Cobble v. Langford
| Decision Date | 29 April 1950 |
| Citation | 190 Tenn. 385,230 S.W.2d 194,26 Beeler 385 |
| Parties | COBBLE et al. v. LANGFORD. 26 Beeler 385, 190 Tenn. 385, 230 S.W.2d 194 |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
White & White, Livingston, for appellants.
J. A. Oakley, Livingston, A. H. Roberts, Jr., Nashville, for appellee.
The bill in this cause was filed by the Cobbles against the sister of Mrs. Cobble, Edna Langford, to enjoin the prosecution of an ejectment case in the Circuit Court of Overton County involving the title and possession of a tract of land in that County. After the bill was filed the complainants confessed judgment in the ejectment case. Proof was heard and the Chancellor dismissed the suit because in his opinion the memorandums of the sale of land by Edna Langford to the Cobbles was not sufficient to satisfy the statute of frauds. The Chancellor also rendered judgment against Edna Langford for the purchase price of the land as paid to her agent and received by her from the Cobbles. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decree of the Chancellor. A petition for certiorari has been filed, granted and argument has been heard.
The petitioners allege and prove that they purchased a tract of land from Edna Langford on a parol contract and as a result of this purchase went into possession of and lived on this land from 1939 until the time this suit was instituted in 1946. They further allege and prove and base their claim for the injunction, to enjoin the ejectment suit, on memorandums signed by the parol vendor, Edna Langford, and by her agent. The question is whether or not these written agreements can be tied together and when tied together whether they are sufficient to bring this original parol sale within the terms of the statute of frauds so as to satisfy the statute.
The statute of frauds is carried in the present Code under Section 7831 and contains the following provision with regard to the sales of land: 'No action shall be brought: Whereby to charge * * * any person * * * upon any contract for the sale of lands, tenements, or hereditaments, * * * unless the promise or agreement, upon which such action shall be brought, or some memorandum or note thereof, shall be in writing, and signed by the party to be charged therewith, or some other person by him thereunto lawfully authorized.'
Under the proof in this record the Cobbles went into possession of the land in question in 1939. Some years thereafter Edna Langford sold this property to one Smith by warranty deed which was duly recorded. After the recordation of this deed suit was brought by the Cobbles against Smith and it was held in that suit that the deed therein was champertous. Immediately after this holding, Edna Languford signed a memorandum to the Cobbles as follows:
'Jim Cobble and wife Martha Cobble: You and each of you are hereby notified and this is to make known that any Agreement or Understanding I may have had with you, or either of you, about the Conveyance of a tract of land described as follows:
"Lying and being in the Third Civil District of Overton County, bounded on the north by Dale and Smith; on the west by Dora Hawkins and George Copeland; on the south by Geraldine Ayers and on the east by Loa Ayers, containing Ninety-four (94) Acres more or less.'
'That I have no intention of executing to you a deed to the above land described and set out and that whatever understanding may have been between us with respect thereto is hereby disaffirmed and you each of you are hereby required to at once surrender and turn possession to me off said above described boundary of land.
'This April 18th., 1946.
'Edna Langford.'
It is also shown by the overwhelming preponderance of the evidence, and this fact is inescapable after one reads the record, that Edna Langford appointed her sister Lula A. Brown as her agent to collect for the sale of this land and authorized her to sign receipts for the purchase money as paid. The record contains a receipt for the payment or part payment of this land signed by Lula Brown, setting forth the terms of the purchase. This receipt is as follows:
'We have bought this farm we now live on from Edna Langford bounded on the north by Dale and Smith and on the West by Dora Hawkins and George Copeland and on the south by Geraldine Ayers and on the east by Lola Ayers; We are to pay $250.00 two hundred and fifty dollars for this land, all to be paid to Lula Brown in payment as we can pay it.
'My sister, Edna Langford, authorized me to sign these receipts.
'Lula A. Brown.'
Can these two writings, signed by the party to be charged and her agent, be tied together so as to satisfy the statute of frauds? It is not what the parties agreed to in their oral contract, but whether the contents of these memorandums, signed by Edna Langford and her agent, satisfies the requirement of the statute of frauds.
It is not that the parol agreement is and of itself void, but becomes unenforceable when the statute of frauds is pleaded. Brakefield v. Anderson, 87 Tenn. 206, 208, 209, 10 S.W. 360; Bailey v. Henry, 125 Tenn. 390, 400, 401, 143 S.W. 1124.
This Court has held that it is immaterial, 'as to the number of papers which, connected together, make out the memorandum * * *' Hudson v. King, 49 Tenn. 560, 573. In this case, Hudson v. King, the Court holds that the memorandum may be executed after the transaction. The Court says:
The statute of frauds was not enacted for the purpose of permitting a person to avoid a contract. Its object was not to grant a privilege to a person to refuse to perform what he has agreed to do. It was not enacted as a shield to the dishonest, it is sometimes used as such, but that was not its purpose. It was enacted to prevent fraud and perjury. Its purpose really was to prevent the mischief arising from resorting to oral evidence to prove the existence and terms of an alleged verbal agreement in certain cases as specified under the statute, among which are sales of real estate. The purpose of the statute is well set forth by Lord Hardwicke in an English case, Welford v. Beasley, 3 Atk. 503 wherein it was said: 'The meaning of the statute is to reduce contracts to a certainty, in order to avoid perjury on the one hand and fraud on the other, and, therefore, both in this court and in the courts of the common law, where an agreement has been reduced to such a certainty, and...
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...whom enforcement is sought. Anderson v. Hacks Crossing Partners, 3 S.W.3d 482, 485 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1999) (citing Cobble v. Langford, 190 Tenn. 385, 230 S.W.2d 194, 196 (1950)). Under this scheme, "it is generally held that the enforceability of a bargain, rather than its validity, depends o......
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In re Estate of Reynolds, No. W2006-01076-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 9/11/2007)
...warranties may all be omitted." Tenn. Code Ann. § 47-2-201, cmt. 1 (2001) (emphasis added). See also Cobble v. Langford, 190 Tenn. 385, 393-94, 230 S.W.2d 194,197-98 (Tenn. 1950) (memorandum satisfied statute of frauds even though it did not contain the consideration to be paid; parol evide......