Cline v. Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc.

• Decision Date: 03 June 1980
• Citation: 418 A.2d 968
• Parties: , 29 UCC Rep.Serv. 461 Roy A. CLINE and Gertrude F. Cline, his wife, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. PROWLER INDUSTRIES OF MARYLAND, INC., a Maryland Corporation; Motor Wheel Corporation, an Ohio Corporation; Robert G. Horsey, t/a Parkview Trailer Sales, Defendants Below, Appellees. PROWLER INDUSTRIES OF MARYLAND, INC., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Robert G. HORSEY, t/a Parkview Trailer Sales, Defendant Below, Appellee.
• Court: Supreme Court of Delaware

Page 968

418 A.2d 968

15 A.L.R.4th 765, 29 UCC Rep.Serv. 461

Roy A. CLINE and Gertrude F. Cline, his wife, Plaintiffs Below, Appellants, v. PROWLER INDUSTRIES OF MARYLAND, INC., a Maryland

Corporation; Motor Wheel Corporation, an Ohio

Corporation; Robert G. Horsey, t/a

Parkview Trailer Sales,

Defendants Below, Appellees.

PROWLER INDUSTRIES OF MARYLAND, INC., Defendant Below, Appellant, v. Robert G. HORSEY, t/a Parkview Trailer Sales, Defendant

Below, Appellee.

Supreme Court of Delaware.

Submitted Nov. 14, 1979.

Decided June 3, 1980.

Upon appeal from Superior Court. Affirmed in part; reversed in part.

E. Leigh Hunt and Samuel V. Abramo, Wilmington, for plaintiffs below, appellants.

James W. Semple of Flanzer & Isaacs, Wilmington, for appellee Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc.

William F. Taylor and Frederick W. Iobst of Young, Conaway, Stargatt & Taylor, Wilmington, for appellee Motor Wheel Corp.

Wayne N. Elliott of Prickett, Sanders, Jones, Elliott & Kristol, Wilmington, for

appellee Robert G. Horsey, t/a Parkview Trailer Sales.

Before HERRMANN, C. J., and DUFFY, McNEILLY, QUILLEN and HORSEY, JJ., constituting the Court en Banc.

HERRMANN, Chief Justice:

In this appeal we are required to decide, inter alia, whether the doctrine of strict liability in tort is applicable in Delaware in cases involving sales of allegedly defective goods. ¹

I.

In late May, the plaintiffs, Roy and Gertrude Cline, purchased a travel-trailer from the defendant Robert Horsey. The trailer was manufactured by the defendant Prowler Industries of Maryland, Inc. (hereinafter "Prowler") and was heated by a propane heater manufactured by the defendant Motor Wheel Corporation (hereinafter "Motor Wheel"). The heater was installed by Prowler.

During the approximately four months between the date of purchase and the incident giving rise to this litigation, the trailer was used by the plaintiffs on two long trips. The heater was not used prior to October of the year, however, because only summer months had intervened since the purchase of the trailer. In October, the plaintiff Roy Cline entered the trailer for the purpose of "winterizing" the vehicle. He turned the heater on in conformity with his understanding of the instructions riveted to the heater. An explosion resulted, seriously injuring the plaintiff: he sustained third degree burns and required extensive hospitalization and multiple surgical procedures, including skin grafts and amputation of several fingers.

The plaintiffs brought suit against Prowler, Motor Wheel and Horsey. The complaint contained counts based upon the doctrine of strict tort liability, breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 Del.C. § 2-101 et seq., and negligence. Thereafter, the plaintiffs' insurer brought an identical suit against the same defendants, plus an additional defendant, Parkview Trailer Sales, to recover payments it had made to the plaintiffs. By motion, the two actions were consolidated for trial by jury.

At the close of all the evidence, a directed verdict was granted in favor of Horsey on the ground that the evidence failed to establish either any negligence on his part or any independent liability-since he was merely a conduit for Prowler products. In instructing the jury, the Trial Judge refused to instruct either on the doctrine of strict liability in tort or of res ipsa loquitur. The jury returned verdicts in favor of Prowler and Motor Wheel, finding, upon special interrogatories, that neither was guilty of negligence or breach of warranty.

The Trial Court denied the plaintiffs' motion for judgment n. o. v. or, in the alternative, new trial. The Court granted the motion of Horsey for legal expenses and attorneys fees from Prowler under Superior Court Rule 37(c). ²

The plaintiffs appeal from the denial of their motion for judgment n. o. v. or new trial. Prowler appeals from the grant of Horsey's motion for expenses and attorney's fees.

II.

The crux of the plaintiffs' appeal is the Trial Judge's refusal to apply the doctrine of strict liability in tort or res ipsa loquitur. In asserting that strict tort liability is the law of Delaware in cases involving the sale of defective goods, the plaintiffs rely heavily on Martin v. Ryder Truck Rental, Inc., Del.Supr., 353 A.2d 581 (1976). In that case, this Court held that strict tort liability is applicable in this State to a bailment-lease.

