Clowe v. Seavey

• Decision Date: 03 June 1913
• Citation: 102 N.E. 521,208 N.Y. 496
• Parties: CLOWE v. SEAVEY et al.
• Court: New York Court of Appeals Court of Appeals

208 N.Y. 496

102 N.E. 521

CLOWE

v.SEAVEY et al.

Court of Appeals of New York.

June 3, 1913.

Appeal from Supreme Court, Appellate Division, Third Department.

Action by Charles W. Clowe, Trustee in Bankruptcy, against Elizabeth S. C. Seavey and others. From a judgment of the Appellate Division (151 App. Div. 912,135 N. Y. Supp. 1105), affirming by divided court a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Henry J. Hemmens, of New York City, for appellants.

Edgar T. Brackett, of Saratoga Springs, for respondent.

MILLER, J.

This action is brought by a trustee in bankruptcy to set aside a transfer made by Elizabeth S. C. Seavey, the bankrupt, to her mother-in-law of all her right, title, and interest, present and future, in and to the estate of her grandfather. She had no other property. The court found upon sufficient evidence that she made the transfer with intent to cheat and defraud creditors, and in effect that it was voluntary except for the sum of $1,000, loaned by the transferee upon the security of it. The court also found that the transferee did not participate in said fraudulent intent. The judgment provides for the repayment of said loan with interest. The instrument of transfer was executed by both parties. The transferee expressly agreed that in consideration of the transfer she would devise and bequeath the estate transferred to her as well as all of her other estate, in trust for the use of the transferror and her husband during their lives and the life of the survivor, with remainder to their son. The particular clause of the will creating said interest reads as follows: ‘In the event of the death of my said son, and the remarriage of his said wife, should she survive him, I desire and direct my said trustees, John B. Clement and John Cox, to pay to my said grandchildren, lawful children of my son Henry S. Clement, or their descendants, all the estate hereby devised to my son, Henry S. Clement, and his children, as aforesaid. * * *’

[1] It is of no consequence that the transferee had no intent to hinder, delay, or defraud the creditors of the transferror. A person cannot successfully put his property beyond the reach of his creditors by a transfer which secures it to himself and his children, even though the transferee may have the best of motives, and be ignorant of his fraudulent intent.

The important question in the case is whether the interest of the bankrupt passed to the trustee in bankruptcy. Curiously enough the inalienability of that interest is asserted by those who claim under an assignment of it. It is forcibly urged by the learned counsel for the respondent that said interest is a vested remainder. However, we do not consider it necessary to determine whether it was vested or contingent, because we are of the opinion that in either view it was alienable.

It was decided in National Park Bank of N. Y. v. Billings, 144 App. Div. 536,129 N. Y. Supp. 846;Id., 203 N. Y. 556, 96 N. E. 1122, that future contingent interests in personal property were alienable, the same as contingent remainders in real property, but it is argued that case is distinguishable in that in this case the persons who are to take cannot be ascertained until the death of the life beneficiary. The writer did observe in that case that there was no uncertainty of the person, and it has been stated by text-writers, and often assumed by judges, that contingent interests are mere possibilities, and not alienable, where there is uncertainty of the persons who are to take. That doctrine had its origin in conditions which no longer exist. It did not survive the adoption of the Revised Statutes, which divided expectant estates into (1) future estates, and (2) reversions, and provided that a future estate is contingent ‘while the person to whom or the event on which it is limited to take effect remains uncertain,’ and that ‘an expectant estate is descendible, devisable and alienable, in the same manner as an estate in possession.’ R. S. pt. 2, c. 1, tit. 2, §§ 9, 13, and 35; now Real Prop. Law (Cons. Laws, c. 50) §§ 36, 40, 59. Those provisions are plain and simple, and leave no room for the refinements of the ancient common law.

Assuming the interest of Mrs. Seavey under her grandfather's will to be contingent, it will be extinguished by her death before the death of her father. If the person to take were certain, and the event uncertain, the contingentinterest or estate would never vest in possession, unless the event happened . The statute makes no distinction between uncertainty of person and uncertainty of event, and there is no sound reason to make such a distinction with respect to the alienability of contingent interests. Whatever the uncertainty, they are defined by the statute as estates. Of course, the contingency may be such that the interest or estate is not transmissible, descendible, or devisable, but so far as the nature of the contingency admits, all expectant estates are descendible, devisable, and alienable. The interest of Mrs. Seavey is certain to vest in possession and enjoyment if she survives the event, and there is no substantial difference between this case and National Park Bank of N. Y. v. Billings, supra. In that case, as in this, the interest was contingent upon survivorship, but in this case,...