem, Johnson's was given permission to disassemble and inspect the engine.

¶ 7 A Johnson's mechanic testified he discovered the truck's pistons had come into contact with the valves, causing severe damage to the engine. He also stated the truck's engine control module indicated the engine RPMs had exceeded the red line by about 1,100 RPMs. Johnson's service manager relayed this information to DaimlerChrysler, along with his opinion the engine sustained such "overspeed" damage when Plaintiff attempted to pull-start the truck. DaimlerChrysler's service district manager also inspected the truck. The district manager then made the decision not to authorize warranty repairs on the engine, reasoning the damage was not the result of a warranted defect in materials or workmanship but was caused by Plaintiff's attempt to pull-start the truck. The truck warranty states DaimlerChrysler is not responsible for failure or damage resulting in what the company determines to be abuse or neglect, including overspeeding, over fueling or improper starting practices.

¶ 8 Plaintiff thereafter brought the instant action against DaimlerChrysler, claiming the company's decision not to replace the engine under warranty violated the Magnuson-Moss Warranty—Federal Trade Commission Improvement Act (Magnuson-Moss Act), 15 U.S.C. § 2301 et seq., and the Oklahoma Consumer Protection Act (OCPA), 15 O.S. 2001 § 751 et seq.¹ DaimlerChrysler moved for a directed verdict on both of Plaintiff's claims at trial. At the close of all evidence, the trial court directed a verdict for DaimlerChrysler on Plaintiff's OCPA claim and submitted the Magnuson-Moss claim to the jury. The jury returned a verdict in Plaintiff's favor and awarded him $30,000.00. The trial court entered judgment accordingly. Plaintiff then moved for attorney fees, which the trial court denied because it was unable to determine which fees were attributable to the Magnuson-Moss claim against DaimlerChrysler and which were attributable to other claims and defendants. Both parties now appeal.

II. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIMS ON APPEAL

A. OCPA Claim

¶ 9 As his first proposition of error, Plaintiff contends the trial court erred in refusing to submit his OCPA claim to the jury. A motion for directed verdict presents "the question of whether there is any evidence to support a judgment for the party against whom the motion is made." Woods v. Fruehauf Trailer Corp., 1988 OK 105, ¶ 8, 765 P.2d 770, 773. In ruling on such a motion, a trial court must consider as true all the evidence and all the inferences reasonably drawn therefrom that are favorable to the party opposing the motion. Id. "[A]ny conflicting evidence favorable to the movant must be disregarded." Id.

[A] motion for a directed verdict should be denied when there is a controverted question of fact as to which reasonable minds could differ. The motion should be granted, however, if the party opposing the motion has failed to demonstrate a prima facie case for recovery.

Guthrie v. Independent School Dist. No. I-30 of Adair County, 1998 OK CIV APP 47, ¶ 10, 958 P.2d 802, 804 (citations omitted). This Court's standard of review of a trial court's grant of a directed verdict is de novo. Computer Publications, Inc. v. Welton, 2002 OK 50, ¶ 6, 49 P.3d 732, 735.

¶ 10 In order to establish a prima facie case under the OCPA, Plaintiff was required to show inter alia "that the defendant engaged in an unlawful practice as defined at 15 O.S. (1991), § 753." Patterson v. Beall, 2000 OK 92, ¶ 30, 19 P.3d 839, 846. Plaintiff lists six acts or policies of DaimlerChrysler, detailed below, that he argues constituted unlawful practices under the OCPA. DaimlerChrysler counters none of those fit the definition of an unfair or deceptive trade practice, or any of the other unlawful practices enumerated in the Act.

¶ 11 Plaintiff first contends DaimlerChrysler's failure to "liv[e] up to the promise" of the warranty violates the OCPA. The very essence of this cause of action was whether DaimlerChrysler justifiably denied warranty repairs on Plaintiff's truck. As previously stated, the warranty did not cover engine overspeeding or improper starting practices. Plaintiff and his expert witness agreed the engine suffered from an overspeed and Plaintiff admitted he tried to pull-start the truck. Under these circumstances, we conclude that denying a warranty claim for the replacement of the engine did not, standing alone, constitute a violation of the OCPA. As DaimlerChrysler correctly asserts, there is no Oklahoma case law suggesting denial of a warranty claim or merely defending against a disputed claim is actionable under the OCPA.

¶ 12 Plaintiff next argues DaimlerChrysler violated the OCPA because its excuse for denying warranty coverage — that the damage was caused by the pull-start attempt — is not supported by its own expert. This argument is factually inaccurate. Although one of DaimlerChrysler's experts testified the overspeed damage was inconsistent with a pull-start attempt on a sandy road, its other expert opined the damage was caused by Plaintiff's pull-start attempt. The later opinion constitutes competent evidence upon which DaimlerChrysler could reasonably rely in defending its warranty denial. See OKC Refining Co., Inc. v. Gold, 1985 OK 42, ¶ 12, 701 P.2d 1034, 1038 (competent evidence is evidence which is relevant and material to the issue to be determined).

¶ 13 The record reveals that at some point after Plaintiff's truck was repossessed, DaimlerChrysler authorized dismantling and, eventually, replacing the engine in order to increase the truck's auction value. As his third sub-proposition of error, Plaintiff claims DaimlerChrysler violated the OCPA by "secretly dismantling" the key piece of evidence in this case so as to destroy its evidentiary value.

¶ 14 First, insofar as this argument attempts to raise spoliation as an issue on appeal, we note...