Cnty. of L. A. v. Fin. Cas. & Sur., Inc., S230213

• Decision Date: 25 June 2018
• Docket Number: S230213
• Citation: 234 Cal.Rptr.3d 459,5 Cal.5th 309,419 P.3d 934
• Court: California Supreme Court
• Parties: COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

5 Cal.5th 309

419 P.3d 934

234 Cal.Rptr.3d 459

COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Plaintiff and Appellant,

v.FINANCIAL CASUALTY & SURETY, INC., Defendant and Respondent.

S230213

Supreme Court of California.

Filed June 25, 2018

Mary C. Wickham, County Counsel, Ruben Baeza, Jr., Assistant County Counsel, Joanne Nielsen, Principal Deputy County Counsel, and Lindsay Yoshiyama, Deputy County Counsel, for Plaintiff and Appellant.

Law Office of John Rorabaugh, John M. Rorabaugh, Fresno and Crystal Rorabaugh, Santa Ana for Defendant and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

Under Penal Code 1

section 1269b, subdivision (a) ( section 1269b(a) ), authorized jail personnel have the authority to "set a time and place for the appearance of the arrested person before the appropriate court and give notice thereof." Section 1269b further provides that "[i]f a defendant or arrested person so released fails to appear at the time and in the court so ordered upon his or her release from custody, Sections 1305 and 1306 apply." ( § 1269b, subd. (h).) Section 1305, former subdivision (a)(4)² in turn, explained that a court may declare the bail forfeited if a defendant fails to appear on "[a]ny other occasion prior to the pronouncement of judgment if the defendant’s presence in court is lawfully required ." (Italics added.) The issue here is, does the jailer’s authority "to set a time and place for the appearance of the arrested person" ( § 1269b(a) ) make that appearance "lawfully required" for purposes of forfeiting bail under section 1305, former subdivision (a)(4)?

For reasons that follow, we conclude that it does.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

On November 29, 2012, criminal defendant Sandra Chavezgarcia appeared in superior court for arraignment. She pleaded not guilty to four felony counts. After conferring with defense counsel on a possible date for pretrial conference, the court set the matter for January 3, 2013: "So that will be the order, then. We’ll see you all back here on January 3rd." The November 29 minute order contained what the parties describe as the following "boilerplate language": "Matter is continued to date and time indicated below for pretrial conference. [¶] The court orders the defendant to appear on the next court date. [¶] ... Next scheduled event: 01/03/13 8:30 am pretrial conference." Chavezgarcia was remanded to custody.

On December 12, 2012, Financial Casualty & Surety, Inc. (Financial Casualty), acting through an agent, executed a $110,000 bond for Chavezgarcia’s release from custody. The preprinted bail bond form, which included the language, "ordered to appear in the above entitled court on," was filled in with the date January 3, 2013; other blank spaces on the form were filled in with pertinent information. The bail bond form provided that Financial Casualty "undertakes" that Chavezgarcia "will appear in the above-named court on the date above," and that if it fails to perform, the court will order forfeiture of the bond and entry of summary judgment "as provided by Sections 1305 and 1306 of the Penal Code."

On January 3, 2013, Chavezgarcia was not present for the pretrial conference, but was represented by counsel. Based on Chavezgarcia’s failure to personally appear, the trial court ordered bail forfeited and issued a bench warrant. The court clerk mailed the parties a notice of forfeiture. On July 3, 2013, the bail agent filed a motion to extend the appearance period to October 23, 2013. The court granted that motion and subsequently granted another motion extending the period to December 27, 2013. The period expired before any forfeiture was set aside. On January 8, 2014, the court granted summary judgment on the forfeited bond, and sent a notice of entry of judgment and demand for payment to Financial Casualty and the bail agent.

Financial Casualty filed a motion to set aside summary judgment on the ground that Chavezgarcia was not ordered to appear at the January 3, 2013, hearing. In opposing the motion, the County of Los Angeles (County) argued that the trial court did order Chavezgarcia to appear on January 3; she was required to be present pursuant to section 977; and the date on the bond was the same date the court ordered her to appear.

On May 16, 2014, the trial court granted Financial Casualty’s motion. The court found there was "no specific order" for Chavezgarcia to appear at the January 3, 2013, hearing. The court also found itself "obliged to follow" the Court of Appeal’s holding in Safety National , which judgment this court subsequently reversed. (See People v. Safety National Casualty Corp . (2016) 62 Cal.4th 703, 709, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 366 P.3d 57 ( Safety National ).) It further concluded that the transcript did not establish that the hearing was a readiness conference within the meaning of California Rules of Court, rule 4.112, which would have meant Chavezgarcia’s presence was "lawfully required" under section 1305. The trial court explained, "It really doesn’t come down to whether ... the magic words of bail will stand." The Court of Appeal affirmed the trial court’s order setting aside summary judgment, vacating forfeiture, and exonerating bail. Focusing on the bail bond issued on Chavezgarcia’s release from custody, the court held that "a notation on the bail bond form that the defendant was ordered to appear in court on a certain date does not mean the defendant was ‘lawfully required’ to appear for purposes of bail forfeiture under section 1305," and added that section 1269b"does not address forfeiture of bail, which undisputedly is governed by section 1305."

