Coats v. Insurance Co. of North America
| Decision Date | 09 April 1974 |
| Docket Number | No. 19803,19803 |
| Court | South Carolina Supreme Court |
| Parties | Steven Wayne COATS, an infant, by his guardian ad litem, Wilma F. Coats, Respondent, v. The INSURANCE COMPANY OF NORTH AMERICA, Appellnt. |
Wade Hampton Logan, III, of Holmes, Thomson & Logan, Charleston, for appellant.
Demal I. Mattson, Jr., Charleston, for respondent.
Section 21--840 et seq. of the 1962 Code of Laws, as amended, requires that two separate types of liability insurance coverage be carried on all State-owned school buses. The first provides a maximum medical benefit of $3,000.00 for personal injury and is payable to any lawful occupant of a school bus or any school child injured in a school bus connected accident, without regard to fault or negligence. The second provides a maximum single benefit of $10,000.00 and is for the protection of any person, other than those covered under the first type of insurance, who are injured by the negligent operation of a school bus. There is some indication that the above coverages are provided in this case by separate insurers.
The minor plaintiff, a school child, was injured when run over by a school bus, and this action was brought under the foregoing Code sections against the defendant insurance carrier to recover the damages sustained. Plaintiff seeks recovery solely under the second type coverage, that is, as one afforded protection for injuries resulting from the negligent operation of a school bus.
Demurrer was interposed to the complaint upon the ground that it failed to state a cause of action for damages resulting from the negligent operation of a school bus, in that it appeared upon the face of the complaint that plaintiff was entitled to recover, if at all, under the coverage required by the statute for the benefit of school children, without regard to fault or negligence. The demurrer was overruled upon the ground that the question of which type coverage was applicable to plaintiff was a factual issue to be determined upon the trial of the case.
The entire Code sections involved have been set forth in previous decisions of this Court and need not be repeated here. Farmer v. National Surety Corp., 223 S.C. 143, 74 S.E.2d 580; Collins v. National Surety Corp., 225 S.C. 405, 82 S.E.2d 511; Weston v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., 237 S.C. 464, 118 S.E.2d 67.
The provisions of Code Section 21--840 prescribe the two types of insurance coverage required for school buses. Paragraph 1(a) of that section requires coverage for injuries or death to any 'lawful occupant' of any school bus, without regard to fault or negligence; and paragraph (2) extends such benefits to certain stated school bus connected accidents including, quoting 2(e), 'by being run down, struck, or run over by a school bus.'
The second type coverage is provided under paragraph 1(b) of Section 21--840. It requires liability protection for any person, other than a person riding on a school bus or one who qualifies for benefits under the coverage afforded by the aforementioned paragraph 1(a), who is injured by the negligent operation of the bus.
The two types of coverage are separate and distinct and a person cannot recover under both. Collins v. National Surety Corp., supra.
In construing the present statute, the Court stated in Weston v. Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co., supra:
'It is evident, however, that the Legislature intended to provide for two forms of coverage, one, providing coverage for school children without regard to fault or negligence while doing certain acts in connection with school attendance and, two, where a member of the general public or persons not making use of the facilities for the purpose of attending school are injured by the negligent operation of the school bus.'
While the provisions of paragraph 1(a) provide coverage for a 'lawful occupant' of a school bus, such coverage has been construed in Collins v. National Surety Corp., supra, to include a school child in attendance upon school, although at the time of injury he was not technically a 'lawful occupant' of a school bus.
In Collins the school child 'was injured while engaged in supervised play on the school grounds by the negligent backing over him of a school bus.' He was clearly not an occupant of the school bus at the time of injury. He was injured, however, by the school bus while he was engaged in an activity connected with school attendance. The Court held that he was covered under the insurance provided pursuant to the provisions of paragraph 1(a) and not under the coverage afforded under paragraph 1(b).
In Farmer v. National Surety Corp., supra, the school child was injured 'when he was crossing the road to get on a school bus which...
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Toney v. South Carolina Dept. of Educ.
...by Bus B, she was also covered under subsection (1)(a) based on Bus B's involvement in the accident. Coats v. Insurance Company of North America, 262 S.C. 331, 204 S.E.2d 436 (1974). The coverages provided by subsection (1)(a) and (1)(b) are separate and distinct, and one person cannot reco......
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Toney v. South Carolina Dept. of Educ.
...prohibits recovery by Toney against Bus B since he has already collected the 1(a) benefit provided for an "occupant" of Bus A. We find the Coats case can be readily distinguished on its facts. In Coats, only one bus was involved. The Plaintiff was an "occupant" of that bus pursuant to 1(a) ......