Hartford Ins. Co. v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc.

• Decision Date: 01 September 1993
• Docket Number: No. 28,28
• Citation: 642 A.2d 219,335 Md. 135
• Parties: The HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY v. MANOR INN OF BETHESDA, INC. et al. ,
• Court: Maryland Court of Appeals

Page 135

335 Md. 135

642 A.2d 219

The HARTFORD INSURANCE COMPANY v. MANOR INN OF BETHESDA, INC. et al.

No. 28, Sept. Term, 1993.

Court of Appeals of Maryland.

June 9, 1994.

Jill A. Reid (Donovan, O'Connell & Broderick, all on brief), Silver Spring, for petitioner.

John D. Holler, Mt. Rainier, for respondent, Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc.

Dawna M. Cobb, Asst. Atty. Gen. (J. Joseph Curran, Jr., Atty. Gen., and C.J. Messerschmidt, Asst. Atty. Gen., all on brief), Baltimore, for State of MD.

Argued Before MURPHY, C.J., and ELDRIDGE, RODOWSKY, McAULIFFE ^*, CHASANOW, KARWACKI and BELL, JJ.

BELL, Judge.

The issue this case presents involves causation, proximate and superseding. This case arose when an escaped patient from a State-operated hospital for the mentally ill stole a van that had been left unattended, with the keys in the ignition, and, while driving the van, subsequently struck another automobile, causing personal injury and property damage. The injured driver, Robert Wewer ("Wewer"), having been compensated for his injuries, pursuant to an existing insurance policy, his carrier, The Hartford Insurance Company, the petitioner, sued the State of Maryland ("the State") and Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc. ("Manor Inn"), the respondents, for negligence, seeking to recover what it paid out in connection with Wewer's claim. The Circuit Court for Montgomery County entered summary judgment in favor of both defendants and the Court of Special Appeals affirmed. The Hartford Insurance Company v. Manor Inn of Bethesda, Inc., et al., 94 Md.App. 225, 617 A.2d 590 (1992). We granted certiorari to consider the State's duty to warn when the injured person is not a member of an identifiable class and whether, in this case, the negligence of the thief, rather than Manor Inn's negligence, which facilitated the theft, was the proximate cause of the accident.

I.

Robert Lee Griffin ("Griffin") was involuntarily committed to the Springfield Hospital Center, an inpatient facility located in Sykesville, Carroll County, Maryland and operated by the Department of Health and Mental Hygiene for the treatment of mentally ill individuals. The certification pursuant to which he was admitted indicated that admission was necessary for his protection or for the protection of another. Consequently, Griffin was placed on a high security ward for acutely disturbed patients. He subsequently eloped from Springfield.

Three days after he was discovered missing, Griffin turned up in Bethesda, Maryland. Not being aware that Griffin had eloped and believing that he was homeless and in need of emergency shelter, Montgomery County police officers took Griffin to the Manor Inn. Pursuant to an agreement with the Montgomery County Department of Social Services, he was assigned a room for the night. Springfield was not notified.

On the following morning, an employee of Manor Inn parked a laundry van in front of Griffin's room, leaving it unattended, with the doors unlocked and the keys in the ignition. Griffin was seen entering the van and driving away. Approximately thirty minutes later, he negligently drove the van into Wewer's car, which was stopped at a stop sign. ¹

Having compensated its insured, but believing that, together, the negligence of the State and of Manor Inn was the proximate cause of the accident, the petitioner filed suit against them seeking to recover what it paid out. As to the State, the petitioner relied on the State's duty to supervise and detain Griffin. The negligence it alleged as to Manor Inn was its employee leaving the van unattended with the keys in the ignition. Manor Inn filed a cross complaint against the State in which it also alleged the State's negligence in failing properly to supervise and detain Griffin.

The State moved for summary judgment against both the petitioner and Manor Inn, both of whom opposed it. Following a hearing, the court granted the motion and, notwithstanding that Manor Inn did not move for summary judgment with respect to the petitioner's claim against it, sua sponte, entered summary judgment in favor of Manor Inn. ² As to the State of Maryland, the court said:

See, that is where I think the difficulty really is. You say it is a duty to identifiable persons as opposed--as you saying, it is a duty to persons who they might reasonably foresee this injury resulting.

That is the causal connection, but that--your client, your insurer was not identifiable until after he stole the car and ran into her. So, it would have no way of warning her because they didn't know who it was.

