Cobb v. City of Lincoln

• Decision Date: 15 November 1883
• Citation: 17 N.W. 365,15 Neb. 86
• Parties: BENJAMIN F. COBB, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE CITY OF LINCOLN, DEFENDANT IN ERROR
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

17 N.W. 365

15 Neb. 86

BENJAMIN F. COBB, PLAINTIFF IN ERROR, v. THE CITY OF LINCOLN, DEFENDANT IN ERROR

Supreme Court of Nebraska

November 15, 1883

ERROR to the district court for Lancaster county. Heard below before POUND, J.

AFFIRMED.

R. D Stearns, for plaintiff in error.

A. C Ricketts, for defendant in error.

OPINION

LAKE, CH. J.

This is a petition in error from Lancaster county. The ruling complained of was in the sustaining of a general demurrer to the petition. The question thus presented is, simply, whether there is any liability on the part of the city to the police judge, for fees adjudged by him against violators of city ordinances, which he is unable to collect from them in money in these cases where, for non-payment thereof, they are required to work, as provided in sec. 31 of the act incorporating cities of the second, class, Comp. Statutes chap. 14. One of the provisions of this section is, that whenever a defendant is committed "for the non-payment of a fine or costs for the violation of any ordinance, he shall also be put to work for the benefit of the city, and shall be credited on such fine and costs $ 1.50 per day, for each day he shall work."

The only other provision of statute bearing directly upon this subject is sec. 8 of the same act, which provides that, "The police judge shall receive the same fees as justices of the peace for similar services."

It is urged by counsel that this provision, especially when taken in connection with the one first quoted, imports not only that the measure of this officer's compensation is the same as that provided for justices of the peace, but also that he shall in all cases receive it, if not from persons adjudged to pay it, then from the city whose officer he is.

But we cannot adopt this as a proper construction of the section. It seems to us, that if the design of the legislature had been to impose such costs upon cities, against their will, it would have been expressed in unmistakable language. The terms here employed, under the accepted rule of construction that the words of a statute must be given their ordinary meaning, where it is not clear that a different one was intended, have no such meaning. They convey no such intention. "The police judge shall receive the same fees," etc. As ordinarily understood, the word "same," when used as it is here, in comparison, means, "Of like kind, species, sort, dimensions, or the like; not...