Coakley v. Police & Firemen's Ret. & R. Bd.
| Decision Date | 09 March 1977 |
| Docket Number | No. 9081.,9081. |
| Citation | 370 A.2d 1345 |
| Parties | Daniel J. COAKLEY, Petitioner, v. POLICE AND FIREMEN'S RETIREMENT AND RELIEF BOARD et al., Respondents. |
| Court | D.C. Court of Appeals |
Edward Jasen, Washington, D. C., for petitioner; Robert Cadeaux, Washington, D. C., was on the brief.
Leo N. Gorman, Asst. Corp. Counsel, with whom C. Francis Murphy, Corp. Counsel, at the time the brief was filed, Louis P. Robbins, Principal Asst. Corp. Counsel, and Richard W. Barton, Asst. Corp. Counsel, Washington, D. C., were on the brief, for respondents.
Before NEBEKER and HARRIS, Associate Judges, and JOHNSON, Associate Judge, Superior Court.*
Daniel J. Coakley, petitioner, challenges two rulings of the Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board (Retirement Board) dated October 6, 1972, and June 22, 1973, respectively, and the October 10, 1974, decision of the Board of Appeals and Review (BAR) affirming the Retirement Board rulings.1
Petitioner was appointed to the District of Columbia Fire Department in 1963. After nine years of service, he was presented to the Retirement Board by the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons due to chronic asthmatic bronchitis with hypersensitivity to smoke and a non-contributory chronic behavioral problem. Based on the medical evidence adduced at the hearing, the Retirement Board, on January 6, 1972, found that petitioner was unable to perform firefighting duties as a result of his respiratory ailment, but was capable of performing non-firefighting duties within the department. Since petitioner was not precluded from further useful service in the department, the Retirement Board concluded that petitioner's malady did not constitute a "disability" within the meaning of D.C.Code 1973, § 4-521(2).2 Petitioner was reassigned to, and commenced, a non-firefighting job in the department while retaining the same salary and grade level, i. e., Private, Class I-A, Step 6. Petitioner appealed the January 6, 1972, decision to the BAR.
A few months later, petitioner appeared before the Fire Department Trial Board (Trial Board) for disciplinary action resulting from allegations of bizarre behavior following his transfer to the non-firefighting unit. The Trial Board dismissed petitioner from the department, thereby depriving him of any annuity. Petitioner appealed the Trial Board's decision to the BAR.
At petitioner's request, Mayor-Commissioner Walter E. Washington stayed further action on the appeal from the findings and recommendation of the Trial Board and remanded the case to the Retirement Board for consideration of petitioner's claim of psychological disability. On the basis of the Mayor-Commissioner's action, and with the concurrence of the Corporation Counsel, the BAR dismissed the pending appeal of the January 6, 1972, Retirement Board decision without prejudice and remanded the case to the Retirement Board for a hearing on petitioner's claim of psychological disability.
On June 22, 1973, the Retirement Board ruled on both of petitioner's pending cases. First, it set aside the Trial Board's recommendation that petitioner be dismissed from the department for disciplinary problems. Second, based on a reconsideration of petitioner's claim of psychological disability, the Retirement Board ordered petitioner retired under D.C.Code 1973, § 4-526.3 The ruling on the disability issue followed a full hearing and a finding that petitioner was psychologically incapacitated but that his mental condition was neither duty-caused nor duty-aggravated.
Petitioner thereupon reinstated his appeal of the January 6, 1972, Retirement Board decision and also appealed the June 22, 1973, decision of the Retirement Board to the BAR. On October 10, 1974, the BAR unanimously sustained both Retirement Board decisions. When the petition for reconsideration was denied, the petition for review presently before the court was filed.
Petitioner challenges the sufficiency of the evidence and the Retirement Board's and the BAR's interpretation of the term "disabled" as defined in § 4-521(2).
In reviewing the findings of an agency of the District of Columbia, the District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act provides that this court must hold unlawful and set aside any agency decision not based upon substantial evidence.4 Therefore, the court must consider whether the agency findings are supported by reliable, probative, and substantial evidence in the record, and whether the conclusions reached by the agency "flow rationally from these findings." Dietrich v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 320 A.2d 282 (1974); Marjorie Webster Junior College, Inc. v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 309 A.2d 314, 319 (1973); Schiffmann v. ABC Board, D.C.App., 302 A.2d 235 (1973). If the agency's decision is supported by substantial evidence, we must affirm its action even though we might have reached another result, for it is not the function or authority of the reviewing court to superimpose its opinion upon the legitimate action of an administrative agency. Shay v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 334 A.2d 175 (1975); Stewart v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, D.C.App., 305 A.2d 516 (1973).
