Clopton v. Cecil, 12160
| Decision Date | 25 October 1950 |
| Docket Number | No. 12160,12160 |
| Citation | 234 S.W.2d 251 |
| Parties | CLOPTON v. CECIL. |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Strickland, Wilkins, Hall & Mills, Mission, for appellant.
Hill, Lochridge & King, Mission, Cecil, Keith & Mahaffy, and John P. Blair, all of Beaumont, for appellee.
This is an appeal from a judgment reforming a deed upon the ground of mutual mistake. The primary question involved is whether or not appellee's demand for reformation was barred by the four year statute of limitations. Article 5529, Vernon's Ann.Civ.Stats. The deed was executed on November 8, 1938, and this suit was not filed until April 6, 1948. Appellant contends that appellee and T. S. Reed, who caused John H. Clopton, now deceased, to execute the conveyance to Lamar Cecil, the appellee, accepted and examined the deed in 1938, and that limitation commenced to run at that time. The statute of limitations does not begin to run against a suit to reform a deed for mutual mistake until the mistake has been discovered or should have been discovered by the exercise of reasonable diligence. Oldham v. Medearis, 90 Tex. 506, 39 S.W. 919, Kelley v. Ward, 94 Tex. 289, 60 S.W. 311, and the trial court found that neither T. S. Reed nor Lamar Cecil was negligent or lacking in reasonable diligence in failing to discover the mistake prior to December, 1946, and that they acted with reasonable diligence thereafter. The effect of appellant's points is to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence to support these findings. It is asserted as a contrary proposition thereto that both the pleadings and the evidence show conclusively that appellee's suit was barred by inattention, negligence and laches chargeable to him.
We must assume that evidentiary details having support in the evidence were found in accordance with the ultimate fact findings made by the trial judge, and in line with those findings we make the following statement of the case:
From 1935 until Clopton's death in the early part of 1947, Reed and Clopton, acting together, purchased and sold numerous oil properties, some of which were located in Starr County, Texas. In a number of instances Reed put up the money and Clopton made the purchases. Clopton for his services would receive an interest in the property after the purchase price had been paid back from rentals or royalties. In 1938 Clopton and Reed each owned an undivided one-eighth mineral interest in approximately 1431 acres of land in Starr County, that is, each owned approximately 179 mineral acres. Clopton owed Reed $2,803.55 and in order to discharge this indebtedness, he agreed to convey to Reed or his nominee an undivided 18.6 mineral acres of his interest in the 1431 acres above mentioned, at an agreed price of $150 per acre. Reed requested that the conveyance be made to his son-in-law, Lamar Cecil, the appellee. Clopton had a conveyance prepared, executed the same and delivered it to Reed who had the same recorded. By this deed, Clopton attempted to convey an 18.6 acre interest by using a decimal fraction. The property was described in the granting clause as 'an undivided .001298 per cent interest in and to all of the oil, gas and other minerals in and under the following described tract of land situated in Starr County, Texas:' Then followed a description of 1302 acres out of a 1673 acre share set apart to one M. Desmond in a partition suit, and a 640 acre section. The deed, however, contained an exception as to Lots 3, 4, 5, 9, 10, 12, 13, 14, 15, 17, 18, 19 and 22 out of the San Cristobal Subdivision theretofore sold by one Cristobal Salinas. Reference was made to a map or plat of the subdivision which was evidently one involving all or parts of the 1302 acre tract and the section mentioned. Although the net acreage of the tracts affected by the conveyance is not set out in the instrument, the parties to the transaction seem to have accepted 1431 acres as being the area involved. It was admitted by appellant upon the trial that the conveyance of 'an undivided .001298 per cent interest' conveyed only a 1.86 acre mineral interest.
Appellee alleged that when T. S. Reed received the deed from Clopton, 'he examined it, but due to the fact that the mineral interest conveyed therein was in decimal fractions, and the number of mineral acres conveyed thereby could not be readily ascertained from a reading of the deed, and due to his long and close association with the said John H. Clopton, and relying upon the same John H. Clopton, h...
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Cherokee Water Co. v. Forderhause
...action of the parties in dealing with the property after the mistake has occurred and similar matters. Clopton v. Cecil, 234 S.W.2d 251 (Tex.Civ.App.--San Antonio 1950, writ ref'd n.r.e.). Cherokee also argues that because there was no evidence that Cherokee was not a bona fide purchaser fo......
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...excuse their failure sooner to file the suit. Rowe v. Horton, 65 Tex., 89; Oldham v. Medearis, 90 Tex. 506, 39 S.W. 919; Clopton v. Cecil, Tex.Civ.App., 234 S.W.2d 251, writ refused n. r. e.; Texas Osage Cooperative Royalty Pool v. Colwell, Tex.Civ.App., 205 S.W.2d 93, writ refused n. r. e.......
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