Closser v. HKT Teleservices (US) Inc.
| Decision Date | 02 April 2021 |
| Docket Number | 4:21CV3040 |
| Parties | HEATHER M. CLOSSER, Plaintiff, v. HKT TELESERVICES (US) INC., P.C.C.W. TELESERVICES (US) INC., c/o HKT Teleservices; HKT TELESERVICES INC., c/o Vincent J. Tersigni, Jackson Lewis; JEWEL THOMAS, Human Resources Manager; ANGEL SLAUGHTER, Human Resources Generalist; and DOUG GARRISON, Site Director, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Nebraska |
Plaintiff filed her pro se Complaint (Filing 1) on February 23, 2021, and has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. The court now conducts an initial review of the Complaint to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2).
Plaintiff alleges she was retaliated against by her employer's local manager for reporting sexual harassment on the part of a supervisor against a co-worker in December 2018, and ultimately was discharged, in December 2019, by the human resources department at corporate headquarters for reporting the local manager's harassment and retaliatory behavior beginning in July 2019. The EEOC issued a right-to-sue notice on November 25, 2020.
The court is required to review in forma pauperis complaints to determine whether summary dismissal is appropriate. The court must dismiss a complaint or any portion of it that states a frivolous or malicious claim, that fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).
Pro se plaintiffs must set forth enough factual allegations to "nudge[ ] their claims across the line from conceivable to plausible," or "their complaint must be dismissed." Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 569-70 (2007); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (). "The essential function of a complaint under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure is to give the opposing party 'fair notice of the nature and basis or grounds for a claim, and a general indication of the type of litigation involved.'" Topchian v. JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A., 760 F.3d 843, 848 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Hopkins v. Saunders, 199 F.3d 968, 973 (8th Cir. 1999)).
"A pro se complaint must be liberally construed, and pro se litigants are held to a lesser pleading standard than other parties." Topchian, 760 F.3d at 849 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). A "liberal construction" means that if the essence of an allegation is "discernible, the district court should construe the plaintiff's complaint in a way that permits his or her claim to be considered within the proper legal framework." Solomon v. Petray, 795 F.3d 777, 787 (8th Cir. 2015). However, even pro se complaints are required to allege facts which, if true, state a claim for relief as a matter of law. Martin v. Aubuchon, 623 F.2d 1282, 1286 (8th Cir. 1980).
This is an action brought under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq. (Filing 1, p. 4.) Plaintiff also lists various claims she allegedly has under Nebraska law. (Filing 1, p. 5.)
Plaintiff's federal claim arises under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a).1 To establish a prima facie case of retaliation under this statute, Plaintiff must show "(1) she engaged in statutorily protected conduct; (2) she suffered an adverse employment action; and (3) a causal connection exists between the two." Lopez v. Whirlpool Corp., 989 F.3d 656, 664 (8th Cir. 2021) (quoting DePriest v. Milligan, 823 F.3d 1179, 1187 (8th Cir. 2016)).
Plaintiff can satisfy the first element if she "oppos[ed] an act of discrimination made unlawful by Title VII ('the opposition clause'), or participat[ed] in an investigation under Title VII ('the participation clause')." Id. (quoting Hunt v. Neb. Pub. Power Dist., 282 F.3d 1021, 1028 (8th Cir. 2002)). Plaintiff must show "an objectively reasonable belief that an actionable Title VII violation has occurred for [her] complaint to qualify as a protected activity." Id. (quoting Gibson v. Concrete Equip. Co., Inc., 960 F.3d 1057, 1064 (8th Cir. 2020)). This reasonableness assessment is made "in light of the applicable substantive law." Gibson, 960 F.3d at 1065 (quoting Brannum v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 518 F.3d 542, 548-49 (8th Cir. 2008)). Protection under Title VII "does not depend on proving the illegality of the complained-of conduct." Auer v. City of Minot, 896 F.3d 854, 859 (8th Cir. 2018). The Eighth Circuit "generally construe[s] § 2000e-3(a) 'broadly to cover opposition to employment actions that are not unlawful, as long as the employee acted in a goodfaith, objectively reasonable belief that the practices were unlawful.'" Equal Emp. Opportunity Comm'n v. N. Mem'l Health Care, 908 F.3d 1098, 1103 (8th Cir. 2018) (quoting Pye v. Nu Aire, Inc., 641 F.3d 1011, 1020 (8th Cir. 2011)); cf. Barker v. Mo. Dep't of Corr., 513 F.3d 831, 835 (8th Cir. 2008) ().
