Cochran's Adm'X v. Cochran

Decision Date25 March 1938
Citation273 Ky. 1
PartiesCochran's Adm'x et al. v. Cochran et al.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

1. Descent and Distribution. — Advancements to children, reasonable in relation to amount of property owned, made in good faith and not to defraud wife, afford no grounds of complaint by her.

2. Descent and Distribution. — Proof of gifts or voluntary transfers of greater portion of husband's property, made without knowledge of wife or intended wife, presents prima facie case of fraud upon wife's marital rights.

3. Descent and Distribution. — Transfers by husband of greater portion of his property without wife's knowledge are not binding upon wife unless satisfactorily explained by recipients, and equity will require proper accounting and restoration to widow of her rights of which she has been fraudulently deprived.

4. Descent and Distribution. — Evidence relating to alleged conveyance by deceased to his son dated prior to deceased's second marriage, but recorded several months thereafter, and relating to suit brought at instance of deceased wherein judgment rendered subsequent to alleged date of deed to son directed deceased and his wife to convey an interest in property involved to deceased's daughter, established that conveyance to son was a fraud upon marital rights of second wife, who was entitled to her legal rights in property after deceased's death, regardless of whether it had come through deceased's first wife.

5. Witnesses. — In action by deceased's wife to set aside transfers by him in fraud of her marital rights, wife was incompetent to testify concerning conversations with deceased relating to circumstances connected with conveyance of some of property (Civil Code of Practice, sec. 606).

6. Descent and Distribution. — A wife who signed deed conveying husband's property could not, subsequent to his death, complain that transfer was in fraud of her marital rights.

7. Descent and Distribution. — In suit by deceased's wife to set aside transfers by deceased in fraud of her marital rights, recipients of property received in transactions covered by badges of fraud had burden of showing good faith and regularity of transactions.

8. Descent and Distribution. — Where a lot and a note received by deceased as consideration for property conveyed by deceased by deed signed by deceased's second wife were transferred to deceased's daughter and son, that transfer was a fraud on second wife, who, upon deceased's death, was entitled to have children account to her.

9. Descent and Distribution. — Evidence relating to deceased's alleged gift of stock to children prior to his second marriage, although new certificates were never issued to children and deceased continued to receive dividends and vote stock at subsequent meetings, considered in connection with other transactions by which deceased divested himself of practically all of substantial estate subsequent to second marriage, established gross fraud as to deceased's second wife.

10. Corporations. — The transfer of stock on books of corporation is regarded as being for its protection, and a contract of sale passes rights of vendor in stock.

11. Gifts. — Deceased's children, claiming to be recipients of gift inter vivos of stock, had burden of establishing that there was an actual and completed transfer of stock represented by stock certificates.

12. Descent and Distribution. — A husband may not deprive his wife of her distributable share in his estate either by will or by transfer of his property before death by gift in nature of a testamentary devise with retention of benefits and control during his life.

13. Gifts. — A "gift inter vivos" is one between living persons to operate, if at all, in the donor's lifetime, immediately and irrevocably, and, to constitute such a gift, property must be delivered absolutely.

14. Evidence. — All evidence is to be weighed according to proof which it was in power of one side to have produced and in power of other to have contradicted.

15. Evidence. — Where evidence tends to prove material fact imposing liability upon party having power to produce evidence of facts as they existed and he neglects to offer that proof, it will be concluded that proof, if produced, would not rebut, but would support inference against him, especially where conduct apparently suspicious or dishonorable is subject of investigation.

Appeal from McCracken Circuit Court.

W.V. EATON, C.C. GRASSHAM and L.B. ALEXANDER for appellants.

WHEELER & SHELBOURNE for appellees.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY STANLEY, COMMISSIONER.

Reversing in part and affirming in part.

This suit is being prosecuted by Mrs. Artha May Cochran, widow of the late W.E. Cochran, as administratrix and individually, against the children and others, to discover assets of his estate, to set aside certain conveyances and transfers made by him in fraud of her marital rights, and to settle the estate.

