Cmty. Youth Athletic Ctr. v. City of Nat'l City
Decision Date | 30 October 2013 |
Docket Number | D061141,D060001 |
Citation | 164 Cal.Rptr.3d 644,220 Cal.App.4th 1385 |
Court | California Court of Appeals |
Parties | COMMUNITY YOUTH ATHLETIC CENTER, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY OF NATIONAL CITY et al., Defendants and Appellants, Robert Leif et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
See 12 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Real Property, § 827 et seq.
APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of San Diego County, Steven R. Denton, Judge. Affirmed in part, reversed in part with directions. (Super. Ct. No. 37–2007–00076404–CU–EI–CTL).
Pillsbury WinthropShaw Pittman, San Diego, Richard M. Segal, Brian D. Martin, Nathaniel R. Smith; Institute for Justice, Dana Berliner and Jeff Rowes, for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Claudia G. Silva, City Attorney; Best Best & Krieger, San Diego, Bruce W. Beach, Rebecca J. Andrews and Ellen P. Head, for Defendants and Appellants.
Thorsnes Bartolotta McGuire, San Diego, Vincent J. Bartolotta, Jr. and Karen R. Frostrom, for Defendants and Respondents.
In 2007, defendants and appellants, the City of National City and its Community Development Commission (the Commission or CDC; together, the City), approved an amendment to its 1995 redevelopment plan, ordinance No. 2007–2295 (Amendment), that extended the time period authorized by the plan for the use of eminent domain powers within a 300–acre area, based on certain designations of physical and economic blight. (Health & Saf.Code, § 33000 et seq., the Community Redevelopment Law (CRL); all further statutory references are to the Health & Safety Code unless noted.) During the City's months-long amendment and hearing process, it received statutorily mandated reports from a retained private consultant, held noticed hearings, and received opposition from two sets of landowners within the Amendment area, plaintiff and appellant Community Youth Athletic Center (CYAC), and additional respondents, Robert Leif, Suzanne Leif and Anthony Bedford (the “Interested Parties”). (§§ 33352, subd. (b); 33457.1.) 1
When their opposition to the City's approval of the Amendment was unsuccessful, CYAC brought this reverse validation action in superior court (Code Civ. Proc., § 860 et seq., the Validation Act), to seek declaratory and injunctive relief and damages under several statutory and constitutional theories, along with attorney fees and costs. (CRL, §§ 33500, 33501; Gov.Code, § 6250 et seq., Public Records Act (PRA) violations; U.S. Const., 14th Amend. (due process clause); 42 U.S.C. § 1988.) The response filed by the Interested Parties sought similar relief.
After a bench trial, the superior court issued a statement of decision and judgment in favor of CYAC, the Interested Parties and the interested public. In the reverse validation proceedings, the trial court examined the administrative record and set aside the Amendment to the redevelopment plan, by issuing declaratory relief based on its findings of several violations of the CRL: (1) contrary to the provisions of section 33457.1, the City failed to include in its mandated report, prior to the hearing on such Amendment, the maps required by section 33352, subdivision (b) that documented the physical and economic conditions of blight that existed within the project area, (2) the administrative record did not contain substantial evidence supporting the physical blight findings underlying the Amendment, and (3) neither the City nor its retained private consultant (Rosenow Spevacek Group, or “RSG”) had produced, on request by CYAC, two types of underlying raw data relied upon in the RSG “Report to Council” (the “RTC”) (i.e., RSG's field surveys of blight conditions, or the City's police department's property-by-property crime data). 2 The City had relied on those RSG field surveys and crime data to support the enactment of the Amendment which extended the eminent domain redevelopment power, as they led to the RTC's conclusions that physical and economic blight existed within the project area, but the record did not support that reliance.
In an underlying finding, the trial court concluded that the administrative record nevertheless contained “substantial evidence” of a condition of economic blight (by using crime statistics City-wide). However, since the record failed to contain “substantial evidence of at least one condition of physical blight,” and since both findings were needed, the Amendment was declared invalid. (§§ 33030, subd. (b); 33031, subds. (a), (b); 33333.2, subd. (a)(4).)
Additionally, the trial court issued declaratory relief on the ground that the City had violated the PRA, by failing to produce at the request of CYAC certain documents about the same two types of underlying raw data relied upon in the RTC (field surveys of blight conditions, and property-by-property crime data), which the City had used to justify its blight claims.