The second element can be satisfied with a showing that "a reasonable employee would have found the challenged action materially adverse, which in this context means it might well have dissuaded a reasonable worker from making or supporting a charge of discrimination." Lopez, 989 F.3d at 664-65 (quoting AuBuchon v. Geithner, 743 F.3d 638, 642 (8th Cir. 2014) (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 67-68 (2006)).
Third, any adverse employment action must have been motivated by the employer's "desire to retaliate" against Plaintiff for reporting discriminatory and harassing behavior. Bharadwaj v. Mid Dakota Clinic, 954 F.3d 1130, 1136 (8th Cir. 2020) (quoting Wright v. St. Vincent Health Sys., 730 F.3d 732, 737-38 (8th Cir. 2013)); see also Donathan v. Oakley Grain, Inc., 861 F.3d 735, 739 (8th Cir. 2017) (); Blomker v. Jewell, 831 F.3d 1051, 1059 (8th Cir. 2016) ().
A plaintiff need not plead facts sufficient to establish a prima facie case of employment discrimination. See Swierkiewicz v. Sorema N.A., 534 U.S. 506, 511-12 (2002) (), abrogated in part on other grounds by Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. The elements of a prima facie case are relevant to a plausibility determination, however. They "are part of the background against which a plausibility determination should be made," and "may be used as a prism to shed light upon the plausibility of the claim." Blomker, 831 F.3d at 1056 (quoting Rodriguez-Reyes v. Molina-Rodriguez, 711 F.3d 49, 54 (1st Cir. 2013)); see also Khalik v. United Air Lines, 671 F.3d 1188, 1192 (10th Cir. 2012) ().
Plaintiff alleges she reported to her employer's site director, Defendant Doug Garrison, in December 2018 that her supervisor was sexually harassing a coworker. This allegedly resulted in Plaintiff being required to perform the supervisor's duties as well as her own while the supervisor was placed on a 3-day suspension. Plaintiff claims she was "subject to pervasive harassment from that point on." Plaintiff alleges she complained to an HR representative, Defendant Angel Slaughter, in July 2019 about Garrison's "harassment and retaliation." Plaintiff allegedly followed up with Slaughter in October 2019, who said she would inform her boss, Defendant Jewel Thomas, about the situation, but there was no further response. Plaintiff alleges she then contacted Thomas directly in November 2019, when Thomas was visiting the local office; Thomas said she "had not been notified about the events taking place here with Doug Garrison and his behavior towards myself and others," but would investigate. This personal contact was followed by a conference call with Slaughter and Thomas a few days later, during which Slaughter allegedly raised her voice at Plaintiff for questioning why she had not reported Plaintiff's complaints to Thomas, and a final conference call with Thomas on December 10, 2019. Thomas allegedly told Plaintiff there was nothing in the file to show that her supervisor was suspended for sexual harassment. The HR department then terminated Plaintiff's employment for her "attendance and behavior." (Filing 1, p. 8).
In the charge of discrimination Plaintiff filed jointly with the Lincoln Commission on Human Rights (under NFEPA) and the EEOC (under Title VII) on December 17, 2019, she claimed both sex discrimination and retaliation, alleging she "was subjected to different terms and conditions of employment, to illegal harassment which created a hostile work environment based on my sex (female), and discharged in retaliation for engaging in a protected activity ...." (Filing 1, p. 25.) Specifically, Plaintiff alleged:
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