COALITION OF CONCERNED COMMUNITIES v. LA

Decision Date09 December 2004
Docket NumberNo. S119897.,S119897.
Citation34 Cal.4th 733,101 P.3d 563,21 Cal.Rptr.3d 676
CourtCalifornia Supreme Court
PartiesCOALITION OF CONCERNED COMMUNITIES, INC., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. CITY OF LOS ANGELES, Defendant and Respondent; Catellus Residential Group, Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

Law Office of Craig A. Sherman and Craig A. Sherman for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Rockard J. Delgadillo, City Attorney, Susan D. Pfann, Jack L. Brown and Jeri L. Burge, Assistant City Attorneys, and Kenneth T. Fong, Deputy City Attorney, for Defendant and Respondent.

Latham & Watkins, Robert D. Crockett, Kathryn M. Davis and James R. Repking, Los Angeles, for Real Party in Interest and Respondent.

CHIN, J.

Government Code section 65590, subdivision (d) (section 65590(d)), part of the Mello Act, provides that "[n]ew housing developments constructed within the coastal zone" shall provide housing for those with low or moderate income where feasible. We must decide whether this provision applies to a proposed project that is partly within the coastal zone but has no housing impacts within that zone. Because the purpose of the Mello Act is to provide for affordable housing based on housing impacts within the coastal zone, we conclude that section 65590(d) does not govern this project.

I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Real party in interest Catellus Residential Group (Catellus) proposes to develop approximately 45 acres of land near the Pacific Ocean in the Westchester-Playa del Rey area of Los Angeles. About 12 acres of the property is located within the California coastal zone. (See Pub. Resources Code, § 30103.)

Defendant City of Los Angeles (city) originally approved an earlier version of the proposed project. It concluded that the Mello Act's affordable housing requirement did not apply because none of the proposed houses would be constructed within the coastal zone. Plaintiffs Coalition of Concerned Citizens, Inc. and Spirit of the Sage Council (collectively, Coalition) commenced the instant action in March 1999 by filing a petition for writ of mandate in the superior court challenging the city's approval of the project. As relevant here, the petition alleged that the project violated the Mello Act. (Gov.Code, §§ 65590, 65590.1.) After this action commenced, the Coastal Commission denied Catellus a coastal development permit. The trial court then stayed the instant action pending revision of the project.

Catellus revised the project. As currently proposed, the project includes 114 homes, all to be constructed outside the coastal zone, and about 19 acres of open space. The dissent in the Court of Appeal described the proposed construction within the coastal zone: "Proposed construction within the coastal zone includes the construction of part of an access road, widening of Lincoln Boulevard, construction of a public view park, and erosion control measures, all of which will involve the grading of a total of 2.31 acres of land within the coastal zone. A storm drain and water, sewer, and other utility lines also are to be constructed in or under the access road and partly within the coastal zone." The city approved the new proposal. In August 2000, the Coastal Commission issued a coastal development permit. (The commission's issuance of the permit is being challenged in a separate action that is also before this court. (Sierra Club v. California Coastal Com., review granted July 23, 2003, S116081.)) Coalition amended the petition for writ of mandate in October 2000 to challenge the city's approval of the revised project. It alleges that the project is located within the coastal zone and therefore must comply with Mello Act affordable housing requirements. After a hearing, the trial court rejected Coalition's contentions and entered a judgment denying the petition in February 2001. Coalition appealed.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the judgment. The majority, in an opinion by Justice Aldrich, held that "the Mello Act affordable housing requirement applies to a new housing development only if the development includes housing constructed within the coastal zone." Justice Croskey dissented on this point. He argued that "if a substantial part of the development is constructed within the coastal zone, as here, the affordable housing requirement will apply." We granted Coalition's petition for review limited to whether the Mello Act applies to this development.