Further, the court determined that the federal procedural due process rights of CYAC and the public had not been adequately protected by the City during the amendment process, due to the City's failure to comply with CRL statutory requirements or to grant a continuance of the hearing. The court issued declaratory relief finding federal due process violations and awarded nominal damages ($1). (U.S. Const., 14th Amend. [due process clause]; Mathews v. Eldridge (1976) 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (Mathews ).) However, CYAC's alternative California Constitution due process causes of action were found to lack merit. (Cal. Const., art. I, §§ 7(a), 19 [ ].)
After trial, the court ordered the City to pay substantial attorney fees to CYAC ($1,906,516.75) and to the Interested Parties ($84,652.50). The court had initially determined that their requests were untimely filed, but that discretionary relief from default should be granted to entertain the fees motion. (Cal. Rules of Court, rule 3.1702; all further rule references are to the California Rules of Court; Code Civ. Proc., § 473, 1021.5; 42 U.S.C. § 1988; Gov.Code, § 6259, subd. (d).)
The City appeals the judgment and in the consolidated appeal (D061141), the fee orders. CYAC has filed a cross-appeal of a portion of the underlying findings on the reverse validation decision (to challenge the trial court's ruling regarding economic blight, that City-wide crime data was correctly considered by the City, rather than just project-wide data). (§ 33031, subd. (b)(7); CYAC does not cross-appeal the dismissal of its California Constitution claims.)
CYAC has also cross-appealed on a timeliness issue regarding its attorney fees request, since the trial court granted CYAC and the Interested Parties discretionary relief from the untimely filing, then awarded fees. However, CYAC contends there was no late filing in the first place that gave rise to any such need for such relief. (Rule 3.1702; Code Civ. Proc., § 473.)
In a previous order, we granted in part and denied in part the City's judicial notice request, to permit additional materials on the attorney fee questions to be considered on appeal. (See part V, post.) 3
On the merits of the appeal and cross-appeal, first, our review of the administrative record persuades us that the trial court's reverse validation order is well supported by the facts and the law, concerning the CRL violations of sections 33352 and 33457.1 ( ). Although the Legislature abolished redevelopment agencies through its 2011 legislation, the issues regarding the invalidity of this Amendment have not become moot by the passage of time or the subsequent legislative action, particularly as to the attorney fees awards. (§ 33037, subd. (c); California Redevelopment Assn. v. Matosantos (2011) 53 Cal.4th 231, 135 Cal.Rptr.3d 683, 267 P.3d 580 (Matosantos ) [discussed post ].)
Next, on the trial record of the PRA issues, which includes both the administrative record and the trial exhibits and testimony, we uphold the judgment of the trial court issuing declaratory relief in favor of CYAC. Although we disagree with some of the reasoning set forth in the statement of decision, the particular theory of the trial court is not controlling, and it reached the correct result. (Gov.Code, § 6250 et seq.; D'Amico v. Board of Medical Examiners (1974) 11 Cal.3d 1, 18–19, 112 Cal.Rptr. 786, 520 P.2d 10 (D'Amico ).) We shall affirm the declaratory relief judgment on the reverse validation and PRA issues.
However, the judgment must be reversed in part with respect to the trial court's erroneous determination that as a matter of law, the City's proven statutory violations of the CRL additionally amounted to an actionable deprivation of federal due process protections, under the appropriate legal test. (Mathews, supra, 424 U.S. 319, 96 S.Ct. 893.) 4 Although CYAC properly pursued its remedy in the reverse validation action, to challenge such a blight designation amendment within the statutory limitations period (only 90 days; §§ 33500 or 33501), at this point, CYAC or the Interested Parties still cannot show their essential property interests were actually or potentially affected at the level necessary to satisfy the above-cited due process test.5 There was no eminent domain filing by the City, nor had CYAC brought any inverse condemnation action, to crystallize its immediate property interests as protectable under federal due process standards during this early stage redevelopment amendment proceeding. ( Cambria Spring Co. v. City of Pico Rivera (1985) 171 Cal.App.3d 1080, 1097–1098, 217 Cal.Rptr. 772 ( Cambria Spring Co.).)
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment in part but reverse the grant of declaratory relief on the due process theory, with directions to enter a different order. On the attorney fees issues, we find the trial court appropriately granted CYAC and the Interested Parties discretionary relief from any...
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