The decedent was a citizen of Paducah. His first wife died in the spring of 1929. In the summer of 1930, Mr. Cochran, who was then about 60 years old, met the appellant, who was about 40, at South Haven, Mich., where he and his family had spent the summers for many years. She lived in Chicago, and is a talented and refined lady. They soon became engaged to marry. She visited his home in Paducah for a few days in the early part of November, 1930, and they were married on November 27, 1930, in Chicago. Mr. Cochran's two daughters were bridesmaids. After a short wedding trip they returned to his home in Paducah. Mr. Cochran had two daughters and three sons by his former marriage, the youngest of whom was then about 19 years old. The daughters and youngest son lived with their father. The daughters married in 1933. Friction soon arose between them and their stepmother and the relations seem to have progressively grown more unpleasant. Each side has blamed the other for the unfortunate situation. Difficulties likewise arose between Mr. and Mrs. Cochran, apparently through the children's influence. It was not long after their marriage that he consulted his old friend and counselor, Hon. Charles K. Wheeler, who advised him that he had no cause for divorce, and cautioned him in certain particulars so that he should not give his wife such cause About the 8th of August, 1933, Mr. Cochran went to Pine Bluff, Ark. This was after a statute had been enacted by that state authorizing the granting of a divorce to one who had resided there for 3 months. On October 10, following, he filed a suit for divorce, alleging as grounds, in substance, his wife's fussy disposition, bad temper, and cruel treatment. Mrs. Cochran, summoned as a nonresident, filed answer and a cross-complaint as an independent action seeking maintenance or alimony. Before the case was submitted for judgment, Mr. Cochran died at Pine Bluff, on February 14, 1934. Two of his sons were with him, but none of the family advised his wife of his death. She learned of it through her attorney and the newspapers.

The widow qualified as the administratrix of the estate and found only her husband's personal effects and a little furniture not claimed by the daughters, all of which was disposed of for about $500. This suit was soon filed by her both as administratrix and individually, but the court ruled that she could not maintain it in such dual capacity. Electing to continue the suit as administratrix, she filed answer and cross-petition individually against the children and others, setting up substantially the same allegations and prayers as in the petition. The court overruled a demurrer to this pleading.

There were many and somewhat involved pleadings and a large amount of testimony taken by depositions. During the progress of the case, some assets were discovered and brought into the estate, concerning which there ceased to be any controversy. There is reason to believe that there were other assets not uncovered. Thus a sealed and carefully preserved envelope delivered by the proprietor of the Pine Bluff Hotel, where Mr. Cochran had been staying, to one of his sons, but addressed to a daughter whom subsequent disclosures show to have been most active, was said to have contained nothing but a trial balance of one of the companies Mr. Cochran was interested in and some old letters; and the appraisers were denied access to the safe and bank safety box in the name of that daughter and to which he had the right of access. Certificates of stock in one company at least were never produced.

The chancellor refused to set aside all conveyances and transfers of property made by the decedent as they affected her marital rights, except a deed to nine parcels of Paducah real estate. The widow, as personal representative and individually, prosecutes an appeal from the judgment adverse to her, and the children have a cross-appeal from that part of it which gives her dower in the Paducah property covered by the deed mentioned.

The parties are in agreement on only one point and that is that there was much incompetent and irrelevant evidence. The trial court overruled exceptions to the depositions, but stated in his judgment that he had considered only what was competent. Some complaint is made of this by the parties. The cross-appellants also question the ruling on their demurrer to the answer and cross-petition of Mrs. Cochran. We will not undertake to pass upon these questions specifically, but shall go direct to the issues of fact and the rights of the parties as presented by the whole record. In doing so, we shall consider only the competent and relevant evidence, supported by pleadings we deem good.

The general principle is that advancements or gifts to children, reasonable in relation to the amount of property owned, made in good faith and not to defraud a wife or a prospective wife, afford no grounds of complaint by her. But in this state proof of gifts or voluntary conveyances and transfers of all or the greater portion of...

To continue reading

Request your trial

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT