Clowney v. State
| Decision Date | 09 May 1958 |
| Citation | 102 So.2d 619 |
| Parties | James Raymond CLOWNEY, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent. |
| Court | Florida Supreme Court |
J. Ben Watkins (of Truett & Watkins), Tallahassee, and Roberts & Sellars, Fort Lauderdale, for petitioner.
Richard W. Ervin, Atty. Gen., and David U. Tumin, Asst. Atty. Gen., for respondent.
Upon the petition of James Raymond Clowney and by authority of Sec. 4(2) of Article V of the Constitution, F.S.A., adopted 6 November 1956, a writ of certiorari was issued by this court to review the decision of the District Court of Appeal, Second District, rendered in the appeal of this case to determine whether or not it was 'in direct conflict' with decisions of this court, notably Cannon v. State, 91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 360, Taylor v. State, Fla., 46 So.2d 725, and Smith v. State, Fla., 65 So.2d 303, on the subject we will discuss.
The petitioner was charged in the first count of an information filed in the Criminal Court of Record of Broward County with having committed manslaughter by the culpably negligent operation of an automobile. In the second count he was alleged to have caused the death of a person when the petitioner struck him with a car the petitioner was driving 'while intoxicated by the voluntary use of alcoholic liquor * * *.' We have italicized the predominant word in the charge, the one which is so difficult to define.
The jury found the petitioner guilty only of the offense presented in the second count and, as a consequence, not guilty of the one alleged in the first count so the latter need not be further considered.
The circumstances in the present case are not precisely those with which the court dealt in the three cases already cited. In Cannon v. State, supra, the defendant had been charged in a single count with both kinds of manslaughter, namely, by culpable negligence and while intoxicated. This court held that the allegations were insufficient to charge intoxication and that the charges, with reference to culpable negligence, were deficient so the judgment of conviction was reversed. In both Taylor v. State and Smith v. State, supra, the defendants were found not guilty of causing death when driving while intoxicated.
Nevertheless, the court did, in deciding the three cases, discuss the word 'intoxicated' as it is used in the statute, present Sec. 860.01, Florida Statutes 1955, and F.S.A., and the statements appear harmonious. Taking the opinions in the order cited, it was held in Cannon v. State, supra, that there was a distinction between the word 'intoxicated' and the term 'under the influence of intoxicating liquor,' for a person might be under the influence of liquor without being intoxicated. (91 Fla. 214, 107 So. 361) In that case, as we have indicated, the court was considering the allegations of the indictment.
In the next cited case, Taylor v. State, supra (46 So.2d 726), we referred to the Cannon case, and reiterated the announcement that the word "intoxicated" and the term "under the influence of intoxicating liquor" were not synonymous, the former being a stronger expression. In Smith v. State, supra, we recognized again this distinction.
It appears from the opinion of the District Court of Appeal, which we are reviewing, that the trial judge charged the jury that if "the death of any human being be caused by the operation of an automobile by a person under the influence of intoxicating liquor, he shall be deemed guilty of manslaughter * * *." (97 So.2d 318) The District Court of Appeal found that this isolated portion of the charge was erroneous, and we quite agree. But the court found that the error was cured by the further charge: "Intoxication * * *, as used in the second count of the Information, means under the influence of intoxicating liquor to such an extent as to deprive one of the normal control of one's body or mental faculties, or both."
The effect of these charges when read together, as they should be, was to tell the jury that the petitioner could be convicted only if the state proved that he was, at the time the death was caused, under the influence of intoxicants to the degree that he had been deprived of the normal control of his bodily or mental faculties.
We do not find in the definition conveyed to the jury by the combined charges an expression that conflicts with the pronouncements of this court in the opinions to which the petitioner has referred us.
Somewhere between the point of utter sobriety and the point of saturation, or immobility, the imbiber reaches the condition that makes him, at the wheel of a dangerous...
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...from the introduction of substances into the body." American Law Institute Model Penal Code Section 2.08(5)(a) (1962). In Clowney v. State, Fla., 1958, 102 So.2d 619, the Supreme Court of Florida held that, "a person is intoxicated when he is under the influence of intoxicants to such an ex......
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