Cobb v. State

• Decision Date: 12 January 1938
• Docket Number: 12067.
• Parties: COBB v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

195 S.E. 758

185 Ga. 462

COBB v. STATE.

No. 12067.

Supreme Court of Georgia

January 12, 1938

Rehearing Denied Feb. 18, 1938.

Error from Superior Court, Whitfield County; C. C. Pittman, Judge.

Norris Cobb was convicted of murder, and he brings error.

Affirmed.

Paul H Field, of Dalton, for plaintiff in error.

J. H Paschall, Sol. Gen., of Calhoun, M. J. Yeomans, Atty. Gen Dave M. Parker, Asst. Atty. Gen., and E. J. Clower, of Atlanta, for the State.

Syllabus OPINION.

ATKINSON Presiding Justice.

Norris Cobb was indicted for murder of Charlotte Cobb, committed on January 19, 1937, by beating her with certain sticks and other blunt instruments the nature and description of which were to the grand jurors unknown. The evidence tended to show that the person slain was the wife of defendant, and that the homicide was committed in a room occupied by the couple in the dwelling of Joe Brown and his wife, Ada Brown, the latter being the mother of the slain woman. The injury was inflicted Tuesday morning after the Browns had temporarily left their home. The woman died the ensuing Thursday night. There was no eyewitness. The defendant denied commission of the crime or knowledge of the offender. The jury returned a verdict finding the defendant guilty, without a recommendation. His motion for a new trial was overruled and he excepted.

1. If a question sought to elicit and the answer stated a conclusion of the witness, for which reason both were objectionable, the admission of such evidence did not require the grant of a new trial, where the witness stated the facts upon which the conclusion was based. Robinson v. State, 158 Ga. 47(2), 122 S.E. 886; Ray v. State, 142 Ga. 655(3), 83 S.E. 518. A witness for the State testified that between 7:30 and 8 o'clock Tuesday morning he went to the Brown dwelling, and only the defendant and his wife were there; witness walked up on the porch and knocked at the door; the wife appeared and said the defendant 'was in'; witness told her he wanted to buy a quart of liquor; defendant was then 'lying on his bed'; about that time defendant said, 'I am going to raise _____,' witness left the house and stood outside about 15 or 20 steps from the house, and from that position he heard 'a lot of racket in the room, and noise.' 'It was a noise like two people fighting in there.' Under application of the above-stated principles, there is no merit in the assignments of error on the admission of the foregoing testimony as to what witness heard; the ground of objection being that the testimony was only a conclusion of the witness.

2. 'The trial judge has the right to propound a question, or a series of questions, to any witness, for the purpose of developing fully the truth of the case, and the extent to which the examination conducted by the court shall go is a matter within his discretion.' Marcus v. State, 149 Ga. 209(6), 99 S.E. 614; Johnson v. State, 169 Ga. 814(2), 152 S.E. 76. The complaint of the action of the judge in propounding questions to the above-mentioned witness, and eliciting answers, shows no error on the ground, as contended, that the judge acted without his province, and intimated to the jury that the court was adverse to the movant.

3. 'In the trial of a murder...