Cochran v. State, 19880

Decision Date08 November 1957
Docket NumberNo. 19880,19880
Citation100 S.E.2d 919,213 Ga. 706
PartiesHenry Grady COCHRAN v. The STATE.
CourtGeorgia Supreme Court

George C. Mitchell and Dan C. Mitchell, Atlanta, for plaintiff in error.

Paul Webb, Sol. Gen., Thomas R. Luck, Jr., Eugene L. Tiller, Eugene Cook, Atty. Gen., Rubye G. Jackson, Atlanta, for defendant in error.

Syllabus Opinion by the Court.

WYATT, Presiding Justice.

Henry Grady Cochran was convicted of murder without a recommendation to mercy. He filed his motion for new trial on the general grounds, and by amendment added a number of special grounds. The motion for new trial as amended was denied. The exception here is to that judgment. Held:

1. The general grounds and special grounds four and twelve all concern the sufficiency of the evidence. Without here setting out the lengthy evidence in this case, it is necessary to say only that there was evidence from which the jury was authorized to find every element of the offense charged. There is no merit in these grounds.

2. Ground six of the motion for new trial contends that the opening and closing argument of counsel for the State contained improper argument. The first time this question was raised was in the amendment to the motion for new trial. 'When improper argument is made to the jury by an attorney for one of the parties, it is necessary, in order to make the same a basis for review, that opposing counsel, during the trial, properly object to such argument or invoke some ruling or instruction with reference thereto by the court. A party cannot during the trial ignore what he thinks to be an injustice, take his chance on a favorable verdict, and complain later.' Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435, 67 S.E.2d 221, 222.

3. Special grounds five, seven, and eight all complain of the failure of the court, upon written request, to charge the law relating to manslaughter. This complaint seems to be based upon the testimony and the statement of the accused to the effect that the accused and the deceased were engaged in an argument, and the deceased said in substance, 'If you don't kill me, I will come back and kill you.' The deceased, who was sitting in an automobile, then cranked up the car, and started to back away. The car brushed against the accused, who was standing beside the car, and he shot her twice. This testimony and these statements do not show any present intention or any present threats or any present ability to do bodily injury to the defendant such as would mitigate the charge against the accused. It shows without any question that the deceased had broken off the argument and was in the process of leaving the scene when she was shot by the defendant. Under the evidence and the statement of the defendant, it was not error to refuse to charge the law relating to manslaughter.

4. Ground nine contends that the accused is entitled to a new trial because one of the jurors who served upon the jury that convicted the defendant was prejudiced against the accused. In support of this ground, there is in the record an affidavit to the effect that, after the trial was over, this juror made a statement to the effect that the accused had killed a man in Texas and had gotten away with it. It is alleged in the ground that this statement was false. The juror in question made a counteraffidavit to the effect that he did not hear this report about the defendant until after the trial had been completed and the defendant had been convicted. The trial judge could believe the affidavit of the juror, and, under this affidavit, no harm to the accused is shown because the prejudice, if any, was not in existence at the time of the trial. There is no merit in this contention.

5. Ground ten complains of certain language of the court during the trial. Counsel for the defendant was cross-examining a witness for the State when the following occurred: 'Q. (Mr. Mitchell) When I asked you a moment ago what else was said, why did you eliminate that?' (The testimony referred to as having been eliminated being: 'She ...

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25 cases
  • Brown v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • October 5, 1964
    ...remarks and invokes a ruling by the court on an objection or motion. Mims v. State, 188 Ga. 702, 704, 4 S.E.2d 831; Cochran v. State, 213 Ga. 706, 100 S.E.2d 919; Georgia Power Co. v. Puckett, 181 Ga. 386, 395, 182 S.E. We do not construe the decisions just cited to require counsel, when he......
  • Butts v. Davis, 47045
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • May 16, 1972
    ...injustice, take his chance on a favorable verdict, and complain later.' Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435(2), 67 S.E.2d 221; Cochran v. State, 213 Ga. 706(2), 100 S.E.2d 919. As was pointed out in Loomis v. State, 203 Ga. 394, 404, 47 S.E.2d 58, 64 the constitutional right to handle one's case i......
  • Johnson v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Supreme Court
    • June 9, 1970
    ...argument complained of, the trial court did not err in not reprimanding the district attorney or declaring a mistrial. Cochran v. State, 213 Ga. 706(2), 100 S.E.2d 919; Moseley v. Moseley, 214 Ga. 137(9), 103 S.E.2d 6. Enumeration of error 7 contends that the court erred in not charging on ......
  • Arnold v. State
    • United States
    • Georgia Court of Appeals
    • July 9, 1982
    ...injustice, take his chance on a favorable verdict, and complain later." Joyner v. State, 208 Ga. 435(2), 67 S.E.2d 221; Cochran v. State, 213 Ga. 706(2), 100 S.E.2d 919. See also Daniels v. State, 230 Ga. 126, 127(2), 195 S.E.2d 900; Strozier v. State, 231 Ga. 140, 141(1), 200 S.E.2d 762. C......
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