Cobb v. Gin-Bob, Inc.
| Decision Date | 22 October 2019 |
| Docket Number | No. 1091,1091 |
| Parties | RUTH COBB v. GIN-BOB, INC., ET AL. |
| Court | Court of Special Appeals of Maryland |
Circuit Court for Harford County
Case No. 12-C-17-001871
UNREPORTED
Opinion by Fader, C.J.
*This is an unreported opinion, and it may not be cited in any paper, brief, motion, or other document filed in this Court or any other Maryland Court as either precedent within the rule of stare decisis or as persuasive authority. Md. Rule 1-104.
Ruth Cobb, the appellant, sued Gin-Bob, Inc. and LCBDM LLC, the appellees, for damages after she was badly injured in a fall while exiting a store.1 The Circuit Court for Harford County granted summary judgment in favor of Gin-Bob and LCBDM, reasoning that Ms. Cobb had not shown that her injuries were caused by the appellees' negligence. Ms. Cobb appeals, arguing that the circuit court improperly "tried the case at the summary judgment hearing" by resolving "disputed material fact[s]." We disagree: Ms. Cobb failed to set forth a prima facie case that her injuries were caused by the appellees' conduct or that there was any defect in the store's door. Because Gin-Bob and LCBDM were entitled to judgment as a matter of law, we affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
On March 24, 2017, Ms. Cobb, then 84 years old, visited The Whiteford Business Center, Etc. ("Whiteford Business Center"), a store that provides shipping, copying, and office supply services out of a strip mall in Harford County. Gin-Bob trades as the Whiteford Business Center, and LCBDM owns the strip mall at which the store is located.
In the proceedings before the circuit court, Gin-Bob's president, Jack Whitmer, was the only witness who testified about the incident from which this litigation arose. According to Mr. Whitmer—who was working at the Whiteford Business Center that day—Ms. Cobb had come to make three copies of a scrapbook for her children. After Ms. Cobb received the copies of her scrapbook, she "backed out the door" to the Whiteford Business Center with "her hands full." Shortly thereafter, Mr. Whitmer found Ms. Cobb lying on the ground. Mr. Whitmer did not see Ms. Cobb fall, but "ran out" to her after he saw her on the ground and "helped her up." He "asked her if she was okay" and "if she wanted other help," but "she refused that." Mr. Whitmer also recalled that Ms. Cobb "said that she must be an old klutz, and she was glad that she swam every day." After Mr. Whitmer "helped [Ms. Cobb] up" and "[h]elped her get her glasses and her materials picked up, . . . [s]he got in her car and left."
Ms. Cobb "do[es] not remember" why she went to the Whiteford Business Center that day, nor does she "remember anything about the accident" or the events surrounding it.2 Although she remembers having "been told" about the incident, she "do[es]n't recall the person who told [her] . . . or . . . the details." Mr. Whitmer recalled that one other customer was in the store at the time Ms. Cobb fell, but nobody involved with the case appears to have spoken to him about the incident.
Unfortunately, Ms. Cobb's injuries were more serious than they initially appeared. Two days after the fall, Ms. Cobb was hospitalized with a "very large acute subdural hematoma,"3 consistent with having fallen and struck her head. She required emergency surgery to "evacuate[]" the hematoma and relieve "the pressure on the brain." As a result of the hematoma, Ms. Cobb suffered "traumatic brain injury" and "cognitive deficits." She now experiences "moderate to severe cognitive impairment," which includes "memory issues." "She cannot monitor her medications," she "ha[s] trouble recalling the birthdays of [her] children," and she no longer can cook or "live independently."
Ms. Cobb filed a complaint against Gin-Bob and LCBDM, alleging that her injuries were caused by their negligence. Specifically, the complaint alleges that, while Ms. Cobb exited the Whiteford Business Center on the day of the accident, "the door suddenly and without warning flung open causing [Ms. Cobb] to fall and smack her head and body onto the concrete sidewalk directly outside the door." Ms. Cobb alleged in the complaint that the "door . . . flung open" because it was defective and that Gin-Bob and LCBDM, by neglecting to repair or replace the door, negligently "failed to exercise due care . . . for the safety of business invitees."
Gin-Bob and LCBDM denied Ms. Cobb's allegations and, after a period of discovery, each moved for summary judgment. They argued that Ms. Cobb had not set forth a prima facie case of negligence because she could not recall the events herself, had not produced any eyewitnesses, and had not examined the door. Her evidence, they contended, sufficed to show neither that the door was defective nor that she had been struck by it.4
After a hearing, the circuit court granted the motions for summary judgment from the bench. The court noted that Ms. Cobb had no recollection of the incident, Mr. Whitmer did not see it, and no one else who witnessed the incident testified. Thus, no evidence in the record indicated that she fell due to a problem with the door.
