Cochran v. Murrah

• Citation: 235 Ga. 304,219 S.E.2d 421
• Decision Date: 30 September 1975
• Docket Number: No. 30107,30107
• Parties: William O. COCHRAN et al. v. John Elbert MURRAH.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

Page 421

219 S.E.2d 421

235 Ga. 304

William O. COCHRAN et al. v. John Elbert MURRAH.

No. 30107.

Supreme Court of Georgia.

Sept. 30, 1975.

Dennis & Fain, Michael J. Gorby, Dennis J. Webb, Atlanta, for appellants.

Scott Walters, Jr., East Point, for appellee.

HILL, Justice.

In this appeal upon certificate from the denial of the defendants' motion for summary judgment, the sole issue concerns cancellation, upon equitable grounds, of a release signed by the plaintiff.

The plaintiff had been employed by defendant William O. Cochran for over eight years as a farm laborer. He was paid seventy dollars a week and lived in a house furnished by his employer. Some weeks he was paid only sixty or sixty-five dollars but he does not know why and apparently has never asked. He can read, but never does.

On May 1, 1973, the plaintiff was attaching a plow to a tractor driven by defendant Cochran when the mechanical lift was suddenly activated, squeezing the plaintiff between the plow and the tractor and injuring his left side and back. After the accident the plaintiff saw several doctors on different occasions and was hospitalized for tests and treatment.

On deposition plaintiff testified that defendant Cochran paid one of the doctors 'twenty some dollars' and also paid plaintiff's salary for three weeks even though he was unable to work. According to plaintiff's testimony, defendant Cochran told plaintiff that his insurance company was going to send some papers for the plaintiff to sign so the defendant could get back the money he had paid the doctor. The plaintiff testified further that defendant Cochran told him that the insurance would pay the medical bills and would pay the plaintiff as long as he remained unable to work.

On May 25, 1973, the defendant brought the papers out to the plaintiff's house and told him to sign them. The plaintiff testified that he got up out of bed to sign the papers, that he was still on pain pills and that he signed them although he did not read them.

The papers consisted of an agreement and release by which the plaintiff released defendant Cochran and defendant Georgia Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company from any and all claims arising out of the accident in exchange for $248.74 paid to the plaintiff and a promise to pay his future medical expenses for one year up to a total of $1,000.00. The plaintiff moved out of the house on the defendant's farm when he was told to begin paying rent of $50 a month.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendant Cochran and the defendant insurance company seeking cancellation of the release and payment of his salary of $70.00 a week plus his medical expenses, less payments previously made to him. In a second count alleging negligence he prayed for damages for lost wages, medical expenses, pain and suffering and total and permanent disability.

The defendants moved for summary judgment based on the release. They relied on the pleadings, the release, plaintiff's deposition, and an affidavit of defendant Cochran stating that he saw the plaintiff voluntarily sign the release at his request. The trial judge denied the motion and certified that order for immediate appeal.

The rule in this State is that where one who can read signs a contract without reading it, he is bound by the terms thereof, unless he can show that an emergency existed at the time of signing that would excuse his failure to read it, or that the opposite party misled him by an artifice or device which prevented him from reading it, or that a fiduciary or confidential relationship existed between the parties upon which he relied in not reading the contract. Morrison v. Roberts, 195 Ga. 45, 23 S.E.2d 164, and cases cited therein.

Here the plaintiff admits that he can read, but that he did not read the release. The law is clear that, since he can read, he is responsible for what he signs, unless he fits within one of the exceptions mentioned above.

Upon trial of a case seeking cancellation of a release, the burden of proof would be upon the releasor to bring himself within one of the exceptions. On the releasees' motion for summary judgment, however, the movants have the burden of producing evidence which negatives, with necessary certitude, the plaintiff's claim, Burnette Ford, Inc. v. Hayes, 227 Ga. 551, 181 S.E.2d 866.

Did the defendants in the case before us produce evidence negating the possibility that plaintiff may come within one of the exceptions to the rule? We need consider only one of those exceptions because, if a confidential relationship were found to exist between the two parties, on which plaintiff relied in signing the release without reading it, the plaintiff would not be bound by the release if his employer misled him as to its contents.

Code Ann. § 37-707 defines confidential relations as follows: 'Any relations shall be deemed confidential, arising from nature or created by law, or resulting from contracts, where one party is so situated as to exercise a controlling influence over the will, conduct, and interest of another; or where, from similar relation of mutual confidence, the law requires the utmost good faith; such as partners, principal and agent, etc.' The relationships listed as examples in the statute are not exclusive, as shown by the use of the abbreviation 'etc.' and the phrase 'where one party is so situated . . ..'

In addition to partners and principals and agents, it has been held that confidential relationships may exist between husband and wife, Cain v. Ligon, 71 Ga. 692, brother and sister, Sutton v. McMillan, 213 Ga. 90(3), 97 S.E.2d 139, and even banks and creditors of a depositor, American National Bank v. Fidelity Co., 131 Ga. 854, 859-860, 63 S.E. 622.

This is to say that although some confidential relationships are created by law and contract (e.g., partners), others may be created by the facts of the particular case. See Johnson v. Sherrer, 197 Ga. 392, 395, 29 S.E.2d 581. As noted in Bernstein v. Peters, 69 Ga.App. 525, 533, 26 S.E.2d 192, the facts of that case did not show a confidential relationship between a retailer and the agent of a liquor wholesaler. Implicit in that decision, however, is the recognition that a confidential relationship may exist...