Cochran v. McLaughlin
| Decision Date | 17 February 1942 |
| Citation | 24 A.2d 836 |
| Court | Connecticut Supreme Court |
| Parties | COCHRAN et al. v. MCLAUGHLIN, Tax Com'r, et al. |
As Amended on Denial of Reargument April 8, 1942.
Appeal from Superior Court, New Haven County; McEvoy, Judge.
Action by Edwin Paul Cochran and others, executors of the estate of Alice F. Cochran, deceased, against Charles J. McLaughlin, Tax Commissioner, and others, for declaratory judgment regarding whether a corporation reorganized by the plaintiff executors would be a proper beneficiary for them to designate under the provisions of the will, and, if so, whether the property turned over to it would be exempt from the succession tax. The case was tried to the court. From a judgment answering the first question in the negative and refusing to pass on the other question, plaintiffs appeal.
Error in part and case remanded with direction.
Before MALTBIE, C. J., and AVERY, BROWN, JENNINGS, and ELLS, JJ.
Charles M. Lyman, of New Haven, and Albert M. Chandler, of Boston, Mass., for appellants (plaintiffs).
Louis Weinstein, Asst. Inheritance Tax Atty., of New Haven (Francis A. Pallotti, Atty. Gen., Frederick W. Dauch, Deputy Tax Comm'r., of Waterbury, and Harry L. Brooks, Asst. Atty. Gen., on the brief), for appellees (defendants).
Alice F. Cochran, who died at New Haven in 1939, in her will provided that a trust fund of $200,000 should be established, the income to be paid to her husband and at his death the principal to be paid "to such charitable, benevolent, religious or educational institutions as my said trustees, or their successors, may determine." She also disposed of the residue of her estate as follows: "All the rest and residue of my estate, real and personal, of which I shall die seized or possessed or to which I shall be in any way entitled or over which I shall have any power of appointment at the time of my decease I give, devise, bequeath and appoint to such charitable, benevolent, religious or educational institutions as my executors here inafter named may determine." The executors allege in the complaint their belief that the essential intention of the testatrix in making these provisions could not be carried out if the selection of the ultimate beneficiaries was to be made within any reasonable time for the administration of the estate, but that her intention could best be effectuated if the selection could be extended over a reasonable period of years. They, therefore, propose the organization of a corporation to receive the funds, and annex to the complaint a form it might take. The name of the corporation would be the Elm City Charity Fund; the purposes would be to receive and collect funds exclusively for charitable, religious and educational purposes, and to pay the same, from time to time to such charitable, religious and educational institutions whereever situated, as might be selected by the corporation; provision is made against private gain to any person connected with the corporation except reasonable compensation for the services rendered; should the corporation be dissolved, the property would be paid to such charitable, religious or educational institutions as it might select; and the members would be the executors and such other persons as might from time to time be constituted members under by-laws adopted by the corporation. The plaintiffs requested a declaratory judgment determining (1) whether such a corporation would be a proper beneficiary under the provisions quoted from the will; (2) whether the executors could properly turn over the property to that corporation in fulfilment of those provisions; (3) whether the property so turned over would form a part of the net estate of Alice F. Cochran upon which succession and estate taxes would be based; and (4) whether or not any class of beneficiaries would be included under the designation "benevolent" which did not fall within the word "charitable" as used in the will.
The trial court found that prior to the death of Mrs. Cochran one of the executors talked with her with regard to her philanthropic plans and was given a list of institutions in which she was interested, a copy of the list being made a part of the finding. The purposes and nature of some of the institutions named are so much a matter of general knowledge that we can take judicial notice of them; Roden v. Connecticut Co., 113 Conn. 408, 415, 155 A. 721; McCleave v. Flanagan Co., 115 Conn. 36, 38, 160 A. 305; while the very names of others may be assumed fairly to indicate the scope of their activities. With very few exceptions, the institutions upon the list were apparently engaged in actually administering funds in their possession for education, assistance or relief. One, however, the "Fund for Near East Colleges," we apprehend distributes money to various colleges, and another, the "New Haven Foundation," may also be engaged in distributing money to institutions which directly administer relief or assistance. The trial court also found that during the year 1939 the executors duplicated the donations made by the testatrix in 1938, all of which donations were within the class of gifts for charitable, educational and religious purposes; and that during the year 1940 they made substantial donations, leaving out some of those to whom gifts were made in 1939 and adding certain others. It also found that the essential intention of the testatrix could be carried out if the selection of the beneficiaries was completed within a reasonable time for the administration of her estate. The net estate of the testatrix, exclusive of the remainder interest in the trust fund for her husband, amounted at the time of trial approximately to one million dollars. The trial court answered the first two questions stated in the complaint in the negative and held it unnecessary to answer the other two, and the executors have appealed.
It is only necessary to consider the questions as applied to the provision for the disposition of the residue, and we confine our discussion to it. We premise that the testatrix undoubtedly used the word "institutions" in its broad meaning of established societies or corporations. Webster's New International Dictionary; Matter of Shattuck's Will, 193 N.Y. 446, 454, 86 N.E. 455; Estate of Sutro, 155 Cal. 727, 735, 102 P. 920. In the provisions in the will, read in the light of the trial court's finding, certain aspects of the testatrix' intent can be clearly seen. Most of the institutions which she had in mind directly administered the money they received in providing education, relief or assistance instead of holding and distributing funds or the income thereof among...
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