Cloud v. State, 23658.
Decision Date | 21 May 1947 |
Docket Number | No. 23658.,23658. |
Citation | 202 S.W.2d 846 |
Parties | CLOUD v. STATE. |
Court | Texas Court of Criminal Appeals |
Appeal from District Court, Callahan County; J. R. Black, Judge.
Arthur Cloud was convicted of the theft of an automobile over the value of $50 and he appeals.
Affirmed.
J. M. Parker, of Gorman, for appellant.
Ernest S. Goens, State's Atty., of Austin, for the State.
The offense is theft of an automobile over the value of Fifty Dollars. The punishment assessed is confinement in the state penitentiary for a period of two years.
Appellant's chief contention is that the court erred in overruling his motion for an instruction to the jury to return a verdict of not guilty based on the ground that the evidence was insufficient to justify and sustain a conviction.
The State's evidence, briefly stated, shows that on the morning of the 27th day of April, 1946, Robert Chaney and appellant met in the town of Comanche, from there they went to Brownwood, and from Brownwood to Cross Plains, arriving at the latter place about 8:30 or 9:00 P.M. After eating supper at a cafe, they went to visit a young lady, but she was not at home. They then decided to get an automobile. After looking over some of the automobiles parked on the square, Chaney found one with the key in it. They both entered it and drove to Baird. At Baird they ran into an automobile doing some damage to it. They then drove back to Cross Plains where they parked the car, not at the place where they had obtained it but near a cotton gin; went back to the home of their lady friend; and visited with her a short while. They then started to Comanche but when they arrived at a curve on the highway, they turned the car over and wrecked it to such an extent that it would not run under its own power. They abandoned the automobile there and went to Brownwood.
On cross-examination of Robert Chaney, the State's principal witness, he testified as follows:
The cafe owner testified that the appellant and Robert Chaney were together in his cafe on the night in question.
Thelma Jean Thompson, the young lady they visited on the night in question, testified that they, appellant and Robert Chaney, both were at her home and visited with her a short time.
Mrs. Boyle testified that she lived in Cross Plains; that on the night in question, she parked her automobile in the middle of the street in front of the telephone building; that she knew D. L. Barnes' automobile; that she saw Robert Chaney and another boy get into the automobile belonging to Mr. Barnes and drive it away; that Chaney got into the car while the other party stood on the sidewalk and looked around. On cross-examination by appellant's attorney, she testified as follows:
The court submitted the case to the jury on the law of principal and instructed the jury that Robert Chaney was an accomplice; that they could not convict the defendant on the testimony of the accomplice unless corroborated by other evidence tending to connect the defendant with the commission of the offense charged.
In our opinion, the evidence is sufficient to bring the appellant within the definition of a principal as that term is defined by Articles 66 and 69, P.C. The record shows that he was present at the time and place of the commission of the offense; that he knew of the unlawful intent of his companion, Chaney. Furthermore, there is evidence from which the jury could draw the conclusion that appellant had agreed to the commission of the offense that he stood near and kept watch while Chaney took possession of the automobile; then appellant immediately entered it and they drove away.
The issue of appellant's guilt, under the charge of the court as a guide, was exclusively within the province of the jury and this Court would not be authorized to disturb their conclusion on the question. We think the following authorities sustain the opinion here expressed: Smith v. State...
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