Moreover, the court ruled, even assuming that the door caused Ms. Cobb's fall, she failed to introduce evidence of a defect. The only evidence of a defect to which Ms. Cobb pointed was a handwritten sign that Mr. Whitmer sometimes would place on the door, which read, "[W]indy, please hold door." Mr. Whitmer testified that he sometimes placed the sign on the door because on "a windy day, the wind w[ould] sometimes hold the door open." That sign, the court noted, was "the only suggestion . . . of any defect," and "[t]here [was] no other testimony about any problem with the door." Furthermore, there was no evidence that the sign had been placed on the door on the day of the accident, nor did Ms. Cobb introduce any evidence regarding wind conditions that day.
As the court saw it, Ms. Cobb argued for "a great leap of faith that the existence vel non of that sign, whether it was up there that day or not, indicates that there was a defect in the door." The circuit court disagreed, however, that the mere "existence of a sign" was itself "evidence, no matter how slight, of a defect in the door." Accordingly, the court granted the motions for summary judgment.5
On July 11, 2018, the circuit court issued a written order directing that judgment be entered in favor of Gin-Bob and LCBDM. Ms. Cobb timely appealed.
When reviewing "the trial court's grant of a motion for summary judgment, the standard of review is de novo." Beka Indus., Inc. v. Worcester County Bd. of Educ., 419 Md. 194, 227 (2011) (quoting Dashiell v. Meeks, 396 Md. 149, 163 (2006)). Bank of N.Y. Mellon v. Georg, 456 Md. 616, 651 (2017) (quoting Chateau Foghorn LP v. Hosford, 455 Md. 462, 482 (2017)). "So long as the record reveals no genuine dispute of material fact 'necessary to resolve the controversy as a matter of law . . . the entry of summary judgment is proper.'" Appiah v. Hall, 416 Md. 533, 547 (2010) (quoting O'Connor v. Balt. County, 382 Md. 102, 111 (2004)).
The parties devote most of their briefs to arguing whether Ms. Cobb introduced evidence sufficient to show the existence of a defect in the door, the issue upon which the circuit court ruled. We believe, however, that Ms. Cobb's case fails on a logically prior issue (also addressed, albeit in less detail, by the circuit court): whether she introduced evidence sufficient to show that the door caused her fall at all.6 Cf. Restatement (Second) of Torts § 430 cmt. a ("[C]ourts often consider the causation question without inquiring into the negligence problem . . . [when] they are clearly of the opinion that the actor's conduct cannot be regarded as a substantial cause of the other's harm, so that even were the actor negligent he could not be held responsible.").
To prevail in a cause of action for negligence, a plaintiff must show that (1) "the defendant was under a duty to protect the plaintiff from injury," (2) "the defendant breached that duty," (3) "the plaintiff suffered actual injury or loss," and (4) "the loss or injury proximately resulted from the defendant's breach of the duty." Rosenblatt v. Exxon Co., U.S.A., 335 Md. 58, 76 (1994). The first and third elements are not disputed here: Gin-Bob and LCBDM acknowledge that they "owed [Ms. Cobb] the highest standard of care" as a "business invitee," and Ms. Cobb was injured.7 As for the other two elements, even if we assume that Gin-Bob and LCBDM "breached th[eir] duty" to Ms. Cobb, she has not introduced evidence sufficient to show that her "injury proximately resulted from the defendants' breach of the duty." Rosenblatt, 335 Md. at 76.
"[N]egligence is not actionable unless it is a proximate cause of the harm alleged." Pittway Corp. v. Collins, 409 Md. 218, 243 (2009) (quoting Stone v. Chi. Title Ins., 330 Md. 329, 337 (1993)). "To be a proximate cause for an injury," an act must be both (1) "a cause in fact" of the injury and (2) "a legally cognizable cause." Pittway Corp., 409 Md. at 243 (quoting Hartford Ins. v. Manor Inn, 335 Md. 135, 156-57 (1994)). "Causation-in-fact concerns the threshold inquiry of 'whether [the] defendant's conduct actually produced an injury.'" Pittway Corp., 409 Md. at 244 (quoting Peterson v. Underwood, 258 Md. 9, 16-17 (1970)). "No matter how negligent a party may be, if his act stands in no causal relation to the injury, it is not...
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