Clouse v. State
| Decision Date | 19 April 1991 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 89-96,89-97,s. 89-96 |
| Citation | 809 P.2d 791 |
| Parties | Leonard Dean CLOUSE, Appellant (Defendant), v. STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff). (Two Cases) |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
Leonard D. Munker, State Public Defender, Steven E. Weerts, Sr. Asst. Public Defender, and David Gosar (argued), Appellate Counsel, for appellant.
Joseph B. Meyer, Atty. Gen., Sylvia L. Hackl, Deputy Atty. Gen., Karen A. Byrne, Sr. Asst. Atty. Gen., Theodore E. Lauer, Director, Prosecution Assistance Program, and David J. Huss (argued), Student Intern, for appellee.
Before URBIGKIT, C.J., and THOMAS, CARDINE, MACY and GOLDEN, JJ.
Leonard Dean Clouse challenges the sentences he received for his armed robberies to which he pled guilty in Park County.
We remand Issue I and affirm Issue II.
Clouse raises two issues:
Clouse faced several charges in Campbell and Park Counties for the armed robberies of convenience stores located in those two counties. On June 3, 1988, the attorney appointed to represent Clouse against the charges filed in Campbell County telephoned the Park County prosecutor to get an "indication of what Park County would be willing to do with [Clouse's] assorted felony charges." The Park County prosecutor responded with a proposal--in a letter dated June 6, 1988--that offered "the possibility of concurrent sentencing" on the Campbell and Park County charges. The attorney sent Clouse a copy of the letter he received from the Park County prosecutor along with a letter updating Clouse on the status of his case. The proposal contained in the letter fell through, according to the Park County prosecutor, when the Campbell County Attorney's office decided to keep the Campbell County charges separate from the Park County charges.
After the district court denied various pretrial motions filed by the defense, Clouse's attorneys became concerned that the case was not "defensible." There was also a concern over the possible severity of the sentence Clouse could receive if convicted on all the charges filed in Campbell County. The attorneys discussed these concerns with Clouse who agreed to accept the plea agreement offered by the Campbell County Attorney's office. During those plea negotiations, the attorneys for Clouse never mentioned the letter from the Park County prosecutor because it "was not part of any arrangement in Campbell County and wasn't relevant to the plea bargain that was made in [Campbell County]." The terms of the agreement called for Clouse to plead guilty to one count each of armed robbery and first degree sexual assault in exchange for the other counts of armed robbery and first degree sexual assault being dismissed. 1
When Clouse was subsequently arraigned on the Park County charges, a different public defender was appointed to represent him. Clouse, after initially pleading not guilty, agreed to negotiate towards a possible plea agreement. Park County rejected, however, any proposal that required it to consent to concurrent sentences. The two sides then reached a tentative agreement that did not involve the issue of concurrent sentencing. The public defender, after discussing the proposed terms of the agreement with Clouse, sent a letter to the prosecution confirming the terms of that agreement. The public defender also sent a letter to Clouse the same day to make sure that the terms of the proposed agreement were acceptable to him.
On January 31, 1989, Clouse agreed to plead guilty to two counts of armed robbery in exchange for the dismissal of the other charges of kidnapping, use of a firearm while committing a felony, and felon in possession of a firearm. After outlining the terms of the plea agreement, Clouse's attorney informed the district court that "[t]here has been no agreement as pertains to sentencing." The following exchange then took place between the district court and Clouse:
At sentencing, Clouse's attorney argued that the Park County sentence should run concurrently with the Campbell County sentence. He argued, alternatively, for the Park County sentences to run concurrent with each other. The district court in its written judgment sentenced Clouse to a term of 20-25 years in the state penitentiary on one count of armed robbery and, applying the habitual criminal statute, an enhanced sentence of 40-50 years on the other count of armed robbery. The district court ordered the two sentences to run consecutive to each other, and consecutive to the 60-75 year sentence Clouse was currently serving on the Campbell County charges, for a combined sentence of 120-150 years.
Clouse now challenges the sentences he received for the armed robberies he committed in Park County. Clouse maintains that his decision to plead guilty in Campbell County was based, in part, on his belief that the June 6, 1988 letter from the Park County prosecuting attorney offered the prospect of concurrent sentencing for the crimes he committed in Campbell and Park Counties. Clouse now claims he relied to his detriment on the possibility of concurrent sentences when he agreed to plead guilty. Principles of due process therefore require, Clouse asserts, that he be given the opportunity to withdraw his guilty pleas in Park County and have the terms of the letter presented to the district court in Park County at a new arraignment. He frames this as a request for specific performance.
We granted Clouse an evidentiary hearing to determine whether there existed a plea agreement under which Clouse pleaded guilty to the Campbell County charges in exchange for the Park County prosecutor consenting to concurrent sentences on the Campbell and Park County charges. At the conclusion of the hearing, the district judge made the following findings:
It is the district court--as the trier of fact--who must assess the credibility of witnesses and the weight to be given their testimony, in deciding whether there existed a valid plea agreement and its terms and conditions. People v. Navarroli, 121 Ill.2d 516, 118 Ill.Dec. 414, 416, 521 N.E.2d 891, 893 (1988). Whether a plea agreement exists dovetails with our own standard of review for questions of fact:
Richardson v. Green, 644 P.2d 778, 779 (Wyo.1982). See also Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Wyo.1984).
The determination of the existence of a valid agreement between the State and the defendant is a matter...
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Doles v. State, 01-172.
...appeal." Richardson v. Green, 644 P.2d 778, 779 (Wyo.1982). See also Anderson v. Bauer, 681 P.2d 1316, 1319 (Wyo.1984). Clouse v. State, 809 P.2d 791, 794 (Wyo.1991). [¶ 15] At the sentencing hearing, the transcript of the change of plea hearing, which included the discussions of the plea a......
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...23 P.3d 27, ¶ 4 (Wyo.2001) (citing Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 262, 92 S.Ct. 495, 499, 30 L.Ed.2d 427 (1971)); Clouse v. State, 809 P.2d 791, 795 (Wyo.1991); and United States v. Robertson, 45 F.3d 1423, 1442 (10th Cir.1995). See also Browning v. State, 2001 WY 93, ¶ 32, 32 P.3d 1......
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...error has occurred, we will direct the district court to enter a nunc pro tunc order to correct the judgment entry. See Clouse v. State, 809 P.2d 791, 795 (Wyo.1991) (interpreting Wyoming rule of criminal procedure identical to Iowa Rule of Criminal Procedure 22(3)(g) to allow remand to tri......
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