We granted review.

DISCUSSION

Because the relevant facts are undisputed and only legal issues are involved, we conduct an independent review. (See Imperial Merchant Services, Inc. v. Hunt (2009) 47 Cal.4th 381, 387, 97 Cal.Rptr.3d 464, 212 P.3d 736 ; People v. International Fidelity Ins. Co . (2012) 204 Cal.App.4th 588, 592, 138 Cal.Rptr.3d 883.)

As we recently recounted, "The forfeiture of bail and related proceedings are a matter of statutory procedure governed by sections 1305 through 1308. [Citation.] ‘The object of bail and its forfeiture is to insure the attendance of the accused and his obedience to the orders and judgment of the court.’ [Citation.] ‘While bail bond proceedings occur in connection with criminal prosecutions, they are independent from and collateral to the prosecutions and are civil in nature.’ [Citation.] In that regard, the bail bond itself is a ‘ "contract between the surety and the government whereby the surety acts as a guarantor of the defendant’s appearance in court under the risk of forfeiture of the bond." ’ [Citation.] When a defendant who posts bail fails to appear at a scheduled hearing, the forfeiture of bail implicates not just the defendant’s required presence, but constitutes a ‘breach of this contract’ between the surety and the government. [Citation.] Ultimately, if the defendant’s nonappearance is without sufficient excuse, it is the surety who ‘must suffer the consequences.’ [Citation.]" ( Safety National , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 709, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 366 P.3d 57.)

Under section 1305, former subdivision (a), the forfeiture of bail is authorized if a defendant, without sufficient excuse, fails to appear at an enumerated proceeding or on another occasion as " ‘lawfully required.’ " ( Safety National , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 710, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 366 P.3d 57 ; id . at p. 709, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 366 P.3d 57.) The issue here is whether Chavezgarcia’s appearance at the January 3 hearing "could be ‘lawfully required’ by another provision of law," specifically, section 1269b. ( Safety National , supra , 62 Cal.4th at p. 710, 199 Cal.Rptr.3d 272, 366 P.3d 57.)

Section 1269b, which consists of subdivisions (a) through (h), covers a range of bail-related subjects. As relevant here, subdivision (a) provides that specified jail personnel "may approve and accept bail in the amount fixed by the warrant of arrest, schedule of bail, or order admitting to bail in cash or surety bond executed by a certified, admitted surety insurer as provided in the Insurance Code, to issue and sign an order for the release of the arrested person, and to set a time and place for the appearance of the arrested person before the appropriate court and give notice thereof ." ( § 1269b(a), italics added.) This authority to set the time and place for a defendant’s appearance has been included in section 1269b—with little change to the italicized language—since section 1269b was first enacted in 1945. (Stats. 1945, ch. 363, § 1, pp. 822-823.)³

As contemplated, section 1269b(a) offers an arrested person held in custody—one who has not yet been arraigned—an expeditious process by which specified jail personnel, an authorized sheriff’s or police department employee, or a court clerk may accept bail (in an amount previously fixed by warrant of arrest or countywide bail schedule); issue an order for the arrestedperson’s release; and set a time and place for the next appearance, which is often the arraignment hearing. This administrative procedure is in lieu of the individualized, but somewhat cumbersome, written court approval set out under section 1269a, which requires a "written order of a competent court or magistrate admitting the defendant to bail" delivered to the officer having custody of the defendant. (See County of Los Angeles v. Surety Ins. Co. (1985) 165 Cal.App.3d 704, 706-707, 211 Cal.Rptr. 867.) Past cases discussing the interplay between section 1269b and section 1305 have typically been in the prearraignment context, where the defendant did not have a next court-ordered appearance. (See, e.g., People v. American Surety Ins . Co. (2009) 178 Cal.App.4th 1437, 1439, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 286 ( American Surety ); County of Los Angeles v. Fairmont Specialty Group (2008) 164 Cal.App.4th 1018, 1021, 79 Cal.Rptr.3d 421 ; People v. Ranger Ins. Co . (2006) 145 Cal.App.4th 23, 30, 51 Cal.Rptr.3d 326 ( Ranger ).)

In this case,...