Club v. Ill. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd.

• Decision Date: 16 June 2011
• Docket Number: No. 2–10–0388.,2–10–0388.
• Citation: 352 Ill.Dec. 329,953 N.E.2d 1010,2011 IL App (2d) 100388
• Parties: ONWENTSIA CLUB, Petitioner,v.ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD and Lake County Board of Review, Respondents.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

2011 IL App (2d) 100388
953 N.E.2d 1010
352 Ill.Dec. 329

ONWENTSIA CLUB, Petitioner,
v.
ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD and Lake County Board of Review, Respondents.

No. 2–10–0388.

Appellate Court of Illinois, Second District.

June 16, 2011.

[953 N.E.2d 1011]

David T.B. Audley, Chapman & Cutler, LLP, Chicago, for Onwentsia Club.Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, State of Illinois, Michael A. Scodro, Solicitor General, John P. Schmidt, Assistant Attorney General, for Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board.Michael J. Waller, Lake County State's Attorney, Tara H. Ori, Assistant State's Attorney, for Lake County, Illinois Board of Review.[352 Ill.Dec. 330] OPINION Justice HUDSON delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.

¶ 1 Petitioner, Onwentsia Club, appeals a decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) that affirmed (in pertinent part) a decision of the Lake County board of review, both bodies being named as respondents in the instant action. The board of review denied open-space status to certain portions of land owned by petitioner. Having one's property classified as open space is favorable to a land owner in terms of taxation. See 35 ILCS 200/10–155 (West 2006). The PTAB agreed with the board of review. We, however, do not. Accordingly, we vacate and remand with directions.

¶ 2 BACKGROUND

¶ 3 The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Petitioner is a private golf club located in Lake Forest. The club occupies about 180 acres of land, which is divided into 10 tax parcels. Most of the land consists of an 18–hole golf course. However, other portions of the land are occupied by a swimming pool, clubhouse, horse riding area, stable, parking lot, driveway, and tennis courts. These improvements cover 8.72 acres.

¶ 4 Prior to 2006, the Lake County assessor's office granted open-space status to all property owned by a golf course. For other owners of land, only those portions of their property that were actually used for open-space purposes were granted open-space status. In 2006, the county began treating golf courses in the same manner that it treated other owners of land. Accordingly, it assessed improved portions of golf courses based on their fair-market value as a residential use. In 2006, open space was assessed at a rate of $1,000 per acre. Changing the designation of the improved[352 Ill.Dec. 331]

[953 N.E.2d 1012]

portions of petitioner's land to residential resulted in substantial increases in their assessed value. For example, a 3.85–acre tax parcel that would have been assessed at $3,850 had it been granted open-space status for its improved portions was now assessed at $861,594.

¶ 5 Central to this appeal is the following statute:

“Open space land; valuation. In all counties, in addition to valuation as otherwise permitted by law, land which is used for open space purposes and has been so used for the 3 years immediately preceding the year in which the assessment is made, upon application under Section 10–160, shall be valued on the basis of its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair, voluntary sale for use by the buyer for open space purposes.

Land is considered used for open space purposes if it is more than 10 acres in area and:

(a) is actually and exclusively used for maintaining or enhancing natural or scenic resources,

(b) protects air or streams or water supplies,

(c) promotes conservation of soil, wetlands, beaches, or marshes, including ground cover or planted perennial grasses, trees and shrubs and other natural perennial growth, and including any body of water, whether man-made or natural,

(d) conserves landscaped areas, such as public or private golf courses,

(e) enhances the value to the public of abutting or neighboring parks, forests, wildlife preserves, nature reservations, sanctuaries, or other open spaces, or

(f) preserves historic sites.

Land is not considered used for open space purposes if it is used primarily for residential purposes.” 35 ILCS 200/10–155 (West 2006).

Of particular significance is subsection (d), which specifically mentions golf courses.

¶ 6 Petitioner brought the matter to the board of review, which, by its findings, implicitly rejected petitioner's arguments that all of its property was entitled to open-space status. Petitioner then appealed to the PTAB. The PTAB affirmed the decision of the board of review. It framed the issue as “whether or not the land that underlies certain structural improvements at the golf course such as the tennis courts, the swimming pool, the clubhouse, parking lot and the like, are to receive the open space valuation and assessment, or are to be valued based on the land's fair cash value as otherwise provided in the Property Tax Code.” The PTAB noted that land is deemed open space where it is “more than 10 acres in area” and it “conserves landscaped areas.” 35 ILCS 200/10–155 (West 2006). The PTAB then held that “only those portions of the subject [parcels] actually used to conserve landscaped area satisfy the definition of open space land within the statute.” It found that, notwithstanding the fact that certain improvements are “used in association with the commercial/business purpose of Onwentsia Club,” they “are not used to conserve landscaped areas.” Accordingly, the PTAB determined that it was appropriate to exclude such areas from the balance of the golf course, which would retain open-space status. Petitioner now appeals the PTAB's decision to this court.

¶ 7 ANALYSIS

¶ 8 The sole issue in this appeal is whether petitioner's property was properly denied open-space status where certain improvements existed. Assessing the [352 Ill.Dec. 332]

[953 N.E.2d 1013]

character of petitioner's property and determining whether it falls within the statutory definition of open space presents a mixed question of law and fact, as it involves “an examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts.” City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill.2d 191, 205, 229 Ill.Dec. 522, 692 N.E.2d 295 (1998). To such questions we apply the deferential “clearly erroneous” standard of review. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill.2d 380, 391, 261 Ill.Dec. 302, 763 N.E.2d 272 (2001). However, before reaching this question, it is necessary for us to construe section 10–155 of the Property Tax Code (Code). To the extent a statute is ambiguous, we give substantial deference to an agency charged with administering it. Board of Education of Auburn Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Department of Revenue, 398 Ill.App.3d 629, 637, 347 Ill.Dec. 19, 941 N.E.2d 888 (2010). However, if the statute is not ambiguous, we are not bound by the agency's decision and our review is de novo. Burzic v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 391 Ill.App.3d 202, 208–09, 332 Ill.Dec. 1, 912 N.E.2d 187 (2009).

¶ 9 Before turning to the particular facts of this case, we will examine section 10–155 in detail. In ascertaining the meaning of a statute, a court must first look to its plain language, as that is usually the best indication of the legislature's intent. First American Bank Corp. v. Henry, 239 Ill.2d 511, 515, 347 Ill.Dec. 682, 942 N.E.2d 1262 (2011). Our primary goal is, of course, to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill.2d 546, 552, 328 Ill.Dec. 942, 905 N.E.2d 831 (2009). Where a statute is unambiguous, we must apply it as written. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill.2d 49, 59, 306 Ill.Dec. 136, 857 N.E.2d 229 (2006). A statute must be read as a whole, giving effect to all of its parts. First American Bank Corp., 239 Ill.2d at 516, 347 Ill.Dec. 682, 942 N.E.2d 1262. A court must not frustrate the expressed intent of the legislature by reading into a statute any conditions, limitations, or exceptions that conflict with the statute's...