The record reveals that the medical evidence submitted to the Retirement Board clearly supported the finding that petitioner's hypersensitivity to smoke rendered him unable to perform firefighting duties, but did not impair his ability to assume a non-firefighting position in the department. Petitioner's respiratory condition was diagnosed by three physicians. Dr. Howard Yeager of the Board of Police and Fire Surgeons, testifying before the Retirement Board, concluded that petitioner was capable of performing non-firefighting duties despite his chronic asthmatic bronchial condition. Furthermore, we find no medical evidence in the record to support petitioner's claim that a normal office environment would aggravate his condition.5
Petitioner's contention that the evidence does not support the findings of the Retirement Board is without merit. The decision of the Board is supported by substantial evidence and as such must be affirmed. Brooks v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review, D.C.App., 317 A.2d 864 (1974); Carroll v. District of Columbia Board of Appeals and Review, D.C.App., 292 A.2d 161 (1972).
The Retirement Board found that petitioner was not disabled for useful and efficient service in the grade or class of position he last occupied, namely, Private, Class I-A, and determined that he could perform non-firefighting duties at the same or a higher class of position with no reduction in pay. Consequently, he was not retired as disabled under § 4-521(2).
Petitioner contends that the Retirement Board and the BAR misconstrued the meaning of the word "disabled." He maintains that the phrase "disabled for useful and efficient service in the grade or class of position last occupied" found in § 4-521(2) refers to an occupational category defined by duties and responsibilities, e. g., firefighter, rather than a category defined by rank or salary, or both, e. g., Private, as argued by respondents.
The District of Columbia Administrative Procedure Act authorizes this court to decide all relevant questions of law, to interpret constitutional and statutory provisions, and to determine the meaning or applicability of the terms of any action.6 The legislative history of the DCAPA shows a clear congressional intent that we employ the same standards for judicial review as other federal courts employ for the Federal Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706 (1970). Wallace v. District Unemployment Compensation Board, D.C.App., 294 A.2d 177 (1972); Basiliko v. District of Columbia, D.C.App., 283 A.2d 816, 818 (1971).
Although the ultimate responsibility for determining the correct interpretation of a statute rests with the courts "it is settled that the courts should give great weight to any reasonable construction of a regulatory statute adopted by the agency charged with enforcement of that statute." Watergate Improvement Associates v. Public Service Commission, D.C.App., 326 A.2d 778, 785 (1974). See also Commissioner of District of Columbia v. Benenson, D.C.App., 329 A.2d 437 (1974). As the Supreme Court stated in Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16, 85 S.Ct. 792, 801, 13 L.Ed.2d 616 (1965):
When faced with a problem of statutory construction, this Court shows great deference to the interpretation given the statute by the officers or agency charged with its administration. "To sustain the Commission's application of this statutory term, we need not find that its construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it is the result we would have reached had the question arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings." Unemployment Comm'n v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153, 67 S.Ct. 245, 250, 91 L.Ed. 136, 145. See also, e. g., Gray v. Powell, 314 U.S. 402, 62 S.Ct. 326, 86 L.Ed. 301; Universal Battery Co. v. United "States, 281 U.S. 580, 583, 50 S.Ct. 422, 74 L.Ed. 1051, 1054.
Indeed, "the construction of a statute by those charged with its execution should be followed unless there are compelling indications that it is wrong. . . ." Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. F. C. C., 395 U.S. 367, 381, 89 S.Ct. 1794, 1802, 23 L.Ed.2d 371 (1969). Accord, New York State Department of Social Services v. Dublino, 413 U.S. 405, 421, 93 S.Ct. 2507, 37 L.Ed.2d 688 (1973). Thus, where an administrative agency's construction of a statute is reasonable and does not contravene the language or legislative history of the statute, it should be followed. Harrison v. J. H. Marshall & Associates, Inc., D.C.App., 271 A.2d 404 (1970).
In drafting § 4-521(2), Congress tracked the existing definition of "disabled" found in the Federal Civil Service Retirement Act of 1926.7...
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