Coastal Concrete Co., Inc. v. Patterson
Decision Date | 09 January 1987 |
Citation | 503 So.2d 824 |
Parties | COASTAL CONCRETE COMPANY, INC. v. Thomas R. PATTERSON. 85-840. |
Court | Alabama Supreme Court |
Oliver J. Latour, Jr. of Owens, Latour & Simpson, Bay Minette, for appellant.
Bayless E. Biles of Wilkins, Bankester & Biles, Bay Minette, for appellee.
Appeal by defendant, Coastal Concrete Company, Inc. ("Coastal"), from a judgment against it based upon a jury verdict for plaintiff, Thomas R. Patterson, in plaintiff's action based upon fraud. We affirm.
The complaint consisted of two counts. Count Two became the victim of defendant's motion for a directed verdict; thus, only Count One was submitted to the jury. Count One alleged: 1
The jury returned a verdict in favor of plaintiff and awarded $27,153.14 as damages.
The recitations of Count One contain many of the essential facts; however, some additions are necessary.
It appears that Patterson's claim in district court was for lost wages in the amount of $444.79, which included $20.00 in travel expenses. While this case was pending, Patterson, a concrete truck driver, was notified that his separate claim for unemployment compensation had been denied, based on his employer's statement that he had failed to clean off the build-up material on his truck. Patterson, claiming extenuating circumstances, appealed from that ruling, and his appeal on the unemployment compensation claim was pending when his small claims case for lost wages came up for a hearing.
At the hearing in small claims court, Patterson appeared pro se, and Roland Snarr, an employee of Coastal, appeared for the company. A settlement was reached by the parties. According to plaintiff, he agreed to dismiss his lawsuit if Coastal would pay him half his last week's wages and have his unemployment compensation instated. The trial court, in fact, entered the following order in the case: "By agreement--Def. to lift opposition to unemployment--& pay pl. one half of wages and court costs." On the date of that entry, Patterson went to Coastal's Robertsdale office and signed a release that had been prepared for Coastal at the direction of one of its employees, Richard Summerville:
At the hearing on Patterson's appeal from the denial of his unemployment compensation claim, Richard Summerville appeared for Coastal. His testimony at the hearing on appeal, however, was consistent with that on which the original denial of unemployment compensation was based, i.e., that Patterson had been discharged for failure to keep his equipment clean. On that basis, Patterson lost his appeal, and this lawsuit ensued.
On appeal, defendant presents a number of issues concerning the trial court's denial of its motion for a directed verdict at the close of the evidence; its denial of defendant's motion for judgment notwithstanding the verdict or new trial; the plaintiff's failure to refund the consideration he received before his rescission of the release entered into by the parties; and the failure of plaintiff to prove actual damages. We will consider these issues seriatim.
Did the trial court err in denying defendant's motion for a directed verdict?
The answer to this question is dependent upon the presence or absence of "any evidence," or a scintilla thereof, of fraud. Allstate Enterprises, Inc. v. Alexander, 484 So.2d 375, 376 (Ala.1985).
"Fraud" is defined as (1) a false representation (2) of a material existing fact (3) relied upon by the plaintiff (4) who was damaged as a proximate result of the misrepresentation. Earnest v. Pritchett-Moore, Inc., 401 So.2d 752 (Ala.1981). If fraud is based upon a promise to perform or abstain from performing in the future, two additional elements must be proved: (1) the defendant's intention, at the time of the alleged misrepresentation, not to do the act promised, coupled with (2) an intent to deceive. Clanton v. Bains Oil Co., 417 So.2d 149 (Ala.1982).
The testimony bearing upon the existence of "any evidence" of fraud came from the testimony of Richard Summerville, from which we quote extensively here:
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...to deceive. See Robinson v. Sovran Acquisition Ltd. P'ship , 70 So.3d 390, 396 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011) (quoting Coastal Concrete Co. v. Patterson , 503 So.2d 824, 826 (Ala. 1987) ). A plaintiff pursuing a theory of promissory fraud, which requires proof of intent, bears a heavier burden than ......
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...court may not award punitive damages based on the defendant's misrepresentation and suppression of fact. See Coastal Concrete Co. v. Patterson, 503 So.2d 824, 830 (Ala.1987) (fraud claim must support award of at least nominal compensatory damages before jury may award punitive damages). Eve......
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...to deceive. See Robinson v. Sovran Acquisition Ltd. P'ship, 70 So. 3d 390, 396 (Ala. Civ. App. 2011)(quoting Coastal Concrete Co. v. Patterson, 503 So. 2d 824, 826 (Ala. 1987)). A plaintiff pursuing a theory of promissory fraud, which requires proof of intent, bears a heavier burden than on......
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