Cobb v. Rice
| Decision Date | 14 January 1881 |
| Court | United States State Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts Supreme Court |
| Parties | Samuel C. Cobb v. James W. Rice & others |
Argued May 1, 1880
Suffolk. Bill of interpleader, filed May 27, 1876, against James W Rice and Augustus E. Scott, the assignees in bankruptcy of Ezra D. Winslow, and against Sarah J. Winslow and Julia E Ayres, alleging that the plaintiff, in his capacity of Mayor of the city of Boston, on March 5, 1876, received from the Consul of the United States at Rotterdam, Holland, certain personal property consisting of bonds of the United States certificates of shares of the capital stock of several mining companies, and a bill of exchange, together with a letter from the Consul stating that the property had been delivered to him by the Chief Commissioner of Police of Rotterdam, according to an order of the Minister of Justice at the Hague, and was claimed by the wife of Ezra D. Winslow, and her sister, and also by the creditors of Winslow.
The bill further alleged that the assignees in bankruptcy of Winslow claimed the property as belonging to the estate of Winslow, and that the other defendants claimed it as belonging to one or both of them, and that it was improperly taken from them by the Consul; that the plaintiff had no interest in the property, but was a mere holder thereof; and that he was ready and willing to deliver the property to such of said persons as should be found legally entitled to the same.
The bill then proceeded as follows: "To the end therefore that the said James W. Rice and Augustus E. Scott, assignees, and the said Sarah J. Winslow and Julia E. Ayres, defendants named in this bill, may full, true and perfect answers make to all and singular the premises (the benefit of answers upon oath being hereby expressly waived); and may set forth their several and respective claims, or disclaim all interest in or right to said property or any part thereof; and that such of them, if any, as claim adverse interests therein may be decreed to interplead together; and that it may be ascertained in such manner as the court shall direct to which of them said property ought to be delivered; and that the plaintiff may have leave to deliver the same into court, which he offers to do, for the benefit of such of the parties as shall be found or decreed to be entitled thereto; and that the said defendants may in the mean time be restrained from commencing or prosecuting any suit at law against the plaintiff touching said property; and that he may have such other and further relief in the premises as the nature of the case may require;" and concluded with a prayer for a writ of subpoena commanding the defendants to appear and answer; and for a writ of injunction to restrain the defendants from suing the plaintiff at law in respect to said property, until the further order of the court.
On October 4, 1876, the assignees in bankruptcy of Winslow appeared and filed an answer, claiming the property as part of the estate of Winslow, at the time of their appointment as assignees. The other defendants also filed answers, under oath, claiming the property as theirs. And on December 21, 1876 the court ordered that the defendants interplead.
The case was heard on the pleadings and proofs by Colt, J., who ordered a decree to be entered that the plaintiff deliver the property to the assignees in bankruptcy of Winslow, and that there be paid out of the proceeds of the bonds and bill of exchange (which had been collected) to the solicitors of the plaintiff and of the defendants Sarah J. Winslow and Julia E. Ayres, their costs, to be taxed as between solicitor and client.
From this decree, the defendants Winslow and Ayres appealed to the full court, where the case was heard on the pleadings and a full report of the evidence, the substance of which is stated in the opinion.
B. F. Butler, for the appellants.
J. H. Benton, Jr., for the appellees.
The defendants, Sarah J. Winslow and Julia E. Ayres, delivered the property involved in this suit to the Chief...
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