Clyncke v. Waneka

• Decision Date: 26 February 2007
• Docket Number: No. 06SC66.,06SC66.
• Citation: 157 P.3d 1072
• Parties: Freeman CLYNCKE and Danny Clyncke, Petitioners. v. Michele WANEKA, Respondent.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

157 P.3d 1072

Freeman CLYNCKE and Danny Clyncke, Petitioners. v. Michele WANEKA, Respondent.

No. 06SC66.

Supreme Court of Colorado, En Banc.

February 26, 2007.

As Modified on Denial of Rehearing May 21, 2007.^*

Lambdin & Chaney, LLP, L. Kathleen Chaney, John W. Fairless, Denver, Colorado, Attorneys for Petitioners.

Peter William Thomas, PC, Peter W. Thomas, Jr., Snowmass Village, Colorado, Attorneys for Respondent.

Justice BENDER delivered the Judgment and an Opinion.

I. Introduction

In this appeal, we review and affirm the court of appeals' conclusion in Waneka v. Clyncke, 134 P.3d 492 (Colo.App.2005), that the trial court erred when instructing the jury on the potential liability of a sponsor of an equine event under the Colorado Equine Activities Statute, section 13-21-119, C.R.S. (2006). We agree that the Equine Statute places a two-pronged duty on sponsors, holding that a sponsor may be liable when he fails to make reasonable efforts to determine either a participant's ability to engage in the equine activity or a participant's ability to manage a particular horse.

The Equine Statute provides exemption from civil liability¹ for sponsors of equine activities and equine professionals with respect to inherent risks of equine activity. See § 13-21-119(3). Subsection (4)(b) of the Equine Statute establishes exceptional circumstances where common law civil liability still may be imposed. At issue in this case is what a plaintiff must prove under subsection 13-21-119(4)(b)(I)(B) to establish that an equine sponsor is not exempt from liability.

The trial court's instruction required Waneka to prove that the Clynkes failed to make reasonable efforts to determine both her ability to engage in an equine activity and her ability to manage a particular animal. This instruction tracked the trial court's interpretation that subsection (4)(b)(I)(B), an exception to the Equine Statute's exemption from liability, requires plaintiffs to prove an equine sponsor's failure to make reasonable efforts to determine both a proper activity and a proper horse for the participant.

The court of appeals disagreed with the trial court's interpretation of the exception to the Equine Statute's grant of exemption from common law liability in subsection (4)(b)(I)(B). Waneka, 134 P.3d at 493-94. The court of appeals applied interpretive rules of statutory construction, substituting the word "or" for "and" when interpreting subsection 13-21-119(4)(b)(I)(B). Id. at 496-97. The court justified this substitution because it reasoned that the legislature intended to impose a two-pronged duty on sponsors of equine activity and hence, that its substitution of "or" for "and" was necessary to avoid an absurd or unreasonable result. Id. Accordingly, the court of appeals held that the trial court's jury instruction was improper and constituted reversible error. Id. at 497. The court of appeals' statutory construction holds that a sponsor is subject to common law liability if a plaintiff proves either that the sponsor failed to make reasonable efforts to determine the participant's ability to engage in the activity or that the sponsor failed to make reasonable efforts to determine the participant's ability to manage an animal. Id. We granted certiorari to review the court of appeals' decision.²

We agree with the court of appeals' conclusion that the trial court proffered an erroneous jury instruction constituting reversible error. However, we disagree with its analysis. The court need not employ interpretive rules of statutory construction to resolve this issue. The substitution of "or" for "and" is unnecessary. Instead, the court need only look to the plain language of the statute.

The plain language of subsection 13-21-119(4)(b)(I)(B) places a two-pronged duty on sponsors of equine activity seeking exemption from common law civil liability. Thus, a jury instruction tracking the language of this statute states that sponsors may be held liable if they either failed to make reasonable efforts to determine the participant's ability to engage in the activity or failed to make reasonable efforts to determine the participant's ability to manage an animal. The trial court's jury instruction requiring that the plaintiff prove a sponsor's failure to perform both duties is erroneous because it does not track the plain language of the statute.

