Cobbins v. Mo. Dep't of Corr.
| Decision Date | 28 June 2022 |
| Docket Number | WD 84628 |
| Parties | Timis COBBINS, Appellant, v. MISSOURI DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS, et al., Respondents. |
| Court | Missouri Court of Appeals |
Tyler P. Coyle, Assistant Public Defender, Columbia, MO, Attorney for Appellant.
Eric S. Schmitt, Attorney General, and Andrew J. Clarke, Assistant Attorney General, Jefferson City, MO, Attorneys for Respondents.
Before Division One: Mark D. Pfeiffer, Presiding Judge, and Karen King Mitchell and Gary D. Witt, Judges
This case involves the mandatory minimum sentencing requirements of section 558.019, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2019, and illustrates that the focus of the statute is not on the "name" or the "statute number" of the list of predicate offenses itemized in section 558.019 ; rather, the focus is upon the offender's current offense and whether the elements comprising that offense are "contained in" the section 558.019 list of predicate offenses requiring that a mandatory minimum sentence be served. Here, because the conduct reflected in the elements comprising the offense Mr. Timis Cobbins ("Cobbins") was convicted of in 2011 is not "contained in" any of the predicate offenses listed in section 558.019.2, Cobbins is not subject to the mandatory minimum sentencing guidelines of section 558.019.
Specifically, Cobbins appeals from the judgment of the Circuit Court of Cole County, Missouri ("circuit court"), granting summary judgment in favor of the Missouri Department of Corrections, Director Precythe of the Department of Corrections, and Director Kempker of the Division of Probation (collectively "DOC") on Cobbins's petition for declaratory relief, which sought to enjoin DOC from requiring Cobbins to serve eighty percent of his prison sentence before becoming eligible for parole. We reverse and remand this case back to the circuit court for further proceedings consistent with our ruling today.
In 2011, Cobbins was convicted of one count of second-degree robbery in violation of section 569.030, RSMo (1979). Cobbins was thereafter sentenced to fifteen years’ imprisonment, though the execution of his sentence was suspended pursuant to section 217.362, RSMo (2003) and he was instead ordered to serve five years on probation. In November 2016, after seven probation violations, the circuit court revoked Cobbins's probation and executed his sentence. Cobbins completed long-term drug treatment and in January 2018, the circuit court again ordered Cobbins to serve five years on probation.
In October 2018, the circuit court continued Cobbins on probation after he committed four additional probation violations. However, in August 2020, after Cobbins committed another four probation violations, the circuit court revoked Cobbins's probation and executed his fifteen-year prison sentence. Upon receiving Cobbins, DOC determined that Cobbins must serve eighty percent of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole because he had three or more prior prison commitments.2
In December 2020, Cobbins filed a petition for declaratory judgment in which Cobbins sought a declaration from the circuit court that the application of section 558.019, RSMo Cum. Supp. 2019 did not require him to serve a mandatory minimum of eighty percent of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. DOC filed an answer and motion for summary judgment, contending that Cobbins's claim failed as a matter of law. On May 24, 2021, the circuit court entered its judgment granting DOC's motion for summary judgment. Cobbins appeals therefrom.
The Missouri Supreme Court has outlined the standard of review for summary judgment:
The trial court makes its decision to grant summary judgment based on the pleadings, record submitted, and the law; therefore, this Court need not defer to the trial court's determination and reviews the grant of summary judgment de novo. In reviewing the decision to grant summary judgment, this Court applies the same criteria as the trial court in determining whether summary judgment was proper. Summary judgment is only proper if the moving party establishes that there is no genuine issue as to the material facts and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The facts contained in affidavits or otherwise in support of a party's motion are accepted as true unless contradicted by the non-moving party's response to the summary judgment motion. Only genuine disputes as to material facts preclude summary judgment. A material fact in the context of summary judgment is one from which the right to judgment flows.
Green v. Fotoohighiam , 606 S.W.3d 113, 115-16 (Mo. banc 2020) (quoting Goerlitz v. City of Maryville , 333 S.W.3d 450, 452-53 (Mo. banc 2011) ).
