Cock v. Western Union Tel. Co.

• Citation: 84 Miss. 380,36 So. 392
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Decision Date: 18 April 1904
• Parties: WILLIAM G. COCKE v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY

36 So. 392

84 Miss. 380

WILLIAM G. COCKE v. WESTERN UNION TELEGRAPH COMPANY

Supreme Court of Mississippi

April 18, 1904

FROM the circuit court of Tate county. HON. J. B. BOOTHE, Judge.

Cocke the appellant, was plaintiff, and the telegraph company appellee, defendant in the court below. From a judgment in plaintiff's favor against defendant for nominal damages one dollar, the plaintiff appealed to the supreme court.

The opinion states the facts.

Affirmed.

J. F Dean, for appellant.

Plaintiff's duty was to pay for the transmission of the telegram, which he did. Plaintiff's rights were to have the message received, transmitted, and delivered by the telegraph company, and to have the contents of the message kept secret. Defendant's right was to receive just compensation for the message, and its duties were to receive, transmit, and deliver, and to keep inviolate the secrecy of the telegram. It is as much the duty of the telegraph company to keep the contents of the message from every one but the sendee as it is to transmit or deliver the telegram to him. It has been decided by so many courts so many times that actual damages may be recovered for mental suffering where no pecuniary loss is shown, that I deem it useless to discuss that proposition.

It has been decided in this state in Telegraph Co. v. Watson, 82 Miss. 101; s. c., 33 So. 76; see also Young v. W. U. Tel. Co., 3 Am. R. R. & Corp. Cases, 493; Chapman v. W. U. Tel. Co., 3 Am. R. R. & Corp. Cases, 193; in each of which cases and notes to them this subject is exhaustively treated. I refer also to an Iowa case in 57 Am. St. Rep., 294, in which the same doctrine is discussed and in which the evidence necessary to sustain a verdict is also discussed.

That the telegram was made public is absolutely undisputed. That it was made public in Greenville is shown beyond question. It was not made public by Mr. Cocke or his mother or sister. It was then ex rei necessitate made public by the telegraph company. If made public by the telegraph company, it was through the negligence, willful or otherwise, of its agents. If the contents of the message were made public, the telegraph company negligently and willfully violated its contract, and is liable for all damages resulting proximately therefrom. The disclosure was the proximate cause of the mental suffering and the defendant company is liable. Rogers v. Telegraph Co., 68 Miss. 748.

If injury to the feelings be an element of damage in slander, libel, and breach of promise cases, it seems to us it should equally be so considered in cases of this character. If not, then most grievous wrong may often be inflicted with impunity, legal insult added to outrage by the parties, by offering one cent or the cost of the telegram as compensation to the injured party.

If any wrong was committed in the case, it was not from mere negligence, but was a willful wrong; and damages for mental suffering are allowed in Mississippi where the wrong is willful. Telegraph Co. v. Rogers, 68 Miss. 748, which is followed and amplified by Telegraph Co. v. Watson, 82 Miss. 101; s. c., 33 So. 76.

In Storm v. Greene, 51 Miss. 109, the court says: "The rule on the subject of exemplary damages has been several times repeated in this court, and has assumed a definite form. Where willfulness, fraud, malice, or oppression evincing a disregard of the rights of others, characterized the wrongful act complained of, then the jury are not limited to the mere value of the property and the interest, but may rightfully consider the circumstances of aggravation and increase the damages, so as to enforce a respect for the rights of others and as a punishment to the willful trespasser." Referring to Whitfield v. Whitfield, 40 Miss. 352; Briscoe v. McElween, 43 Miss. 569, and Jamison v. Moon, 43 Miss, 602. In the latter case it was said to be proper to consider whether the trespass was "committed with a high hand, wantonly, needlessly, oppressively." The jury may also take into account the "mortified sensibilities and reputation of the party and the evil example to the public."

The same doctrine here announced is stated in Railroad v. Scurr, 59 Miss. 461.

Harris & Powell, for appellee.

We must not be understood as contending that a telegraph company may not be liable in damages for the wrongful disclosure of the contents of a message, though it is true that the decisions on this point are exceedingly meager. Our statute, Code 1892, § 1301, provides a punishment for any clerk, operator, messenger, or other employee who willfully divulges the contents of a message to any one except the person for whom it is intended. No penalty is imposed, however, on the company.

This, however, is not an action under that statute, but is a claim for damages, punitive damages, from the company itself for an alleged willful and malicious, wanton and reckless disclosure of the message in question, and our contention is that under the peculiar facts disclosed in this case the plaintiff is only entitled to nominal damages, if to any at all. There is no pretense that the plaintiff sustained any actual damage.

In the very nature of things, Cocke could not have been damaged by the disclosure of the contents of this message. While in fact it was a message between individuals, it was not in fact a private message, nor a message in regard to his private business. It was the announcement of the result of a public judicial act by the justices of the highest tribunal in the land, a matter essentially public, in no way secret; a matter in which, as alleged in the declaration, the public at large were very much interested; indeed, a matter that the public at large were entitled to know as much about as Cocke. It was in regard to a public matter in which the state of Mississippi was interested; a matter to which the state was a party; a matter affecting the administration of public justices in this state; a matter which might be said to be so essentially public in its nature as to be presumably known as soon as the justices to whom Mr. Dean had made his application had acted upon it. It was a matter which was bound to be made public. It was a matter which any press reporter could have telegraphed to the end of the world had he seen fit to do so, and a matter which Cocke had no right to keep secret, and which was not, as we say, in the nature of a private message.

The question is, Is the appellant entitled from the facts disclosed in this record to punitive damages? There can be but one answer to this question. The circumstances attending the alleged disclosure of the purport of this message are fully set forth in the record, and there is not the slightest pretense of malice or willful wrong.

While it is true there was a disclosure knowingly made and intentionally made of the message, yet it was not a willful disclosure as that term is technically used and understood in the law, when used as a basis for inflicting punishment.

To hold that the telegraph company is liable for punitive damages in this case would be tantamount in holding that it is liable in punitive damages for a mere disclosure, however innocently made, and...