* * * * * *

Even the California case doesn't give liability that it is foreseeable that they know he is going to--that he stab or shoot people, and still no liability even in California they negligently release him, the psychiatrist evidently lets him go.

At this point the only exception they carved out when they have knowledge of specific, identifiable people against whom he may commit these violent acts. They have a duty to warn to those people that look out, here he comes.

And only those that are identifiable, that, that they have the previous knowledge and notice of, and that is still my understanding of what Judge Lowe was saying in the [Furr v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 53 Md.App. 474, 454 A.2d 414, cert. denied, 296 Md. 60 (1983) ] case.

As to Manor Inn, the court "determin[ed] their negligence was merely passive, and they cannot be held responsible for the actions of Mr. Griffin in negligently running into somebody." It explained further:

The question, Is it foreseeable that if you leave your keys in your car that somebody with a dangerous propensity is going to come and steal the car--I don't see what difference it makes whether it occurs within a reasonable proximity of where the car was parked or it occurs a day later or five days later or one block or several blocks except an argument that may be made that if it is passive negligence, but it is a contributing factor, leaving the keys in, it is foreseeable that an unqualified driver may steal the car.

I don't see it necessarily foreseeable. It sounds more to me like you are dealing in possibilities rather than probabilities or foreseeables. But, let's assume that then if they are saying that once it is reported stolen and they have an opportunity to endeavor to get the car back, the fact that somebody after several days later runs into somebody else, that is so far remote even from the passive negligence that there is a sensation in the violation of the statute.

I read that case to suggest the passive negligence of leaving the keys in the car is a violation of the statute that does not per se give rise to liability when the injury is caused by an intervening person who comes and negligently operates that motor vehicle.

It wouldn't make any difference whether he--if any of you did that, whether you would have the keys in the cars and that one thief steals it and runs into somebody, they would be negligent.

The car behind it is hot wired and also run in--there is no--what do the keys to the car have to do with the fact that somebody negligently operated other than make it easier for them to steal it.

In affirming, the Court of Special Appeals agreed "that, under the decision of Furr [v. Spring Grove State Hospital, 53 Md.App. 474, 454 A.2d 414, cert. denied, 296 Md. 60 (1983).], [the petitioner's] insured was not a readily identifiable victim and thus the State owed him no duty of care." 94 Md.App. at [642 A.2d 223] 241, 617 A.2d at 598. As to Manor Inn, it said:

[W]hen the key is left in the ignition of an unattended vehicle, the taking of that vehicle by an unknown or unauthorized third party who negligently causes damages is an independent and intervening factor, not reasonably foreseeable to the driver, thereby relieving the owner or person in charge of the vehicle from liability for damages caused by a third-party's negligent driving or operation of the vehicle.

Id. at 238-39, 617 A.2d at 597. Like the circuit court, the intermediate appellate court did not find it relevant "whether the injuries [were] remote in time or space to the negligent failure of a driver to remove the keys from the ignition." Id. at 238, 617 A.2d at 596.

II.

The petitioner argues that it was error for the trial court to grant the motion for summary judgment in favor of the State against both Manor Inn and the petitioner and despite Manor Inn's failure to file a motion, to enter, sua sponte, summary judgment in favor of Manor Inn against the petitioner. Addressing the State's judgment first, it maintains that the undisputed evidence clearly discloses that the State violated its duty to properly supervise and detain a mentally ill patient involuntarily committed to one of its facilities and that that breach of duty was the proximate cause of Wewer's injuries. On the other hand, the petitioner recognizes that, "[u]nder the current state of the law, in the absence of a specific identifiable plaintiff, the State is exonerated for failing to properly exercise control over Mr. Griffin or any inpatient." Nevertheless, it urges that "[t]he lack of an identifiable victim should not release the State from liability for its blatant failure to carry out its duty." It asks that we establish a standard which would hold the State liable for its acts of negligence.

With respect to Manor Inn, the petitioner argues that it was a jury question whether Manor Inn's violation of a statute caused or contributed to Wewer's injuries. In this case, it is undisputed, the petitioner points out, that Manor Inn's negligence lay in violating Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Repl.Vol.) Transportation Article, § 21-1101, entitled "Unattended Motor Vehicle." That violation having clearly been shown, its causal relationship to the accident is dependent upon the primary purpose of the statute and upon the attendant circumstances. Thus, while violation of a statute is evidence of negligence, the petitioner...