Cobb v. State, 4 Div. 888
Decision Date | 24 February 1989 |
Docket Number | 4 Div. 888 |
Parties | Roy Wright COBB v. STATE. |
Court | Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals |
James W. Parkman III of Parkman & Adams, Dothan, for appellant.
Don Siegelman, Atty. Gen., and Robert E. Lusk, Jr., Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.
The appellant, Roy Wright Cobb, was convicted of sexual abuse in the first degree in violation of § 13A-6-66, Code of Alabama 1975, and was sentenced to six years' imprisonment.
The state's evidence tended to show that the victim, a nine-year-old girl, had been sexually abused by Roy Cobb since she was in kindergarten. Brenda Harold, the girl's mother, worked a twelve-hour shift at a Sony manufacturing plant several days a week. She would take the young girl and her brother to the house of Evelyn Cobb, the wife of the appellant, who would babysit the children.
The victim testified that appellant would touch her in her "vagina" with his fingers and with his "penis." She also stated that "he tried to put it inside" her and made her "touch him on his penis." She testified that this would happen several times a week and that she had been afraid to tell anyone because appellant had told her "he would do something to her" if she did.
Finally, in August 1986, the girl told a friend at school that Cobb was "messing" with her. It was on the evening of that same day that she told her mother. The next day she was examined by a doctor, who reported the incident to the Department of Human Resources. The young girl was interviewed by two representatives, one from the Alabama Bureau of Investigation and one from the Department of Human Resources. At that time the victim drew a picture of appellant as he appeared when he exhibited himself to her. These pictures were received into evidence over defense objections. Appellant raises six issues.
Appellant first challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to convict him of sexual abuse in the first degree. Specifically, he argues that the victim's testimony was weak and not credible. Appellant has preserved this issue for appeal by making a motion for judgment of acquittal. Section 13A-6-66 defines sexual abuse in the first degree:
When considering any issue dealing with sufficiency, "this court is required to view the evidence in a light most favorable to the prosecution." Parrish v. State, 494 So.2d 705, 709 (Ala.Cr.App.1985). This court will disturb a jury verdict only when the preponderance of the evidence is so one-sided as to "convince this court that it was wrong and unjust." Id., at 709.
In the present case, it is apparent from the evidence that the victim was nine years old. To prove the remaining element, the state must show that the sexual contact was "done for the purpose of gratifying the sexual desire of either party." Section 13A-6-60(3), Code of Alabama 1975.
We have commonly held that "consent, force and intent to gratify the sexual desire of either party are jury questions." See Parrish, supra, at 709; Hutcherson v. State, 441 So.2d 1048, 1052 (Ala.Cr.App.1983).
The appellant further contends that the trial court erred in denying his motion for a new trial because a jury venireman failed to answer a question. During the jury voir dire the following occurred:
Appellant's counsel requested a new trial because Ms. Dendy, one of the jury venire, had worked with Mr. Valeska's mother in the past. Ms. Dendy testified at the hearing on the motion for new trial that when the question was asked, "we all snickered and you all did too." She said that everyone knew Doug Valeska. However, nothing further was asked to the prospective jurors concerning their involvement with the attorney representing the state, Doug Valeska. No questions were asked concerning any relationships the jurors might have had with relatives of Mr. Valeska.
This venire person evidently was not related to and was not a good friend of the prosecuting attorney. She had not been out to eat or "anything socially." She had not been in his office to talk to him. She did not know him. She had only worked with his mother in the past. Even if she had failed to correctly respond, we would note: "[T]his court has said that the failure of a juror to make a response to a question regarding his qualifications to serve as a juror, regardless of the situation or circumstances, does not automatically entitle one to a new trial." Radney v. State, 342 So.2d 942, 946 (Ala.Cr.App.1976), writ denied, 342 So.2d 947 (Ala.1977).
Thomas v. State, 338 So.2d 1045 (Ala.Cr.App.1976).
The trial court did not err in denying appellant's motion for a new trial.
Appellant further argues that the trial court erred in denying, in part, his motion to exclude his extrajudicial statement. Although the court excluded part of the statement made by the appellant, he contends that the court erred in failing to suppress the entire statement on the grounds of involuntariness.
Appellant's counsel maintains that since the appellant was a police officer, he was under substantial pressure to defend himself.
Seawright v. State, 479 So.2d 1362, 1367 (Ala.Cr.App.1985).
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