Cochetti v. Desmond

• Decision Date: 21 February 1978
• Docket Number: No. 77-1340,77-1340
• Parties: 98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2393 Philip COCHETTI, Appellant, v. John DESMOND, Walter M. Phillips, Jr. and Robert P. Kane, Appellees.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit

Page 102

572 F.2d 102

98 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2393

Philip COCHETTI, Appellant, v. John DESMOND, Walter M. Phillips, Jr. and Robert P. Kane, Appellees.

No. 77-1340.

United States Court of Appeals, Third Circuit.

Argued Nov. 29, 1977.

Decided Feb. 21, 1978.

Nicholas Trott Long, Philadelphia, Pa., for appellant.

Mark N. Cohen, Asst. Atty. Gen., Michael Von Moschzisker, Deputy Atty. Gen., Eastern Regional Director, Robert P. Kane, Atty. Gen., Philadelphia, Pa., for appellees.

Before GIBBONS, VAN DUSEN, Circuit Judges, and FISHER, ^* District Judge.

OPINION OF THE COURT

GIBBONS, Circuit Judge.

Philip Cochetti, formerly a Special Investigator III with the Pennsylvania Department of Justice, appeals from a summary judgment in favor of the defendants in his suit seeking relief from an allegedly wrongful discharge. Cochetti was employed in the Office of Special Prosecutor in Philadelphia. The defendants are John Desmond, the Chief Investigator in that office, Deputy Attorney General Walter Phillips, who headed the office, and Attorney General Robert P. Kane, who made the decision first to suspend and then to discharge Cochetti. The appellant's complaint alleges: (1) that as a result of a conspiracy among the defendants he was deprived of a property interest in his continued employment without being afforded due process of law; and (2) that he was discharged in retaliation for making statements that were protected by the first amendment's guarantee of free speech. The complaint seeks reinstatement, prospective injunctive relief, and compensatory and punitive damages. We conclude that, with the exception of the claim for punitive damages, all of Cochetti's claims for relief are moot. As to the claim for punitive damages, we conclude that on the record before the district court summary judgment was proper, even if there were disputed fact issues which might have made summary judgment on the remaining issues improper. Thus we affirm the judgment below.

In ruling on the motion for summary judgment, the district court concluded that Cochetti had a property interest in his continued employment. Based upon the pleadings, depositions on file, and affidavits, the court found such a property interest in the collective bargaining agreement between the American Federation of State, County and Municipal Employees, AFL-CIO, and the Commonwealth, entered into pursuant to the Public Employe Relations Act of July 23, 1970, P.L. 563, No. 195, 43 Pa.Stat.Ann. § 1101.101 et seq. Cochetti contended that he was entitled to a hearing prior to the termination of this property interest. However, the district court held that, in light of the sensitive nature of Cochetti's employment, the post-termination grievance and arbitration procedures provided by the collective bargaining contract afforded sufficient due process protection. Cochetti also contended that, regardless of the availability of a post-termination hearing procedure, the district court should consider his first amendment liberty claim since that claim depended on federal law independent of any state law property interest. ¹ The court considered this claim but rejected it on the grounds, first, that Cochetti had waived his first amendment rights in accepting the employment and, second, that the sensitive nature of the investigation justified curtailing his first amendment rights.

At the time summary judgment was entered, an arbitration proceeding pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement had been concluded. At the close of this hearing the arbitrator had ordered that Cochetti be reinstated with back pay. The award had not been enforced, however, because of the lack of an appropriation of state funds. Recognizing that the appeal might be moot, this court requested counsel to advise us as to the current status of the award. Counsel have stipulated that two letters quoted in the margin ² set forth Cochetti's employment status. These letters disclose that his suspension and termination were cancelled but that he is now on furloughed status because the Office of Special Prosecutor ceased to exist on December 6, 1976. On September 28, 1977, Cochetti received a check for $21,060.47 for the pay he would have received had he not been discharged. He has been credited with the lost time for annual leave purposes and, in accordance with governing Commonwealth regulations, he will remain on the recall list for Special Investigator III until December 6, 1978.

