Coal. on Homelessness v. City of San Francisco
| Docket Number | A164180 |
| Decision Date | 21 July 2023 |
| Parties | COALITION ON HOMELESSNESS, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO, et al., Defendants and Respondents. |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
San Francisco County Superior Court No. CPF-18-516456 Hon. Ethan P. Schulman Trial Judge:
Munger, Tolles & Olson, Rohit K. Singla, J. Max Rosen Bay Area Legal Aid, Novella Y. Coleman, Sasha Ellis Lawyers' Committee for Civil Rights of the San Francisco Bay Area, Zal K. Shroff and Elisa Della-Piana for Plaintiff and Appellant.
Eliana Machefsky; All Rise Trial and Appellate and Jim Davy for the National Police Accountability Project and Roderick & Solange MacArthur Justice Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
Milbank, Mark Shinderman, Asena Baran, Mohammad Tehrani; Law Foundation of Silicon Valley, Jeremy Chen; Public Counsel, Nisha Kashyap; Legal Aid Foundation of Los Angeles and Shayla Myers for San Francisco Public Defender's Office, Disability Rights California, Western Center on Law and Poverty, UNITE HERE Local 11, FreeFrom and National Homelessness Law Center as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and Appellant.
David Chiu, City Attorney, and Wayne K. Snodgrass, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendants and Respondents.
Plaintiff and appellant Coalition on Homelessness (appellant) filed the present action against defendants and respondents the City and County of San Francisco, the San Francisco Municipal Transportation Agency (SFMTA), and the San Francisco Police Department (collectively, respondents) to challenge the SFMTA's policy of towing safely and lawfully parked vehicles without a warrant based solely on the accrual of unpaid parking tickets. Appellant contends the warrantless tows are unreasonable seizures within the meaning of article I, section 13 of the California Constitution and the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution (Fourth Amendment).[1] The trial court denied appellant's motion for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief. We reverse.
The principal issue on appeal is whether the challenged warrantless tows are permissible under the vehicular community caretaking exception to the Fourth Amendment's warrant requirement.[2] We conclude respondents have not shown that legally parked cars with unpaid parking tickets that present no threat to "public safety and the efficient movement of vehicular traffic" (S. Dakota v. Opperman (1976) 428 U.S. 364, 369 (Opperman)) may be towed under that exception. In particular, we reject respondents' argument that their interest in deterring parking violations and nonpayment of parking fines justifies warrantless tows under the vehicular community caretaking exception. Such deterrence does not justify warrantless tows of lawfully registered and lawfully parked vehicles. We also reject the proposition that the tows at issue may be justified by analogy to warrantless property seizures in the forfeiture context.
Because the State of California "has preempted the field of motor vehicle traffic regulation," "[a] city has no authority over vehicular traffic control except as expressly provided by the Legislature." (Save the Sunset Strip Coalition v. City of West Hollywood (2001) 87 Cal.App.4th 1172, 1177-1178.)
Pursuant to Vehicle Code section 22651,[3] the Legislature has authorized vehicle tows in a range of different circumstances. Section 22651, subdivision (i)(1), at issue in the present case, permits tows for unpaid parking citations. Specifically, it permits a peace or parking enforcement officer to tow a vehicle if it "is found upon a highway or public land . . . and it is known that the vehicle has been issued five or more notices of parking violations to which the owner or person in control of the vehicle has not responded within 21 calendar days" of issuance. (§ 22651, subd. (i)(1).) The statute mandates that parking citations warn that multiple citations may result in impoundment: "A notice of parking violation issued for an unlawfully parked vehicle shall be accompanied by a warning that repeated violations may result in the impounding of the vehicle." (§ 22651, subd. (i)(3).)[4]
Once a vehicle has been towed, local authorities may keep it in storage until its owner provides "[s]atisfactory evidence that all parking penalties due for the vehicle . . . have been cleared." (§ 22651, subd. (i)(1)(C).) Alternately, "In lieu of furnishing satisfactory evidence that the full amount of parking penalties or bail has been deposited, that person may demand to be taken without unnecessary delay before . . . a hearing examiner, for parking offenses, within the county where the offenses charged are alleged to have been committed and who has jurisdiction of the offenses and is nearest or most accessible with reference to the place where the vehicle is impounded." (§ 22651, subd. (i)(3).) During such a hearing, "the storing agency shall have the burden of establishing the authority for, and the validity of, the removal." (§ 22650, subd. (c).) Under section 22851.1, subdivision (a), "[i]f the vehicle is impounded pursuant to subdivision (i) of Section 22651 and not released as provided in that subdivision, the vehicle may be sold . . . to satisfy" liens for towing and storage and for the outstanding parking violations.