As was expressly noted in Martin, however, the applicability of the doctrine of strict tort liability is dependent in this State on the scope of the Uniform Commercial Code, 6 Del.C. § 2-101 et seq. It was held in Martin that if by the Code the General Assembly preempted the field of the law of products liability, this Court was not free to apply the doctrine of strict tort liability to a bailment-lease. This Court there concluded, however, that leases and bailments were not within the purview of the Uniform Commercial Code; that the Code's relevant provisions are restricted to sales; and that, therefore, while the General Assembly may have preempted the field as to sales, it had not done so as to bailment-leases. 353 A.2d at 583-4.

Now, we are faced with the question expressly reserved in Martin : ³ whether the Uniform Commercial Code provisions on sales of goods preempt the entire field, thus preventing the extension of the doctrine of strict tort liability to the law of sales. This is a case of first impression in this Court; it has been addressed by the courts of only a small minority of other states. Indeed, those courts that have been faced with the question have chosen either to avoid it, Pearson v. Franklin Laboratories, Inc., S.D.Supr., 254 N.W.2d 133, 139 (1977), or to conclude cursorily that no preemption exists. Caruth v. Mariani, Ct.App.Ariz., 11 Ariz.App. 188, 463 P.2d 83 (1970); Larson v. Clark Equipment Company, Colo.Ct.App., 33 Colo.App. 277, 518 P.2d 308 (1974); West v. Caterpillar Tractor Company, Inc., Fla., 336 So.2d 80 (1976); Phipps v. General Motors Corp., Md.Ct.App., 278 Md. 337, 363 A.2d 955 (1976); Markle v. Mulholland's, Inc., Or.Supr., 265 Or. 259, 509 P.2d 529 (1973).

In view of the novelty of the issue of preemption, and at the risk of some repetition of the discussion contained in Martin, a brief review of the basic concepts and development of the two bodies of law here involved may be helpful.

A.

The emergence of the doctrine of strict tort liability in the products liability area is generally attributed to Dean Prosser. See Prosser, The Assault Upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 Yale L.J. 1099 (1960); (hereinafter cited as "Prosser, The Assault ") Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer) 50 Minn.L.Rev. 791 (1966) (hereinafter cited as "Prosser, The Fall "). The doctrine was first incorporated into case law by Chief Justice (then Justice) Traynor in 1963 in Greenman v. Yuba Power Products, Inc., Cal.Supr., 59 Cal.2d 57, 27 Cal.Rptr. 697, 377 P.2d 897 (1963). It was later adopted by the American Law Institute in 1965 as section 402A of the Second Restatement of the Law of Torts. ⁴ It has since become the prevailing remedy in products liability cases in this country. See Martin, 353 A.2d at 584.

Briefly, strict tort liability, as restated in § 402A, was specifically aimed at remedying injuries caused by defective products. It holds manufacturers, distributors and wholesale and retail dealers liable without fault for these injuries. It is not applicable, however, to sellers who do not regularly engage in the business of selling the particular product. Recovery under this doctrine is available to any user or consumer of the product regardless of his contractual status vis a vis the individual sellers. Likewise, the injured party's right to recover is not dependent upon the rules and limitations imposed on contractual relationships; i. e. the rules of notice, disclaimer, and the applicable statute of limitations.

The development of this new doctrine of liability was based upon four basic premises:

First, strict liability was deemed to have its theoretical basis in tort, not contract. Prosser, The Assault, supra at 1126-1127; Prosser, The Fall, supra at 800-802; Greenman, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A, Comment m (1965). This is important to the issue before us because the Uniform Sales Act, the predecessor to the Uniform Commercial Code, was seen as dominant in the law of contractual sales.

Second, the concept of strict liability was seen as an extension of the common-law food warranty. The common-law food warranty was an implied warranty imposed by law under which it was presumed that the manufacturer of foodstuffs had vouched for its wholesomeness and fitness for human consumption. See Handy v. Uniroyal, Inc., D.Del., 327 F.Supp. 596 (1971); Titus, Restatement of Torts Section 402A and the Uniform Commercial Code, 22 Stan.L.Rev. 713 (1970) (hereinafter cited as "Titus"). This warranty inured to the benefit of all consumers, without the requirement of privity, since the warranty was seen as running with the goods themselves. Prosser, The Assault, supra at 1110; Prosser, The Fall, supra at 800; Greenman, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 701, 377 P.2d at 901; Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 402A Comment a (1965).

Third, the law of sales warranties was viewed as wholly inadequate to deal with the scope and extent of injuries to an ever-growing consuming public caused by ever-increasing types of products. The sales warranty procedural restraints of privity, notice, disclaimer and applicable statutes of limitations were viewed as "booby-traps" for the unwary consumer and unjustified in the context of the more modern manufacturer-consumer relationship. Prosser, The Assault, supra at 1130-1131; Greenman, 27 Cal.Rptr. at 700, 377 P.2d at 900.

Finally, the doctrine of strict tort liability was based on the perceived need for greater protection of the consuming public from...