Cochran v. State

• Decision Date: 31 October 2018
• Docket Number: No. 06-18-00048-CR,06-18-00048-CR
• Citation: 563 S.W.3d 374
• Parties: Joe Bradley COCHRAN, Appellant v. The STATE of Texas, Appellee
• Court: Texas Court of Appeals

563 S.W.3d 374

Joe Bradley COCHRAN, Appellant

v.The STATE of Texas, Appellee

No. 06-18-00048-CR

Court of Appeals of Texas, Texarkana.

Date Submitted: October 11, 2018

Date Decided: October 31, 2018

Troy A. Homsby, Miller, James, Miller & Homsby, LLP, 1725 Galleria Oaks Drive, Texarkana, TX 75503, for Appellant.

Gary D. Young, Lamar County & District Attorney, 119 North Main, Paris, TX 75460, for Appellee.

Before Morriss, C.J., Moseley and Burgess, JJ.

OPINION

Opinion by Chief Justice Morriss

Joe Bradley Cochran was on deferred adjudication community supervision for drug possession when local law enforcement officers searched his motel room and found drugs. From Cochran’s resulting conviction on two counts of drug possession, he appeals, asserting that the trial court erred in overruling his motion to suppress the drugs found in the search because the term of his community supervision allowing a search of his residence was constitutionally defective and did not authorize the search of the motel room in which he was staying at the time of the search. We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial court because (1) Cochran’s constitutional rights were not violated and (2) the search of Cochran’s motel room was authorized.

Cochran had been placed on deferred adjudication community supervision for possession of less than one gram of methamphetamine.¹ The terms and conditions of Cochran’s community supervision required him to "[s]ubmit to a search of [his] person, residence, or vehicle at any time by ... law enforcement official[s], for illegal drugs or contraband."

Cochran became unwittingly entangled with the Paris Police Department’s investigation of Amanda Hurley, an investigation initiated based on an unnamed confidential informant’s tip that Hurley might be a drug dealer. Detectives Leigh Foreman and Josh Crawford tried and failed to conduct a controlled purchase of drugs between Hurley and the confidential informant; Hurley had no drugs to sell. During their investigation, officers discovered that Hurley had visited an unnamed supplier at the local Days Inn motel. The motel clerk was questioned and reported that Hurley visited Cochran in that room.

That led to the search in question. After the trial court overruled Cochran’s motion to suppress the fruit of that search, Cochran pled guilty to, and was convicted of, possessing, in a drug free zone, first, a penalty-group-1 controlled substance in an amount of four grams or more but less than 200 grams and, second, a penalty-group-3-or-4 controlled substance in an amount of less than twenty-eight grams. The trial court sentenced Cochran to fifteen years' and five years' imprisonment, respectively.

(1) Cochran’s Constitutional Rights Were Not Violated

Cochran argues that the trial court erred in overruling his suppression motion because, in the absence of reasonable suspicion, the search based on a term of his community supervision violated his constitutional rights to privacy.

Foreman and Crawford testified that they detained Cochran in the motel lobby after discovering that he was on community supervision for a drug-related offense. They informed Cochran that they planned to search his motel room based on the term of his community supervision requiring him to "[s]ubmit to a search of [his] ... residence ... at any time by ... law enforcement official[s], for illegal drugs or contraband." Officers took Cochran’s room key, after he questioned whether this term authorized a search of a motel room rather than his house at which he resided. Officers arrested Cochran after they found methamphetamine, Alprazolam, and marihuana in his motel room.

At the suppression hearing, Foreman admitted that there was no warrant, exigent circumstance, or probable cause authorizing entry into Cochran’s motel room.² Argument at the hearing focused on whether the term allowing search of Cochran’s residence was valid and whether the motel room constituted his residence. Cochran introduced a copy of his driver’s license, which reflected the address he had registered with the community supervision office as his residence. In response to these arguments, the State pointed to records produced from the motel clerk establishing that Cochran had stayed at the Days Inn for thirteen of the first twenty days in July.³ The motel clerk testified that Cochran always paid in cash and had already paid to spend the night of July 20 at the motel.

After the suppression hearing, the trial court entered a written order, which found that the motel room was a residence and concluded that the Department’s search was authorized by the terms and conditions of Cochran’s community supervision.