Even if we were to decide (1) that the grievance-arbitration procedures did not satisfy due process requirements, or (2) that the district court erred in rejecting the appellant's first amendment liberty claim, we could not now award either injunctive relief or compensatory damages. The appellant has received as much relief as could have been awarded by the district court on the instant complaint. Cochetti resists this conclusion by suggesting that during the period of his discharge he lost the opportunity to apply for a comparable position elsewhere in the Commonwealth once he learned that the Office of Special Prosecutor was to be terminated. This speculative suggestion, plainly an afterthought, was not referred to in the pleadings below. There is nothing in the record which would permit its consideration at this time. The mootness of this appeal must be determined on the basis of the record presented to the district court. Based on that record, the prayers for injunctive relief and compensatory damages are clearly moot.

The arbitration award did not include punitive damages. Cochetti insists that his prayer for the award of such relief is sufficient to require us to consider the merits of his due process and liberty claims. We agree that the arbitration award did not moot the claim for punitive damages. But, even assuming that the appellant's constitutional rights were violated, we do not think that punitive damages could have been awarded in this case.

It is clear that in certain circumstances punitive damages may be awarded for violations of civil rights. Judge Biggs made this point many years ago:

As we have seen, the suit involves the deprivation of civil rights. R.S. §§ 1979 and 1980, 8 U.S.C.A. §§ 43, 47 (42 U.S.C. §§ 1983 and 1985) give to the individuals thus deprived a right of action at law. Irrespective of these statutes, however, a right of action in the individual for damages for loss of political rights existed at common law. Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759. Such an action sounds in tort and the jury may award exemplary or punitive damages. Barry v. Edmunds, 116 U.S. 550, 6 S.Ct. 501, 29 L.Ed. 729; Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58, 21 S.Ct. 17, 45 L.Ed. 84. In such an action the jurisdictional sum is to be determined by the amount claimed by the plaintiff in his complaint or declaration. Hulsecamp v. Teel, Fed.Cas.No.6862, 2 Dall. 358, 1 L. Ed. 414; Wiley v. Sinkler, supra, including an amount claimed by way of punitive damages, Ragsdale v. Rudich, 5 Cir., 293 F. 182, unless it appears from the complaint or declaration that it is not possible for the plaintiff to recover the amount claimed or that the amount is claimed fraudulently in order to create jurisdiction in the court. Smithers v. Smith, 204 U.S. 632, 27 S.Ct. 297, 51 L.Ed. 656. This rule applies as well to suits in equity. Maurel v. Smith, D.C.N.Y., 220 F. 195.

Hague v. Committee for Indus. Org., 101 F.2d 774, 789 (3d Cir.), modified on other grounds, 307 U.S. 496, 59 S.Ct. 954, 83 L.Ed. 1423 (1939). See Fisher v. Volz, 496 F.2d 333, 347-48 (3d Cir. 1974) (holding that in federal civil rights cases punitive damages may be awarded even without an award of compensatory damages); Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 87-88 (3d Cir. 1965) (same). Although punitive damages may be awarded in civil rights cases, we must still examine the circumstances under which such an award would be proper. Punitive damages are not a favorite of the law. Usually assessed both as an example and as a warning against particularly egregious conduct, such damages serve both punitive and deterrent functions. Such awards may be particularly appropriate as a means of vindicating the public interest in preventing violations of civil rights by state officials. The availability of punitive damages as a deterrent may be more significant than ever today, in view of the apparent trend of decisions curtailing the powers of federal courts to impose equitable remedies to terminate such violations. See, e. g., Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 96 S.Ct. 598, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976); O'Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S. 488, 94 S.Ct. 669, 38 L.Ed.2d 674 (1974); Lewis v. Hyland, 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 931, 98 S.Ct. 419, 54 L.Ed.2d 291 (1977). But despite its utility as a deterrent, the punitive damage remedy must be reserved, we think, for cases in which the defendant's conduct amounts to something more than a bare violation justifying compensatory damages or injunctive relief. None of the few cases in this court which have discussed the availability of punitive damages for civil rights violations has presented the occasion for adopting an appropriate test. We find guidance in Justice Brennan's separate opinion in Adickes v. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 233, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 1642, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part):

To recover punitive damages, I believe a plaintiff must show more...