Coastal Conservation Association v. State
| Decision Date | 06 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | COA21-654 |
| Citation | 878 S.E.2d 288 |
| Parties | COASTAL CONSERVATION ASSOCIATION, d/b/a CCA North Carolina; Bruce C. Abbott; Charles P. Adams, Jr. ; Constantine A. Aretakis, II; Frederick L. Berry; Andrew R. Boyd; Harry T. Branch; Troy D. Branham; Rupert D. Brown; Judith C. Bullock; William L. Byrd, Jr.; Johnny L. Canup; Michael D. Carter; Willie T. Closs, Jr.; Kenneth D. Cooper, Jr.; L. Avery Corning, IV; Paul N. Cox; Benjamin M. Currin; Daniel E. Dawson; Mary F. Dawson; Charles B. Efird; Frank K. Eiler; Christopher Elkins ; Dan E. Estrem; Andrew P. Gillikin; Lelan E. Haller, Jr.; John M. Hislop; Raymond Y. Howell; Joey S. Humphrey; Thomas G. Hurt; Clark W. Hutchinson, Jr.; Andrew G. Jones, Jr.; George M. Kivett, Jr.; John C. Knight, Jr.; Bradford A. Koury; Charles H. Laughridge; Casey M. Lloyd; Marilyn R. Lowe; Charlie Loya, Jr.; Nickie N. Lucas; Bruce D. MacLachlan; Euliss D. Madren; William W. Mandulak; Darrell G. McCormick; Teresa A. D. McCullough; Samuel B. McLamb, III; James M. McManus, Jr.; John W. McQuaid; George R. Mode; John V. Moon; Dennis K. Moore ; Kenneth N. Moore, Jr.; Warren S. Mooring; Elijah T. Morton; Daniel J. Nifong; Sadie R. Nifong; Robert B. Nowell, Jr.; Elbert W. Owens, Jr.; Wyatt E. Parcel; Van B. Parrish; James H. Parrott; Bryan C. Pate; Alexandra S. Peyton; Hunter L. Peyton; Jeffrey P. Pickering; Robert R. Rice, II; Robert T. Rice; Orice A. Ritch, Jr.; Mark A. Ruffin; Pearce Ruffin; Eric J. Sato; Sean P. Scully ; Lenny T. Smathers; Carroll W. Spencer; John R. Spruill; David M. Summers ; John B. Taggart; Jesse H. Washburn, II; Andrew J. Webster; Melissa N. Williams; Vandexter Williams; Donald A. Willis, Jr.; A. Rexford Willis, III; Jan L. Willis; Phillip R. Wood; Raye P. Woodin, III; Joseph G. Yager, Plaintiffs, v. STATE of North Carolina, Defendant. |
| Court | North Carolina Court of Appeals |
Poyner Spruill LLP, by Keith H. Johnson, Raleigh, Andrew H. Erteschik, John Michael Durnovich, and Stephanie L. Gumm, Raleigh, for plaintiffs-appellees.
Attorney General Joshua H. Stein, by Assistant Attorney General Scott A. Conklin and Special Deputy Attorney General Marc Bernstein, for defendant-appellant.
Southern Environmental Law Center, by Alex J. Hardee and Derb S. Carter, Jr., Chapel Hill, for Amicus Curiae North Carolina Wildlife Federation and Sound Rivers.
John J. Korzen, for Amicus Curiae Professor Joseph J. Kalo.
¶ 1 The State of North Carolina (the State) appeals from the trial court's Order denying its Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), and 12(b)(6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure. The Record before us—including the factual allegations made in Plaintiffs’ Complaint, which we treat as true solely for purposes of this appeal—reflects the following:
¶ 2 On 10 November 2020, Coastal Conservation Association, d/b/a CCA North Carolina, Inc., and the other named individuals who are citizens and residents of North Carolina, (collectively, Plaintiffs) filed a Complaint against the State, alleging breach of trust under the public trust doctrine, N.C. Const. art. I, § 38, and N.C. Const. art. XIV, § 5. Specifically, Plaintiffs alleged:
The public-trust doctrine imposes a fiduciary duty on the State to manage and regulate the harvest of [coastal finfish and shellfish] in a way that protects the right of current and future generations of the public to use public waters to fish. As a result, the State may not allow the harvest of finfish or shellfish in public waters in quantities or by methods that cause unnecessary waste or impair the sustainability of fish stocks, which in turn threaten the right of current and future generations of the public to use such public waters to fish.
Plaintiffs alleged the State had breached this duty by permitting for-profit harvesting of finfish or shellfish in quantities or through methods that cause overexploitation or undue wastage to North Carolina's coastal fisheries resources. According to Plaintiffs’ Complaint, the State:
has continued to allow—and even facilitated—several commercial fishing practices that result in substantial wastage of coastal fish stocks or their prey species, or result in critical habitat destruction. Those commercial fishing practices include trawling in estuarine waters with significant populations of juvenile finfish, and using "unattended" gillnets.... As a result, stocks of multiple fish species ... have declined precipitously—84 to 98 percent—since the last major fisheries management reform legislation was enacted in North Carolina in 1997.1
Plaintiffs requested that the Court: declare that the State breached its obligation under the public-trust doctrine, Article I, Section 38 of the North Carolina Constitution, and Article XIV, Section 5 of the North Carolina Constitution ; enjoin the State from committing further breaches of its obligations and retain jurisdiction to enforce the State's compliance with that injunctive relief; tax the costs of the action to the State; and assign a Resident Superior Court Judge pursuant to Rule 2.2 of the Local Rules for Civil Superior Court of the Tenth Judicial District to preside over this action.
¶ 3 The State responded to Plaintiffs’ Complaint by filing a Motion to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Specifically, the State alleged:
¶ 4 On 9 June 2021 the trial court held a hearing on the State's Motion to Dismiss, and on 28 July 2021 the trial court entered an Order Denying Motion to Dismiss. The State filed written Notice of Appeal on 26 August 2021.
¶ 5 As an initial matter, we must first address whether we have appellate jurisdiction to review the trial court's Order. As the State acknowledges, the trial court's denial of the State's Motion to Dismiss is an interlocutory order. Generally, "a party has no right to immediate appellate review of an interlocutory order." Veazey v. Durham , 231 N.C. 357, 362, 57 S.E.2d 377, 381 (1950). "An interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the entire controversy." Id. However, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 1-277 (2021) allows a party to immediately appeal an order that either (1) affects a substantial right or (2) constitutes an adverse ruling as to personal jurisdiction.
¶ 6 Here, the State moved to dismiss Plaintiffs’ causes of action pursuant to Rules 12(b)(1), (2), and (6) of the North Carolina Rules of Civil Procedure, based on the defense of sovereign immunity. "Our Courts generally recognize immunity as a defense that can be raised under Rules 12(b)(1), 12(b)(2), or 12(b)(6)." Suarez v. Am. Ramp Co. (ARC) , 266 N.C. App. 604, 610, 831 S.E.2d 885, 890 (2019).
Although the federal courts have tended to minimize the importance of the designation of a sovereign immunity defense as either a Rule 12(b)(1) motion regarding subject matter jurisdiction or a Rule 12(b)(2) motion regarding jurisdiction over the person, the distinction becomes crucial in North Carolina because G.S. 1-277(b) allows the immediate appeal of a denial of a Rule 12(b)(2) motion but not the immediate appeal of a denial of a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.
Teachy v. Coble Dairies, Inc. , 306 N.C. 324, 327-328, 293 S.E.2d 182, 184 (1982). See also Davis v. Dibartolo , 176 N.C. App. 142, 144–45, 625 S.E.2d 877, 880 (2006) (); Data Gen. Corp. v. Cty. of Durham , 143 N.C. App. 97, 100, 545 S.E.2d 243, 245–46 (2001) (). Thus, for the purposes of this appeal, we only review the trial court's denial of the...
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