Club v. Ill. Prop. Tax Appeal Bd.
| Decision Date | 16 June 2011 |
| Docket Number | No. 2—10—0388,2—10—0388 |
| Parties | ONWENTSIA CLUB, Petitioner, v. ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD and LAKE COUNTY BOARD OF REVIEW, Respondents. |
| Court | United States Appellate Court of Illinois |
On Petition for Administrative Review from the Property Tax Appeal Board.
Petitioner, Onwentsia Club, appeals a decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board (PTAB) that affirmed (in pertinent part) a decision of the Lake County board of review, both bodies being named as respondents in the instant action. The board of review denied open-space status to certain portions of land owned by petitioner. Having one's property classified as open space is favorable to a land owner in terms of taxation. See 35 ILCS 200/10—155 (West 2006). The PTAB agreed with the board of review. We, however, do not. Accordingly, we vacate and remand with directions.
The facts in this case are largely undisputed. Petitioner is a private golf club located in Lake Forest. The club occupies about 180 acres of land, which is divided into 10 tax parcels. Most of the land consists of an 18-hole golf course. However, other portions of the land are occupied by a swimming pool, clubhouse, horse riding area, stable, parking lot, driveway, and tennis courts. These improvements cover 8.72 acres.
Prior to 2006, the Lake County assessor's office granted open-space status to all property owned by a golf course. For other owners of land, only those portions of their property that were actually used for open-space purposes were granted open-space status. In 2006, the county began treating golf courses in the same manner that it treated other owners of land. Accordingly, it assessed improved portions of golf courses based on their fair-market value as a residential use. In 2006, open space was assessed at a rate of $1,000 per acre. Changing the designation of the improved portions of petitioner's land to residential resulted in substantial increases in their assessed value. For example, a 3.85-acre tax parcel that would have been assessed at $3,850 had it been granted open-space status for its improved portions was now assessed at $861,594.
Central to this appeal is the following statute:
Of particular significance is subsection (d), which specifically mentions golf courses.
Petitioner brought the matter to the board of review, which, by its findings, implicitly rejected petitioner's arguments that all of its property was entitled to open-space status. Petitioner then appealed to the PTAB. The PTAB affirmed the decision of the board of review. It framed the issue as "whether or not the land that underlies certain structural improvements at the golf course such as the tennis courts, the swimming pool, the clubhouse, parking lot and the like, are to receive the open space valuation and assessment, or are to be valued based on the land's fair cash value as otherwise provided in the Property Tax Code." The PTAB noted that land is deemed open space where it is "more than 10 acres in area" and it "conserves landscaped areas." 35 ILCS 200/10—155 (West 2006). The PTAB then held that "only those portions of the subject [parcels] actually used toconserve landscaped area satisfy the definition of open space land within the statute." It found that, notwithstanding the fact that certain improvements are "used in association with the commercial/business purpose of Onwentsia Club," they "are not used to conserve landscaped areas." Accordingly, the PTAB determined that it was appropriate to exclude such areas from the balance of the golf course, which would retain open-space status. Petitioner now appeals the PTAB's decision to this court.
The sole issue in this appeal is whether petitioner's property was properly denied open-space status where certain improvements existed. Assessing the character of petitioner's property and determining whether it falls within the statutory definition of open space presents a mixed question of law and fact, as it involves "an examination of the legal effect of a given set of facts." City of Belvidere v. Illinois State Labor Relations Board, 181 Ill. 2d 191, 205 (1998). To such questions we apply the deferential "clearly erroneous" standard of review. AFM Messenger Service, Inc. v. Department of Employment Security, 198 Ill. 2d 380, 391 (2001). However, before reaching this question, it is necessary for us to construe section 10—155 of the Property Tax Code (Code). To the extent a statute is ambiguous, we give substantial deference to an agency charged with administering it. Board of Education of Auburn Community Unit School District No. 10 v. Department of Revenue, 398 Ill. App. 3d 629, 637 (2010). However, if the statute is not ambiguous, we are not bound by the agency's decision and our review is de novo. Burzic v. Illinois Workers' Compensation Comm'n, 391 Ill. App. 3d 202, 208-09 (2009).
Before turning to the particular facts of this case, we will examine section 10—155 in detail. In ascertaining the meaning of a statue, a court must first look to its plain language, as that is usuallythe best indication of the legislature's intent. First American Bank Corp. v. Henry, 239 Ill. 2d 511, 515 (2011). Our primary goal is, of course, to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Roselle Police Pension Board v. Village of Roselle, 232 Ill. 2d 546, 552 (2009). Where a statute is unambiguous, we must apply it as written. DeLuna v. Burciaga, 223 Ill. 2d 49, 59 (2006). A statute must be read as a whole, giving effect to all of its parts. First American Bank Corp., 239 Ill. 2d at 516. A court must not frustrate the expressed intent of the legislature by reading into a statute any conditions, limitations, or exceptions that conflict with the statute's plain language. People v. Adair, 406 Ill. App. 3d 133, 144 (2010). Further, "[l]egislative intent can be ascertained from consideration of the entire statute, its nature and objective, and the consequences that would result from construing it one way or the other." In re Marriage of Anderson, 405 Ill. App. 3d 1129, 1134-35 (2010).
We begin with the plain language of the statute. Pertinent here, the statute states, "Land is considered used for open space purposes if it is more than 10 acres in area and *** conserves landscaped areas, such as public or private golf courses ***." (Emphasis added.) 35 ILCS 200/10—155(d) (West 2006). Notably, the statute does not state—which it easily could have—that land is considered open space if it is a landscaped area. "Conserve" means "to keep in a safe or sound state (as by deliberate, planned, or intelligent care)" or "to preserve." Webster's Third New International Dictionary 483 (2002). Thus, the plain language of the statute indicates that the legislature intended to grant open-space status not only to land that actually constitutes a landscaped area, but also to land that facilitates the existence of (i.e., conserves) a landscaped area. Quite simply, land that conserves a landscaped area has a broader meaning than land that is a landscaped area.
Next, considering the statute as a whole, as is proper (First American Bank Corp., 239 Ill. 2d at 516), we conclude that the fact that a particular piece of land has some improvement upon it—including in some cases a building—does not preclude the land from being deemed open space. This proposition becomes clear when one considers the statute's two exceptions to a piece of land receiving open-space status. The first such exception is that "[l]and is not considered used for open space purposes if it is used primarily for residential purposes." 35 ILCS 200/10—155 (West 2006). Obviously, for land to be used for residential purposes, it would have to contain a building. Thus, the mere existence of a building does not, in and of itself, cause land to be ineligible for open-space status. Only if the building is used as a residence does it act as such a bar. Indeed, if any building prevented land from attaining open-space status, this exception would be meaningless, as the question of whether the land was used for residential purposes would be mooted by the existence of the building. This, in turn, would run afoul of the well-established principle of statutory construction that requires a statute to be interpreted such that none of its parts are rendered mere surplusage. Solon v. Midwest Medical Records Ass'n, 236 Ill. 2d 433, 440-41 (2010).
That the existence of a structure does not necessarily prevent land from being classed as open space...
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