Appellant challenges the constitutionality of the SFMTA's policy of towing vehicles pursuant to section 22651, subdivision (i)(1) without first obtaining a warrant. In December 2018, appellant filed a petition for writ of mandate and complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief, objecting to this practice.[5] Appellant alleged the warrantless tows violated article I, section 13 of the California Constitution, and, by extension, the Fourth Amendment. Appellant also alleged the tows violated the owners' constitutional due process rights.
Respondents' answer admitted that the SFMTA "does not obtain warrants when it tows vehicles" pursuant to section 22651, subdivision (i)(1) and that, under the SFMTA's policies, "vehicles subject to tow under [that section] may be towed without regard to whether they are legally or safely parked at the time of the tow and without regard to whether the vehicle is involved in any crime."
During the COVID-19 pandemic, the SFMTA ceased ordering tows for unpaid parking citations. In June 2021, the SFMTA resumed ordering such tows pursuant to an altered policy. Pursuant to the amended policy, the SFMTA no longer orders tows of vehicles where the amounts owed are $2,500 or less,[6] and "when a parking enforcement officer . . . can identify that [a] car is being used as shelter, the officer will not place a boot on the car, and also will not direct that the car be towed for unpaid and delinquent parking citations, regardless of the amount of money that is owed on those citations (unless the car is parked in a tow-away zone, in a place that creates a hazard, or in similar circumstances)."[7]
In June 2021, appellant moved for issuance of a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief. In addition to evidence regarding the SFMTA's policies, appellant presented declarations regarding the severe impacts of vehicle tows on unhoused San Francisco residents. Appellant also presented a declaration from an economist who, among other things, reported data showing that a majority of vehicles towed for "debt collection" were ultimately sold.
In September 2021, the trial court denied appellant's motion for a writ of mandate and declaratory and injunctive relief. The court agreed that towing a vehicle is a seizure under the Fourth Amendment, which would ordinarily require a warrant. But the court held the SFMTA's warrantless tows were lawful under the "community caretaking" exception to the warrant requirement, citing Opperman, supra, 428 U.S. 364. The trial court also rejected appellant's due process claim.[8]
In October 2021, the trial court entered judgment in favor of respondents and AutoReturn, and the present appeal followed.[9]
The Fourth Amendment guarantees "[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures," and further provides that "no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized." The Fourth Amendment's prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures applies to respondents through the Fourteenth Amendment. (Soldal v. Cook County, Illinois (1992) 506 U.S. 56, 61; Verdun v. City of San Diego (9th Cir. 2022) 51 F.4th 1033, 1036.) "The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable interferences in property interests regardless of whether there is an invasion of privacy." (Miranda v. City of Cornelius (9th Cir. 2005) 429 F.3d 858, 862 (Miranda), citing Soldal, at p. 62; see also Soldal, at p. 62 ["our cases unmistakably hold that the [Fourth] Amendment protects property as well as privacy"]; accord, N. Am. Butterfly Ass'n v. Wolf (D.C. Cir. 2020) 977 F.3d 1244, 1264.) A property seizure (the type of action challenged in the present case) "occurs when 'there is some meaningful interference with an individual's possessory interests in [his or her] property.'" (Soldal, at p. 61.) In the present case, it is undisputed that seizures occur when cars are towed under the SFMTA's towing policy. (See Miranda, at p. 862 [].)
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