We review a trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress under a bifurcated standard of review, giving almost total deference to the trial court’s determination of historical facts that turn on credibility and demeanor while reviewing de novo other application-of-law-to-fact issues. See Johnson v. State , 68 S.W.3d 644, 652–53 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002) ; Carmouche v. State , 10 S.W.3d 323, 327 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000). Appellate courts should also afford nearly total deference to trial court rulings on application-of-law-to-fact questions, also known as mixed questions of law and fact, if the resolution of those ultimate questions turns on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor. Guzman v. State , 955 S.W.2d 85, 89 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). Appellate courts may review mixed questions of law and fact not falling within this category on a de novo basis. Id. We must affirm the decision if it is correct on any theory of law that finds support in the record. Osbourn v. State , 92 S.W.3d 531, 538 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002).

Texas trial courts are afforded "broad discretion" in devising terms of community supervision. Butler v. State , 189 S.W.3d 299, 303 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006) ; Briseño v. State , 293 S.W.3d 644, 647 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2009, no pet.). Trial judges "may impose any reasonable condition that is ... designed to protect or restore the community, protect or restore the victim, or punish, rehabilitate, or reform the defendant." TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN . art. 42A.301(a) (West 2018); see TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN . art. 42A.104(a) (West 2018).

A criminal defendant does not have a right to community supervision, but it is a matter of contract setting out terms between the trial court and the defendant. Speth v. State , 6 S.W.3d 530, 534 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Contractual terms of community supervision are accepted unless objected to when established. Id. In the absence of such an objection, the defendant is seen to have waived "any rights encroached on by the terms of the contract." Id. "[A] defendant who is fairly notified of the conditions of community supervision at a hearing at which he has an opportunity to object forfeits any later complaint about those conditions, as long as those conditions do not involve a systemic right or prohibition." Dansby v. State , 448 S.W.3d 441, 447 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014).

A term of community supervision generally authorizing a search and seizure at any time requested by any law enforcement officer, without further restriction, is unreasonable and invalid. Tamez v. State , 534 S.W.2d 686, 690 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976) (acceptance of such condition "was in legal effect coerced"). However, as explained below, a condition of community supervision authorizing a search does not violate the Fourth Amendment or Article I, Section 9, if it is reasonably restricted to promote the purposes of community supervision.

The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution and Article 1, Section 9, of the Texas Constitution prohibit unreasonable searches and seizures. U.S. CONST . amend. IV ; TEX. CONST . art. I, § 9. "The purpose of both the Fourth Amendment and article I, section 9 is to safeguard an individual’s legitimate expectation of privacy from unreasonable governmental intrusions." McArthur v. State , 1 S.W.3d 323, 329 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1999, pet. ref'd). "[P]robationers and parolees do not enjoy the same level of Fourth Amendment protection accorded defendants only suspected of a crime." Garrett v. State , 791 S.W.2d 137, 140 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990). Rather, persons subject to community supervision enjoy "only conditional liberty properly dependent on observance of special supervisory restrictions." McArthur , 1 S.W.3d at 332 (citing United States v. Tonry , 605 F.2d 144, 150–51 (5th Cir. 1979), overruled on other grounds by Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Environment , 523 U.S. 83, 93, 118 S.Ct. 1003, 140 L.Ed.2d 210 (1998) ). Thus, "a community supervision ‘condition is not necessarily invalid simply because it affects [the defendant’s] ability to exercise constitutionally protected rights.’ " Briseño , 293 S.W.3d at 648 (quoting Lee v. State , 952 S.W.2d 894, 900 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1997, no pet.) (en banc) ). This is because "probation supervision g[ives] rise to a special state need ‘permitting a degree of impingement on privacy that would not be constitutional if applied to the public at large.’ " Garrett , 791 S.W.2d at 140 (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin , 483 U.S. 868, 875, 107 S.Ct. 3164, 97 L.Ed.2d 709 (1987) ).

Although Cochran did not consent to the search of the motel room, he had previously agreed to submit to searches of his person, residence, and vehicle for illegal drugs or contraband as a condition of receiving his bargained-for community supervision.⁴ Cochran argues that reasonable suspicion was required to support the search even considering this term of his community supervision. In support, he cites United States v. Knights , 534 U.S. 112, 122 S.Ct. 587, 151 L.Ed.2d 497 (2001). There, the United States Supreme Court was asked to decide whether a search violated Knights' Fourth Amendment rights even though it was conducted pursuant to a condition that Knights would "[s]ubmit his ... person, property, place of residence, vehicle, personal effects, to search at anytime, with or...