In his sole point on appeal, Cobbins contends that the circuit court erred in granting DOC summary judgment in that section 558.019.2 is not ambiguous and, because his predicate offense is not contained in the list of predicate offenses requiring a minimum percentage before parole eligibility, DOC is unlawfully requiring him to serve eighty percent of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. We agree.
When Cobbins was convicted in 2011 of the class B felony of second-degree robbery under section 569.030, RSMo 2000,3 section 558.019.2 set mandatory minimum prison terms offenders were required to serve before becoming eligible for parole. The statute specifically excluded from its coverage "provisions of section 565.020, RSMo, section 558.018 or section 571.015, RSMo, which set minimum terms of sentences, or the provisions of section 559.115, RSMo, relating to probation." § 558.019.1, RSMo 2000. And it expressly "appli[ed] to all classes of felonies except those set forth in chapter 195, RSMo, and those otherwise excluded in subsection 1 of this section." § 558.019.2. Because Cobbins was convicted of a felony that was neither contained in Chapter 195 nor one of the specifically listed exclusions in subsection 1, section 558.019.2 plainly applied to his conviction and, because he had three prior prison commitments, would have required him to serve a minimum of eighty percent of his sentence before becoming eligible for parole. § 558.019.3(3), RSMo 2000.
Cobbins did not enter the department of corrections immediately after his conviction in 2011. Instead, he was placed on multiple terms of probation. After several failed attempts, Cobbins's probation was revoked and he entered the department of corrections in August 2020, where he was advised that, under the current version of section 558.019, he would be required to serve eighty percent of his fifteen-year sentence because he had three or more prior prison commitments.
Between the time of Cobbins's offense and the time he was delivered to the department of corrections, the legislature restructured Missouri's criminal code via L.2014, S.B. No. 491, § A, which became effective January 1, 2017. It is this legislative action that the circuit court erroneously described and which became the underlying erroneous basis of the circuit court's ruling below. In its judgment, the circuit court described S.B. No. 491 as follows:
Instead of repealing the original second-degree robbery statute and replacing it with the new version of second-degree robbery, the General Assembly transferred Section 569.030 [] to Section 570.025 [].
This represents an erroneous characterization of S.B. No. 491. Instead, S.B. No. 491 identified numerous statutes by number, including section 569.030, and then declared that these provisions "are repealed and six hundred eighty-five new sections [including section 570.025] enacted in lieu thereof ." (Emphasis added.) And, the legislature did not merely repeal section 569.030 and transfer the identical language of the former section 569.030 into section 570.025; instead, the legislature substantively changed the offense of second-degree robbery by adding a new element not previously contained in section 569.030.4 This is a distinction with a difference.5
Second-degree robbery under section 570.025, enacted by the legislature to replace section 569.030, requires proof that the accused had forcibly stolen property and caused physical injury to another in the course thereof. § 570.025. In other words, the "new enactment" of second-degree robbery adds an element to the offense of second-degree robbery that did not exist when Cobbins was convicted of second-degree robbery as it existed in 2011 pursuant to section 569.030.6 By changing the elements required to prove second-degree robbery (as compared to the elements previously required by section 569.030 ) and changing the statute number associated with second-degree robbery (§ 570.025), the legislature made clear that conduct constituting the former "second-degree robbery" pursuant to section 569.030 no longer qualified as "second-degree robbery" after the enactment of section 570.025. This distinction becomes significant with subsequent legislative actions.
Also, among the changes to the criminal code in S.B. No. 491 was a transfer of all Chapter 195 offenses to a new Chapter 579. Reflecting this change, S.B. No. 491 amended section 558.019.2 to clarify that it "shall be applicable to all classes of felonies except those set forth in chapter 579, or in chapter 195 prior to January 1, 2017, and those otherwise excluded in subsection 1 of this section." Subsection 1 further reflected the update by deleting the reference to section 558.018 and replacing it with section 566.125, where former section 558.018 had been transferred. § 558.018, RSMo Supp. 2017. The changes from S.B. No. 491 did not otherwise affect the scope of section 558.019 ’s coverage. Thus, under the 2014 amendment, Cobbins's offense under former section 569.030, RSMo 2000, as a felony not within Chapters 579 or 195, was...
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