Coad v. Travelers' Insurance Company of Hartford, Connecticut
| Decision Date | 20 March 1901 |
| Docket Number | 9,313 |
| Citation | 85 N.W. 558,61 Neb. 563 |
| Parties | JOHN F. COAD v. TRAVELERS' INSURANCE COMPANY OF HARTFORD, CONNECTICUT |
| Court | Nebraska Supreme Court |
ERROR from the district court for Douglas county. Tried below before FAWCETT, J. Affirmed.
AFFIRMED.
Constantine J. Smyth and J. J. O'Connor, for plaintiff in error.
Charles Offutt and W. W. Morsman, contra.
A policy of accident insurance was issued to plaintiff in error, also plaintiff below, by the defendant insurance company, in which it was provided that the insurance was "against loss of time not exceeding 26 consecutive weeks resulting from bodily injuries effected during the term of this insurance, through external, violent and accidental means, which shall, independently of all other causes immediately and wholly disable him from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation." In the policy the occupation was given as a capitalist, it being a preferred classification of risks. The plaintiff, according to the allegations of the petition, received, during the continuance of the policy, a personal injury by the bursting of a bottle, cutting his left hand, the cut being, it is alleged, "quite deep, severing several of the tendons of the fingers and damaging others; and he thereby became totally disabled from attending to any business, said hand being totally disabled from attending to any business, said hand being totally disabled." After issues were joined and a trial to a jury, the court, on the request of the defendant, peremptorily instructed the jury that "Under the pleadings and the proof in this case the plaintiff cannot recover and the jury will therefore return a verdict for the defendant." An exception to the instruction was duly taken, and upon a motion for a new trial being overruled and judgment entered on the verdict, error proceeding was begun in this court to secure a reversal of the judgment.
The sole question presented and argued is whether, under the evidence, the question of total disability of the plaintiff from the effects of the injury sustained and pleaded in the petition should have been submitted to the jury as a question of fact for their determination; or, to state the proposition in another way, would the evidence support a verdict for the plaintiff had the jury so found? The injury occurred September 17, 1893. It is described by the physician called to dress it as On February 5, The witness had seen the wound professionally several times between the time when the injury occurred and February 5, when the second piece of glass was removed, and once afterwards. In describing the injury further he says:
The following, aside from the foregoing, may be regarded as a fair epitome of the testimony of the case regarding the plaintiff's ability to conduct, oversee and attend to his business. He went to his office the day following the injury, which occurred on Sunday, and was not at any time subsequently prevented, by reason of the injury, from going to his office and directing the management of his business affairs. He visited the World's Fair at Chicago for a week the latter part of the same month the injury was received. He was able to attend meetings of the board of directors of banks in which he had an interest in both Omaha and South Omaha. He wrote a letter, dictated others and signed checks. He was at his office to look after his business interests every day, unless called elsewhere on other business matters or when visiting the World's Fair. He was unable to button his collar, tie his shoes, or divide his food at meals. He experienced a great deal of pain in consequence of the accident. He had interests in different parts of the state, in California and Texas, which he claims he did not and could not personally visit and look after during the time mentioned and when the injury is claimed to have totally disabled him from attending to his business. While the plaintiff testifies to his disabilities from the accident, he does not testify to facts upon which to base an inference that he was prevented from performing any of the more important duties or work pertaining to his business or occupation as a capitalist. It is not, we think, shown that he was unable to do any usual and ordinary work, pertaining to his occupation, with the possible exception of letter writing, and he says on this point that his correspondence was limited, that he dictated some of it, and also that he could write by holding his left hand up, which position it appears was necessary to avoid severe pain from the injury.
The policy indemnified him against loss of time, when independent of all other causes, he was wholly disabled by accident "from transacting any and every kind of business pertaining to his occupation." Will the evidence sustain a recovery under these provisions? What are the just deductions to be made with reference to the ability of the plaintiff to attend to and carry on his business notwithstanding the injury received? We think the only just inference warranted is that the conduct of his own business was substantially carried on by him after the injury the same as before. He attended to his business at all times. He employed no substitute during any portion of the time. At no time was he prevented from leaving his home, attending his office, directing his business, or taking part in the deliberations of the boards of directors of the banks in which he...
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Coad v. Travelers' Ins. Co. of Hartford, Conn.
... ... Syllabus by the Court.1. In a policy of accident insurance, wherein it is provided for indemnity when the injury resulting from an accident shall wholly ... Coad against the Travelers' Insurance Company of Hartford, Conn. Judgment for defendant, and plaintiff brings error. Affirmed.[85 N.W. 558]C. J ... ...