Cochnauer v. State
| Decision Date | 02 September 2021 |
| Docket Number | 02-19-00165-CR |
| Parties | Casey Joe Cochnauer, Appellant v. The State of Texas |
| Court | Texas Court of Appeals |
Do Not Publish Tex.R.App.P. 47.2(b)
On Appeal from the 78th District Court Wichita County, Texas Trial Court No. 60, 089-B
Before Kerr, Bassel, and Wallach, JJ.
Casey Joe Cochnauer appeals his conviction for two counts of indecency with a child. See Tex. Penal Code Ann § 21.11(a)(1), (a)(2)(A). In two issues, Cochnauer- who represented himself with the assistance of standby counsel at trial-argues that the trial court deprived him of two Sixth Amendment rights: right to counsel and right to a speedy trial. We will overrule Cochnauer's issues and affirm the trial court's judgment.
In early 2016, two brothers made an outcry about indecencies that Cochnauer had committed against them in early 2011 when they were thirteen and ten years old, respectively.[1] A Wichita County magistrate issued arrest warrants in February 2016 for Cochnauer, who had been incarcerated since 2012 at the Texas Department of Criminal Justice's Kyle Facility on unrelated charges. The warrants were served on Cochnauer in May 2018 at that facility. Cochnauer was tried and convicted of the indecency charges in April 2019, and the trial court sentenced Cochnauer in accordance with the jury's punishment assessments.
Cochnauer timely appealed. We will address his two Sixth Amendment issues in reverse order.
In his second issue, Cochnauer contends that the three-year delay between the February 2016 issuance of the arrest warrants and his April 2019 trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to a speedy trial. See U.S. Const. amend VI. He argues that under the four-factor balancing test set out in Barker v. Wingo, he is entitled to a dismissal of the charges against him. See 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 2192 (1972); Gonzales v. State, 435 S.W.3d 801, 808 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014). To assist in evaluating Cochnauer's speedy-trial claim, we will set out a detailed timeline below.
Speedy-trial complaints are subject to error-preservation requirements. See Henson v. State, 407 S.W.3d 764, 768-69 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). To preserve a complaint for our review, a party must have presented to the trial court a timely request, objection, or motion stating the specific grounds, if not apparent from the context, for the desired ruling. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(1); Thomas v. State, 505 S.W.3d 916, 924 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016). Further, the party must obtain an express or implicit adverse trial-court ruling or object to the trial court's refusal to rule. Tex.R.App.P. 33.1(a)(2); Everitt v. State, 407 S.W.3d 259, 262-63 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013).
Here, Cochnauer raised speedy-trial complaints in two pro se motions. Cochnauer's first motion-filed on February 25, 2019, and heard on March 11, 2019-raised a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint. In that motion, Cochnauer requested alternate forms of relief: "trial set for a date on or before the 8th of May 2019, or, if a trial is not set on or before said date, Cause No. 60089-B*1-2 . . . be dismissed on the ground that the defendant has been denied the Constitutional Right to a Speedy Trial." [Emphasis added.] The trial court granted Cochnauer's motion and set the trial for April 22, 2019.[2] Because the trial court granted Cochnauer one form of his requested relief-a trial setting on or before May 8-there is no error for us to review. See Hill v. State, 213 S.W.3d 533, 538 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 2007, no pet.); Cline v. State, 685 S.W.2d 760, 761-62 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, no pet.).
Cochnauer's second speedy-trial motion-the amended IADA motion-asked the trial court to dismiss the case based on the "Speedy Trial Act of 1974" and the IADA, neither of which applies to this case. The Speedy Trial Act is a federal statute that does not govern state-court prosecutions. See 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 3161-74. The IADA is inapplicable because Cochnauer's case does not involve an interstate detainer. See Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 51.14.
Regardless, presenting a statutory speedy-trial claim to the trial court does not preserve error on a claim that the State violated an appellant's constitutional right to a speedy trial. See Dunn v. State, 819 S.W.2d 510, 526 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991); Check v. State, 543 S.W.3d 883, 887 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.); see also Clark v. State, 365 S.W.3d 333, 339 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (). Cochnauer's second speedy-trial motion thus did not preserve his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint for our review.
But even if Cochanuer had preserved his Sixth Amendment speedy-trial complaint, application of the Barker factors shows no speedy-trial violation.
To determine when a Sixth Amendment speedy-trial violation occurs, appellate courts apply a balancing test using the Barker factors. See 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192; Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 808 (reciting the Barker factors). Appellate courts weigh: (1) the length of delay, (2) reasons for the delay, (3) the defendant's assertion of his speedy-trial right, and (4) prejudice to the defendant because of the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 530, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. The conduct of the State and defendant are weighed under each factor, though no single factor alone is necessary or sufficient to establish a speedy-trial violation. Hurdsman v. State, No. 02-17-00319-CR, 2018 WL 5832116, at *3 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth Nov. 8, 2018, pet. ref'd) ().
The first factor-length of delay-is, to an extent, a triggering mechanism for the remaining factors. Santallan v. State, 922 S.W.2d 306, 307 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, pet. ref'd). The "speedy-trial clock" starts only when a formal indictment, information, or actual arrest occurs. Id. (citing United States v. Marion, 404 U.S. 307, 320, 92 S.Ct. 455, 463 (1971)). When, as here, there is no prearrest indictment, the calculation does not include the period before arrest. See id. ().
Here, although a magistrate issued the arrest warrants for Cochnauer in February 2016, his actual arrest did not occur until May 7, 2018. The trial began less than a year later on April 23, 2019. The almost year-long delay between Cochnauer's arrest and the start of his trial does weigh slightly against the State and is enough to trigger an analysis of the remaining Barker factors. See Dragoo v. State, 96 S.W.3d 308, 314 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003) .
When assessing the second factor-reasons for delay-different weight is given to different reasons. Gonzales, 435 S.W.3d at 809. For instance, deliberate delays to hamper the defense will weigh more heavily against the State than more neutral reasons such as negligence or overcrowded dockets, which will still weigh against the State but less heavily. Id.
Cochnauer does not argue that the delay was the result of deliberate conduct; instead, he complains that the State failed to explain the more than two-year delay between the February 2016 arrest warrants and his May 2018 arrest. But as we have explained, the...
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