We hold that the trial court committed reversible error when it instructed the jury that Waneka, the plaintiff in the trial court and the respondent before us, had to prove the defendants' failure to make reasonable efforts to determine both a proper activity and improper horse to establish that they were not exempt from liability. Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the court of appeals employing differing reasoning and return this case to that court with directions to remand this case to the district court for a new trial consistent with this opinion.

II. Facts and Proceedings Below

Respondent Michele Waneka initiated this lawsuit after falling from a horse that Petitioners Freeman Clyncke and Danny Clyncke provided for her to ride while assisting the Clynckes in a horse roundup on their ranch property.

Prior to trial, the court granted partial summary judgment which established that the equine activity which occurred here satisfies the Equine Statute's definition of "inherent risks of equine activity."³ Because the Equine Statute provides exemption from civil liability to equine sponsors⁴ who engage in equine activity involving inherent risks, Waneka, as the plaintiff, had to prove one of the exceptions to this exemption from civil liability to hold the Clynckes liable.

At trial, Waneka argued that the Clynckes failed to adequately consider her safety by both providing a horse she could not safely manage and allowing her to participate in a horseback riding activity unsuited to her ability level. Waneka presented evidence to support each contention.⁵

The Clynckes admitted that Waneka had an accident while riding a horse on their property but denied that they failed to consider adequately her safety with regard to the horse she was riding or the equine activity in which she was participating. They also presented evidence contesting Waneka's assertions that they were not exempt from liability.⁶

At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court instructed the jury on common law negligence.⁷ The court's instruction provided that the jury could find the Clynckes liable if Waneka proved that their conduct fell within section (4)(b)(I)(B)'s exception to the Equine Statute's grant of exemption from liability.⁸ Hence, included in the instructions was an instruction intended to track the statutory language of one of the exceptions to the exemption from civil liability granted by the Equine Statute found in subsections 13-21-119(4)(b) and (4)(b)(I)(B), which states:

Nothing in subsection (3) of this section shall prevent or limit the liability of an equine activity sponsor [or] equine professional . . . if the equine activity sponsor [or] equine professional . . . [p]rovided the animal and failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine the ability of the participant to engage safely in the equine activity . . . and determine the ability of the participant to safely manage the particular animal based on the participant's representations of his ability.

Id. (emphasis added). The trial court's instruction required Waneka, the plaintiff, to prove three things with regard to the defendants' behavior to establish that they were not exempt from liability. First, she had to prove the defendants provided the horse. Second, she had to prove that the defendants failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine her ability to engage safely in the equine activity; and third, she had to prove that the defendants failed to make reasonable and prudent efforts to determine her ability to safely manage the particular animal based on her representations.

Waneka objected, arguing the instruction was erroneous because it did not track the requirements of the statute. She argued that the Equine Statute does not place the burden on the plaintiff to prove that the defendants failed to make reasonable efforts to determine both that the plaintiff could engage safely in the equine activity and that the plaintiff could safely manage the particular animal. Rather she claimed that the statute provides that the defendants are not exempt from liability if the plaintiff proves either occurred—that is, that the Clynckes failed to make a reasonable effort to determine a proper activity or failed to make a reasonable effort to determine a proper horse for her.

The trial court rejected her argument, stating that the legislature would have used the word "or" had it intended there to have been alternative means for establishing that defendants are not exempt from civil liability. The court reasoned that the presence of the word "and" in the statute between the reference to activity and horse meant the legislature intended to require proof of both to establish that the equine sponsor was not exempt from liability. The court further stated that "if the legislature intended to have a different exception putting the word `or' in there, they would have listed it as a separate subsection of the statute, just like they have all the other exceptions listed, A, B, C, D, and this was combined in one exception" and "the word `and' means and." Hence, concluding that a jury instruction containing the conjunctive requirement that the plaintiff have proven both elements to establish potential liability tracked the statute, the court instructed the jury accordingly. The jury found the Clynckes not liable.

Waneka appealed, asserting that the trial court misconstrued the Equine Statute by instructing the jury that she had to prove that the Clynckes failed to make reasonable efforts to determine both her ability to engage in the...