Cnty. of Richland v. Miller
| Decision Date | 19 November 1881 |
| Docket Number | CASE No. 1115. |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | COUNTY OF RICHLAND v. MILLER, CLERK OF COMMISSIONERS. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
1. For moneys alleged to be due to Richland county, an action may properly be brought in the name of “The County of Richland.”
2. The clerk of the board of county commissioners from 1872 to 1876 was entitled to charge for the number of days he was actually and necessarily employed in discharging the duties of his office, and was not limited to the days his board was in session.
3. The accounts of such officer for his services as clerk having been duly audited by the board of county commissioners and ordered to be paid, their action, in the absence of mistake or fraudulent collusion, cannot be disregarded by a succeeding board, nor suit maintained by the county to recover back moneys received on the accounts so audited.
Before MACKEY, J., Richland, November, 1880.
Action commenced in May, 1878, by the county of Richland against Daniel B. Miller, as clerk of the board of county commissioners for Richland county.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of this court. The case seems to have been referred to the master, upon whose report the case was heard by the Circuit judge, without a jury. His findings of fact and conclusions of law were as follows:
FINDINGS OF FACT. 1. That the defendant was clerk of the board of county commissioners for Richland county from January 1st, 1874, to January 1st, 1877.
2. That during that period he rendered accounts against the county which contained illegal charges, as alleged in the complaint, amounting to the sum of $2,091.
3. That the said charges were audited, and the sum of $796.62 paid thereon to said defendant out of the county funds, at the times alleged in the complaint and exhibit.
4. That $57 of said sum so illegally charged and paid were for certain days' services which the defendant had previously
been paid for, and the remaining $739.62 were for days on which he did not render any service required of him by law as clerk of the board, and it is proved by the minute books of the board that the board did not meet on those days.
5. That the accounts of defendant themselves do not state what were the services charged for.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW. 1. The words, “The County of Richland,” used in the complaint, are a proper designation of the plaintiff.
2. The board of county commissioners were not acting as a court, but merely as an auditing board in passing upon the accounts in question, and their proceedings were ex parte as regards the county; therefore, the county is not concluded by their decision.
3. The defendant should have stated in his accounts what were the services he charged for on each particular day.
4. It having been proved that the board of county commissioners was not in session on the days for which the illegal charges sued on were made, the burden of proof was on the defendant to prove that those days were actually and necessarily employed by him, as clerk of the board, in the discharge of his duties under the statute. On the contrary, he does not prove that he rendered any particular service upon any particular day of any week in the year; and the services he testified to as having been rendered by him, such as superintending the building of the court house, examining, approving and reporting on claims, &c., were not such services as devolved upon the clerk under the statute. But, in fact, in so doing he was assuming to himself the functions of the entire board. Still less should he receive pay for the entire day, when he examined, as he states, only one account.
It is, therefore, ordered and adjudged, that the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant for the sum of $796.62, with interest thereon from the dates when the several payments aggregating that sum were made to said clerk.
And it is further ordered and adjudged, that the said illegal charges named in the above findings of fact be canceled, and that the said accounts of the defendant be corrected accordingly. And the defendant is hereby enjoined from collecting, and the county treasurer of Richland county is enjoined from paying the unpaid pro rata portion of said illegal charges. And the county commissioners are enjoined from drawing any order or orders therefor.
It is further ordered, that all moneys now in the hands of the county commissioners or the county treasurer for Richland county, to the credit of said D. B. Miller, or which may hereafter be in their hands or in the hands of either of them to his credit, be applied to the payment of this judgment, and that said county commissioners and said county treasurer are enjoined from paying any of the accounts of said D. B. Miller against said county, which he holds either as the original payee, or as assignee, or otherwise, until this judgment is satisfied.
The defendant appealed upon the following exceptions:
First. The defendant, Daniel B. Miller, excepts to the findings of fact numbered 2, 4, 5.
Second. The defendant excepts to the conclusions of law numbered 1, 2, 3 and 4.
Third. The defendant further excepts to the said judgment, and submits the following grounds therefor:
1. Because the court erred in ordering and adjudging, “That the plaintiff have judgment against the defendant for the sum of $796.62, with interest thereon from the dates when the several payments aggregating that sum were made to said clerk.”
2. Because the court erred in ordering and adjudging,
3. Because the court erred in ordering and adjudging further, “That all moneys now in the hands of the county commissioners or the county treasurer for Richland county, to the credit of said D. B. Miller, or which may hereafter be in their hands or in the hands of either of them to his credit, be applied to the payment of this judgment, and that the said county commissioners and the said county treasurer are enjoined from paying any of the accounts of the said D. B. Miller, which he holds either as the original payee, or as assignee, or otherwise, until this judgment is satisfied.”
Messrs. Melton & Clark and Youmans, attorney-general, for appellant.
Messrs. Bacon & Moore, contra.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
Daniel B. Miller, the defendant, was clerk of the board of county commissioners for Richland county from January 1st, 1872, until 1876. During that period, from time to time, he rendered his account for services as clerk of the board, which were audited, approved and ordered to be paid by the board. Some of the accounts have been paid in full, others in part, and the remainder are still outstanding as unpaid county claims.
In the year 1877, a commission was appointed by the Governor to investigate the indebtedness of the county of Richland under the 16 Stat. 312. The duty of the commission was to report, in writing, a statement of said bona fide indebtedness to the board of county commissioners and to the general assembly at its next session thereafter. This commission, after laborious and careful inquiry, rejected the claims of the defendant as clerk of the board of county commissioners, in so far as the same contained charges for services rendered upon days on which the board did not meet for the transaction of business. They ascertained that for the whole period the defendant was clerk, he charged for six hundred and seventy-eight days on which the board did not meet, amounting, at $3 per day, to the sum of $2,034, of which the defendant had received, at various times, in part, $739.62. Besides it was admitted that there was a mistake of nineteen days, which amounted to $57, wrongfully charged.
This report was placed in the hands of the grand jury of the county, which recommended “that the solicitor be ordered to take such legal steps as may be necessary for the protection and good of the county as suggested by the said report of the said commission.”
Accordingly, this action was brought in the name of “The County of Richland,” under...
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