Cline v. Martin Et Al., 15162

• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Ohio
• Citation: 115 N.E. 27,94 Ohio St. 420
• Docket Number: 15162
• Parties: Cline v. Martin Et Al.
• Decision Date: 01 July 1916

115 N.E. 27

94 Ohio St. 420

Cline
v.
Martin Et Al.

15162

Supreme Court of Ohio

July 1, 1916

Schools - County districts distinct - From political subdivisions -Although territorial limits coextensive - Members of board not county officers - Section 1, Article X, Constitution - Section 4120, General Code (104 O. L., 136), constitutional -Section 26, Article II, and Section 3, Article VI, Constitution.

1. A county school district as defined by Section 4684, General Code (104 O. L., 133), is distinct from a county political subdivision of the state and is not necessarily coextensive with the territorial limits of a county, hut may contain within its limits territory of another county and exclude territory in the same county in which the larger part of its territory is situated.

2. The fact that in some instances the territorial limits of a county and a county school district may he the same, does not destroy the separate identity of the latter.

3. The members of a board of education of a county school district are not county officers within the meaning of Section 1 of Article X of the Constitution of Ohio.

4. Section 4729, General code (104 O. L., 136), is not in violation of Section 1 of Article X or Section 26 of Article II of the Constitution of Ohio, hut is a valid constitutional act of the general assembly under the authority conferred upon it by Section 3 of Article VI of the constitution of Ohio.

[94 Ohio St. 421] On the 3d day of December, 1914, the county board of education of Holmes county adopted a resolution annexing to the Nashville village school district, for school purposes, adjoining territory, comprising four subdistricts.

Thereafter the defendants in error, other than William F. crow, were appointed by the county commissioners of Holmes county as members of the board of education of the Nashville village school district, and as such board of education, on the 6th day of January, 1915, passed a resolution authorizing the submission to the electors of the proposition to issue bonds in the sum of $18,000, for the purpose of constructing a school building within such district.

On the 17th day of February, 1915, the plaintiff in error filed his petition in the common pleas court of Holmes county against the defendants in error to enjoin them from issuing and selling said bonds, from erecting a school building, and front compelling the pupils residing in the territory constituting the four subdistricts to attend the Nashville village school.

The plaintiff in his petition avers that he is an elector and taxpayer residing in Knox township, Holmes county, Ohio, in the territory described in the resolution adopted by the county board of education of Holmes county, Ohio, and that he brings the action on behalf of himself and other taxpayers similarly situated.

[94 Ohio St. 422] The petition further recites the adoption of the resolution by the county board of education on the 3d day of December, 1914, and avers that said county board of education is wholly without authority to change school district lines, or to transfer territory from one school district to another, except as is specially conferred by Section 4736, General Code, which authority is conferred for the sole and express purpose of arranging the schools according to topography and population in order that they may be most easily accessible to pupils; that no such purpose was expressed or intended in the resolution adopted; and that the sole purpose of defendants in obtaining the adoption of said resolution was to defeat the judgment and decree of the court of appeals, wherein it was held that the attempted effort of the defendants to establish a special school district embracing substantially the same territory was illegal and void.

The petition recites the discontinuance of the schools in the four subdistricts, in which the enumeration of pupils was 25, 39, 26, and 40, respectively, or a total of 130 pupils, who were thereby required and compelled to attend the school in the village of Nashville, and further recites that said defendants have provided four wagons to haul said pupils to the Nashville school, to the great inconvenience and detriment of the good health and welfare of said pupils, and at an expense of $180 per month to this plaintiff and other taxpayers in said territory.

Plaintiff further avers that the county board of education was wholly without authority to pass [94 Ohio St. 423] said resolution, and that if it had any authority to make any such changes its action was a gross abuse of discretion and conferred no right or authority upon defendants, the board of education of the so called Nashville village school district, to compel the attendance of said pupils at Nashville village school; no right or authority to issue and sell bonds; no right or authority to levy taxes to pay the principal and interest on said bonds; no right or authority to levy taxes upon plaintiff and other taXpayers in said territory to maintain said Nashville village school and transport said...