Cnty. of Ramsey v. Chi., M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

• Decision Date: 10 July 1885
• Citation: 24 N.W. 313,33 Minn. 537
• Parties: COUNTY OF RAMSEY v CHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

33 Minn. 537

24 N.W. 313

COUNTY OF RAMSEYvCHICAGO, M. & ST. P. RY. CO.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Filed July 10, 1885.

Appeal from the district court, Ramsey county, certified up.

J. J. Egan and M. D. Munn, for respondent, Ramsey county.

Bigelow, Flandrau & Squires, for appellant, Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

DICKINSON, J.

This proceeding involves the taxability, during certain years, from 1879 to 1882, inclusive of lands in the city of St. Paul, claimed to be owned by the Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Company. The railway company claims that the lands are within the exemption from ordinary taxation, which attaches to its property in general, through provisions of law, pursuant to which it pays to the state 3 per cent. of its gross earnings in lieu of such taxation. On the part of the county it is claimed that the manner in which these lands have been held and used has been such as to take them out from the class of exempt property.

The question of the taxability having been determined by the district court adversely to the company, it has been certified to this court, pursuant to the statute. Gen. St. 1878, c. 11, § 80. In our consideration of the case we give the same effect to the findings of fact which has been properly made by the district court, and to its decisions, as is ordinarily given to the determinations of a trial court. The statute above cited evidently contemplates this. The district court before which the proceeding is had is required, when it is considered that a case should be presented for review, to “make a brief statement of the facts established, *** and of its decision,” which is to be transmitted to this court. From the statement thus before us the following facts appear: This land was not taxed prior to 1882, because it was supposed to be exempt. But in that year, pursuant to the requirement of statute, (Gen. Laws 1881, c. 5,) the county auditor entered the lands for taxation and charged upon them taxes for certain previous years, as hereafter more particularly shown.

This railway company is the successor of the Minnesota Central Railway Company, and also of the St. Paul & Chicago Railway Company, and its claim to the lands is in part through conveyances to it from these corporations. The lands were acquired by this company, or by the corporations to whose rights it has succeeded, as early as the year 1874. A description of the lands in question, sufficiently accurate for present designation, and the several years for which the taxes objected to were imposed upon the same, are as follows:

Lot 9, [south 150 feet,] block 30, St. Paul, taxed for year 1882.

‘ 10, ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 1881 and 1882.

‘ 13, ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ ‘ 1879, 1880, 1881, 1882.

Block 49, Rice & Irvine's addition, St. Paul, taxed for years 1878, 1879, 1880, 1881, 1882.

Block 69, Irvine's enlargement, etc., St. Paul, taxed for years 1878, 1879, 1880, 1881, 1882.

Block 70, Irvine's enlargement, etc., St. Paul, taxed for years 1878, 1879, 1880, 1881, 1882.

The south 50 feet of lot 9 was used by the railway company for railroad purposes, in connection with its passenger depot, until July 1, 1881, since which time it has been substantially unoccupied for any purpose. The south 50 feet of lot 10 was so used until the latter part of 1880, since which time it has not been used for railroad purposes, but has been used by private persons for their own benefit, with the consent of the company. Lot 13 was occupied by the railway company for warehouse purposes in connection with the operation of its lines of road until 1879. During the years from 1879 to 1882, both inclusive, it was not used by the company for any purpose, but was occupied by private persons for their own benefit, and is still so used. Blocks 49, 69, and 70 are adjacent to the railway operated by this company. They were acquired and have been held for the purpose of extending railroad tracks upon the same, and for devotion to railroad uses, in connection with the operation of the road, from time to time, as necessity or convenience might demand. These blocks have never been used or occupied for any purpose; but it is probable that it will become necessary for the company to use it for railroad purposes at some time in the future.

This railway company accepted the provisions of chapter 111, Sp. Laws 1873, (Gen. St. 1878, c, 11, §§ 128,129,) whereby it was provided that any railroad company accepting and becoming subject to the provisions of that act, should annually pay into the treasury of the state a defined percentage of its gross earnings. By this act it is declared that, in consideration of the annual payment thereby provided for, “the railroad, its appurtenances and appendages, and all other property, estate, and effects of said corporation, held or used for in or about the construction, equipment, renewal, repair, maintaining, or operating its railroad, including the lands granted to said company to aid in the construction of said railroad, as also the stock and capital of said company, shall be, and hereby are, forever exempt from all taxation and from all assessments.” The corporation having accepted and become subject to the provisions of this act, its rights, as well as those of the state, are to be determined by it; and it will be unnecessary in this case to consider the language of a somewhat similar provision with respect to the Minnesota Central Railway Company contained in Sp. Laws 1865, c. 5. In compliance with this law the corporation has, during each year for which the taxes in controversy are charged, paid to the state the required percentage of the gross earnings of its several lines of railroad in this state. Upon the facts above indicated the district court sustained the taxes as charged upon the land.

There can be no doubt that the statutory exemption from general taxation to which we have referred should not be construed as extending to all property of the corporation, without regard to the purposes for which it is held or the uses to which it is for the time devoted. The most obvious construction of the act declaring the exemption, and a construction supported with substantial unanimity by the decisions bearing upon the subject, is that the exemption extends only to such property as is held or used for the purposes for which the corporation exists. State v. Commissioners of Mansfield, 23 N. J. Law, 510; State v. Collectors of Newark, 26 N. J. Law, 519; Cooley, Tax. 151. As to this there is, perhaps, no controversy in this case. The real controversy is whether the facts that, as to a part of the property, it has never yet been used for railroad purposes, and, as to the remainder, that it has ceased for the time to be so used, subjects it to taxation, in view of the fact that it was acquired for railroad purposes, and is still held for such use in the future. This latter fact is not expressly found by the court as to the lots in block 30; but from the view we take of the law of the case, it may be assumed to be so, as the corporation claims is the fact, and as the evidence tends to show the fact to be.

The decided cases yield but little aid towards the decision of this question. From the decisions of the courts of New Jersey, where, under exemption laws somewhat similar to that above cited, this question has most frequently arisen, the following propositions may be taken as a brief expression of the law as there declared: Lands held by the corporation for future, but already contemplated use, but which are in the mean time let to individuals for use, are taxable. Lands held for future use, such use not being, however, at present actually contemplated, are taxable, although vacant and unoccupied. Lands acquired and held for future use, and which are in the course of being devoted to such use, as by the necessary filling of submerged land, are not taxable; and (perhaps) lands not in use but in good faith held for future use, the need for which is apparent and not remote, are exempt. State v. Collectors of Newark, 25 N. J. Law, 315, affirmed in court of errors, 26 N. J. Law, 519; State v. Collector of Middle Tp. 38 N. J. Law, 270; Cook v. State, ...