Coburn v. First Equity Associates, Inc.
Decision Date | 31 August 1976 |
Docket Number | No. 7450,7450 |
Citation | 116 N.H. 522,363 A.2d 402 |
Parties | Bruce A. COBURN and another v. FIRST EQUITY ASSOCIATES, INC. |
Court | New Hampshire Supreme Court |
Richard E. Boyer, Nashua, by brief and orally, for plaintiffs.
Winer, Lynch, Pillsbury & Howorth (S. Robert Winer, Nashua, orally), for defendant.
The issue presented by this transfer is whether the court erred in granting defendant's motion to set aside plaintiffs' summary judgment. The issue was reserved and transferred by Gormley, J.
Plaintiffs instituted suits against the defendant on October 10, 1974, in two counts of debt for wages due for two different periods of time, the period February 4 through February 23, 1974, and March 11 through April 15, 1974, under RSA 275:44-46 and 53, and a third count in quantum meruit for the value of services rendered for the same periods of time. On January 25, 1975, plaintiffs filed motions for summary judgment with affidavits pursuant to RSA 491:8-a (Supp.1975). On February 13, 1975, defendant filed answers and objections, which in effect served as a general denial of plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment, but which were not accompanied by counter-affidavits. On April 8, 1975, defendant filed counterclaims alleging damages against plaintiffs for breach of contract.
A hearing was held on plaintiffs' motions for summary judgment on April 16, 1975, and the motions were granted on April 18. Also on the 18th, defendant mailed motions to file affidavits, accompanied with the affidavits. On April 22, the defendant filed motions to set aside the summary judgments. Hearing was held on the defendant's motions on August 20, at which time the presiding judge disqualified himself. The hearing was rescheduled to August 27 which resulted in the court's decisions for the defendant of September 19, 1975, setting aside plaintiffs' summary judgments.
The plaintiffs' first contention was that the district court lacked the power to grant a hearing and order on defendant's motion to set aside the summary judgments. It is plaintiffs' argument that the power of the district court to grant summary judgment derives from statute, and thereby any power to set aside summary judgment must also be found in the statute. Since no statute grants the power, plaintiffs argue that no such authority exists.
We have long held that the court has the power to vacate its judgments for sufficient cause. Russell v. Dyer, 43 N.H. 396 (1861). 'As a general proposition, courts have power to set aside, vacate, modify, or amend their judgments for good cause shown.' Adams v. Adams, 51 N.H. 388, 396 (1871); Bussey v. Bussey, 94 N.H. 328, 329, 52 A.2d 856, 858 (1947); Lancaster Nat'l Bank v. Whitefield etc. Trust Co., 92 N.H. 337, 339, 30 A.2d 473, 474 (1943). Once the court has been given the power to grant summary judgment, it has all the powers which are inherent in the court, including the power and duty to reexamine its judgments when the proper case is presented and to set aside that judgment if the court considers it to have been error. See Hallahan v. Riley, 94 N.H. 338, 341, 53 A.2d 431, 433 (1947); Perkins v. Company, 90 N.H. 534, 538-39, 13 A.2d 475, 476 (1940); Lamarre v. Lamarre, 84 N.H. 441, 444-45, 152 A. 272, 274 (1930).
The plaintiffs' second contention is that it was error for the court to grant the defendant's motion to set aside plaintiffs' summary judgment where the defendant failed to file counter- affidavits within the time required under RSA 491:8-a (Supp.1975). The purpose of the summary judgment statute is to determine whether there is any genuine issue of material fact which requires a formal trial on the merits. Chemical Insecticide Co. v. State, 108 N.H. 126, 129, 229 A.2d 167, 169-70 (1967).
RSA 491:8-a (Supp.1975) provides that the facts as stated in the affidavits which accompany the party's motion for summary judgment ...
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