Clutterham v. Coachmen Industries, Inc

• Decision Date: 12 July 1985
• Citation: 215 Cal.Rptr. 795,169 Cal.App.3d 1223
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: , 2 IER Cases 164 Leon CLUTTERHAM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COACHMEN INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant and Respondent. Civ. B007792.

Page 795

215 Cal.Rptr. 795

169 Cal.App.3d 1223, 2 IER Cases 164

Leon CLUTTERHAM, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. COACHMEN INDUSTRIES, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

Civ. B007792.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

July 12, 1985.

Murchison & Cumming, Los Angeles, and George M. Wallace, Northridge, for plaintiff and appellant.

Mark A. Boling and Brian Nevins Winn, Anaheim, Morgan, Lewis & Bockius, Renee P. Turkell and Michael L. Wolfram, Los Angeles, for defendant and respondent.

ASHBY, Acting Presiding Justice.

In this action for wrongful termination, the former employee, plaintiff and appellant Leon Clutterham, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the former employer, defendant and respondent Coachmen Industries. We affirm on the ground of respondent's uncontradicted showing that appellant's responsibilities were transferred to a different division during a reorganization of respondent's operations.

Respondent's predecessor in interest, Sportscoach Corporation of America, hired appellant in 1970 as its sales representative to promote the sale in several western states of recreational vehicles built by Sportscoach. In 1978 respondent Coachmen Industries fully acquired Sportscoach Corporation of America and took over its operation. In April 1979 appellant and respondent executed a written "independent sales representative agreement." The agreement contained a termination clause providing: "This agreement may be terminated by either party upon 30 days written notice to the other party.... Should any violation occur of the General Terms of this agreement, by the Representative or the Company, this agreement is then subject to immediate termination."

On July 20, 1979, respondent gave notice of termination to appellant, the notice stating: "Because of a number of reasons, not the least of which is the present RV market, a decision has been reached to suspend manufacturing of the Sportscoach product here in California effective immediately. [p] Coupled with this decision, it was determined that to the best interests of Coachmen Industries, Inc. the Sportscoach entity would be transferred to the Consolidated Leisure Division in Elkhart, Indiana. The plant would be moved back to Indiana and Sportscoach would be marketed along with the various other products that this Division manufactures. [p] Therefore, it is with regret that I must inform you that under the terms of your Sales Agreement with Sportscoach, your services will no longer be needed as of August 31, 1979."

Appellant filed the instant complaint for breach of oral and written contract, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and wrongful termination. The theory of appellant's case was that the contract permitted termination only for cause, and that respondent lacked good cause for terminating appellant. Respondent filed a motion for summary judgment supported by the declaration of Robert J Adasiak and other exhibits. Respondent contended that appellant was an independent contractor, that as a matter of law the employment was at will and did not require good cause for termination, and that in any event respondent had good cause to terminate appellant. Appellant submitted no declarations in opposition to the motion for summary judgment. He submitted points and authorities which argued that triable issues of fact could be inferred even from respondent's evidence, on the questions of appellant's status as an independent contractor, the interpretation of the contract as requiring good cause, and the existence of good cause.

The trial court granted the motion for summary judgment on the ground that even assuming (1) appellant was an employee with a contract requiring good cause for termination, (2) the contract was subject to an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and (3) appellant had given satisfactory service, respondent had shown that there was good cause for termination due to the depressed conditions in the industry and the relocation of corporate operations. Appellant having submitted no evidence to contradict respondent's showing, the court found no triable issues of material fact. (Code Civ.Proc., § 437c.) We affirm.

Conceding that he presented no evidence in opposition to the motion for summary judgment, appellant argues that the motion nevertheless should have been denied on the ground that reasonable contrary inferences could be drawn from respondent's own evidence. (See, e.g., Hepp v. Lockheed-California Co. (1978) 86 Cal.App.3d 714, 717-718, 150 Cal.Rptr. 408.) ¹ The declaration of Robert Adasiak, president of Sportscoach, addressed four issues: (1) the claim that appellant was an independent contractor subject to termination at will; (2) the depressed conditions in the recreational vehicle industry in 1979; (3) the reorganization and relocation of respondent's operations; and (4) lack of satisfactory effort by appellant in promoting the product. Appellant contends that reasonable inferences could be drawn supporting the existence of triable issues of fact relating to the interpretation of the contract and the quality of appellant's services. ² But the trial court assumed that the contract required good cause for termination, that it contained an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and that triable issues of fact existed concerning appellant's job performance. The court granted the motion because even assuming these issues in appellant's favor, respondent had shown, without contradiction by appellant or other reasonable inferences, good cause for appellant's termination in view of market conditions and company reorganization. The record supports the trial court.

Mr. Adasiak declared, "11. Due to the extremely depressed market in the Recreational Vehicle ("RV") industry during 1979, [respondent transferred] all operations for six (6) of its facilities from California back to Indiana, its corporate headquarters, in an effort to reduce its overhead at these facilities. Said facilities included (1) the SPORTSCOACH operation and plant in Chatsworth, California, (2) COACHMEN's RV plant in Northern California, (3) COACHMEN's RV plant in Hemet, California, (4) a parts and accessories division, (5) an awning company, and (6) a furniture factory. [p] 12. Plaintiff's termination from said defendant as an independent sales representative was caused by, (1) said defendant's change in corporate operations and facilities, as mentioned supra; (2) the depressed market of the RV industry; and (3) plaint...