Cobb v. State

• Decision Date: 26 April 1887
• Citation: 3 S.E. 628,78 Ga. 801
• Parties: COBB v. STATE.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

3 S.E. 628

78 Ga. 801

COBB v. STATE.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 26, 1887

Error from superior court, Chattahoochee county; WILLIS, Judge.

C. J Thornton, (by Joseph F. Pon,) for plaintiff in error.

J. H Worrill, Sol. Gen., (by W. A. Little,) for the State.

HALL J.

Cobb was convicted at the October term, 1885, of Chattahoochee superior court, of the offense of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, and was sentenced to the penitentiary. He made no motion for new trial at that term of the court. He now alleges that he did not do so because the counsel who had represented him in the trial in the court below had abandoned his case, in consequence of his inability to pay him his fees. He, however, after the adjournment of the term of the court, brought a bill of exceptions to this court, alleging error in certain instructions of the court to the jury. The judgment on this writ of error was affirmed at March term, 1886, of this court. At the September term, 1886, of Chattahoochee superior court, the plaintiff in error made a motion for new trial upon extraordinary grounds, alleging that his counsel, on the first trial in that court, had abandoned his case, because of his inability to pay him his fees; that he gave him no notice of his intention to do so prior to the adjournment of the court; and that for that reason he was forced to submit to the sentence imposed upon him, or bring the case directly to this court by bill of exceptions. He also alleged in that motion for new trial that the verdict was contrary to the law and the evidence, and without evidence to support it; and claimed to have ascertained some newly-discovered evidence which he brings before this court. That newly-discovered evidence, it seems to us, was merely cumulative of the evidence given on the trial; for when the case was here before we held that, while knowledge was of the essence of the offense of receiving stolen goods knowing them to be stolen, yet that knowledge need not necessarily be proven by direct testimony. It might be shown by circumstances, such as the defendant's conduct and behavior, the character of the person from whom he received the goods, the kind of goods, and the hour when received. When this extraordinary motion was called for hearing, the solicitor general moved to dismiss it, and that motion was sustained by the court.

We think the court did not err in dismissing the motion for a new...