II. DISCUSSION

The Legislature enacted Government Code section 65590, part of the Mello Act, in 1981. (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles (1996) 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 1552, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 465.) At issue in this case is section 65590(d), which states in part: "New housing developments constructed within the coastal zone shall, where feasible, provide housing units for persons and families of low or moderate income, as defined in Section 50093 of the Health and Safety Code."1 Specifically, we must decide what the Legislature meant by "[n]ew housing developments." If, as here, a proposed housing development includes open space and infrastructure within the coastal zone, but every house will be outside the coastal zone, is it a housing development "constructed within the coastal zone" for purposes of this statute?

Catellus argues, and the Court of Appeal majority below found, that section 65590(d) applies only if some actual housing is constructed within the coastal zone. Coalition argues that the section applies if any part of the development is within the coastal zone. The dissent below argued that the section applies if a "substantial part" of the development is within the coastal zone. We conclude that section 65590(d) does not apply to a development like this which contains within the coastal zone no housing or even private amenities reserved for the exclusive use of the homeowners.2 Our fundamental task in interpreting a statute is to determine the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the law's purpose. We first examine the statutory language, giving it a plain and commonsense meaning. We do not examine that language in isolation, but in the context of the statutory framework as a whole in order to determine its scope and purpose and to harmonize the various parts of the enactment. If the language is clear, courts must generally follow its plain meaning unless a literal interpretation would result in absurd consequences the Legislature did not intend. If the statutory language permits more than one reasonable interpretation, courts may consider other aids, such as the statute's purpose, legislative history, and public policy. (Torres v. Parkhouse Tire Service, Inc. (2001) 26 Cal.4th 995, 1003, 111 Cal. Rptr.2d 564, 30 P.3d 57; People v. Murphy (2001) 25 Cal.4th 136, 142, 105 Cal. Rptr.2d 387, 19 P.3d 1129; People v. Ledesma (1997) 16 Cal.4th 90, 95, 65 Cal. Rptr.2d 610, 939 P.2d 1310.)

We agree with the majority below that section 65590(d)'s words, "[n]ew housing developments constructed within the coastal zone," are ambiguous. (See Citizens for Hatton Canyon v. Dept. of Transportation (2003) 112 Cal.App.4th 838, 844, 5 Cal.Rptr.3d 480 [phrase "in the coastal zone" is ambiguous; it could either mean at least partially within the zone or entirely within the zone].) One could say that if any part of a proposed development that includes houses is within the coastal zone, the development is a housing development, and it is constructed within the coastal zone. One could also say, as did the dissent below, that if a substantial part of a proposed development that includes houses is within the coastal zone, the development is a housing development, and it is constructed within the coastal zone (although it is difficult to find the concept substantial part in the words of the statute). But it is also reasonable to say that if no house is constructed within the coastal zone, a development that includes houses constructed outside the coastal zone is not a housing development constructed within the coastal zone.

We also agree with the majority below that a review of the legislative history does not help to resolve the ambiguity. The parties discuss at some length the nature and significance of the city's position on this question as expressed in this case, in certain guidelines and interim procedures the city has adopted, and in an agreement to settle the litigation in Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th 1547, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 465. We conclude that the city's actions do not assist us in determining what the Legislature meant in enacting the Mello Act and, accordingly, do not consider those actions. The parties also debate the history and nature of the Coastal Commission's role in furthering the goal of providing affordable housing. This, too, we find unhelpful. Finally, noting that the Mello Act does not define the term, "[n]ew housing developments," the parties cite definitions of somewhat similar terms in other, generally unrelated statutes. We also find these definitions do not assist in deciding what the Legislature meant in this specific context. Instead, we find the answer to the question presented by considering the statutory language in context and in light of the statute's purpose.

One purpose of the Mello Act is "to preserve residential housing units occupied by low- or moderate-income persons or families in the coastal zone." (Venice Town Council, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, supra, 47 Cal.App.4th at pp. 1552-1553, 55 Cal.Rptr.2d 465.) The act also seeks to create affordable housing in some circumstances. It promotes these purposes by two means. First, when existing affordable housing within the coastal zone is converted or demolished, it seeks to provide replacement affordable housing nearby. (Gov.Code, § 65590, subd. (b).) Second, when a new housing development is constructed within the coastal zone, it seeks to provide commensurate affordable housing nearby. (§ 65590(d).) The key...

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