Codd v. McGoldrick Lumber Co.

• Decision Date: 07 May 1928
• Docket Number: 5154
• Citation: 46 Idaho 256,267 P. 439
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court
• Parties: AMBROSE W. CODD and JOHN V. ALLEN, a Copartnership Doing Business Under the Firm Name and Style of CODD & ALLEN LUMBER COMPANY, Petitioners and Plaintiffs, v. MCGOLDRICK LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant

267 P. 439

46 Idaho 256

AMBROSE W. CODD and JOHN V. ALLEN, a Copartnership Doing Business Under the Firm Name and Style of CODD & ALLEN LUMBER COMPANY, Petitioners and Plaintiffs, v. MCGOLDRICK LUMBER COMPANY, a Corporation, Defendant

No. 5154

Supreme Court of Idaho

May 7, 1928

Affidavit and petition for writ of mandate. Demurrer overruled.

Demurrer overruled.

N.D Wernette, for Plaintiffs.

The supreme court has jurisdiction; the affidavit and petition of plaintiffs state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action; plaintiffs have no speedy or adequate remedy at law. (C. S., secs. 2377, 2378, 2380, 2396 and 6444; Alabama Great Southern R. Co. v. Alabama Public Service Com., 210 Ala. 151, P. U. R. 1924A, 477, 97 So. 226; Public Service Com. v. St. Louis, S. F. R. R. Co., 301 Mo. 157 P. U. R. 1924B, 690, 256 S.W. 226; Southern Oil Corp. v. Yale Nat. Gas Co., 89 Okla. 121, P. U. R. 1924A, 435, 214 P. 131; Wisconsin-Minnesota Light & Power Co. v. Wisconsin Railroad Com., 183 Wis. 96, P. U. R. 1924C, 534, 197 N.W. 359; Southern California Edison Co. v. Railroad Com., 194 Cal. 757, 230 P. 661; Neil v. Public Utilities Com., 32 Idaho 44, 178 P. 271; Stoehr v. Natatorium Co., 34 Idaho 217, 200 P. 132; Humbird Lumber Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 39 Idaho 505, 228 P. 271; Washington W. P. Co. v. Montana P. Co., 3 P. U. C. I. 102; P. U. R. 1916E, 144, 156; Public Utilities Com. v. Natatorium Co., 36 Idaho 287, 211 P. 533; Const., sec. 5, art. 11; McLean v. District Court, 24 Idaho 441, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 542, 134 P. 536; Connolly v. Woods, 13 Idaho 591, 92 P. 573; Blackwell Lumber Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 189, 155 P. 680; Const., sec. 14, art. 1; Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Henry T. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 118 Am. St. 233, 88 P. 426; 6 R. C. L., sec. 47, p. 52.)

In order to be entitled to the writ of mandamus demand need not be made first if such demand would be unavailing. (38 C. J. 578, citing numerous authorities supporting the text; 18 R. C. L. 123, sec. 37; Berkey v. Board of Commrs., 48 Colo. 104, 20 Ann. Cas. 1109, 110 P. 197; Cox v. State, 182 Ind. 497, 106 N.E. 878; State v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 85 Kan. 649, 118 P. 872.)

A company that owns a public railroad must perform its duty to the public and compelling the same to create ways and means of doing so does not violate the fourteenth amendment of the United States constitution. (Hatch v. Consumers Co., Ltd., 17 Idaho 204, 104 P. 670, 40 L. R. A., N. S., 263.)

Any corporation or person owing a special duty to the public can be forced by mandamus to perform it, and the fact that it may require specific acts over a period of time makes no difference, as that right is considered an exception to the general rule and mandamus will lie to enforce such right. (38 C. J. 603, sec. 76, pp. 809-813, 816-820, and numerous cases cited supporting text; 18 R. C. L., p. 119, sec. 62, p. 146, sec. 70, p. 152, sec. 71, p. 153, sec. 73, p. 156, sec. 77, p. 160, sec. 78, p. 161, sec. 80, p. 163, secs. 81, 82, p. 165, sec. 83, p. 166.)

Robert H. Elder and Randall & Danskin, for Defendant.

Defendant's log spur does not constitute a public highway, public railroad and common carrier under the constitution and laws of Idaho, for it is not a railroad corporation. (State v. Public Service Com., 117 Wash. 453, 201 P. 765, 203 P. 3; Southern California Edison Co. v. Railroad Com. of Cal., 194 Cal. 757, 230 P. 661; Public Utilities Com. v. Natatorium Co., 36 Idaho 287, 211 P. 533.)

That it exercised the power of eminent domain did not make it a public utility.

(1) Two purposes for which eminent domain may be exercised. (Const., sec. 5, art. 11, and sec. 14, art. 1.) (a) Right of all railroad corporations to exercise right guaranteed by sec. 5, art. 11. (Connelly v. Woods, 13 Idaho 591, 92 P. 573; McLean v. District Court, 24 Idaho 441, Ann. Cas. 1915D, 542, 134 P. 536; Chapman v. Trinity Valley & N. Ry. Co. (Tex. Civ. App.), 138 S.W. 440.) (b) All persons or corporations guaranteed right for development of natural resources under sec. 14, art. 1. (Blackwell Lbr. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 189, 155 P. 680; Potlatch Lumber Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 118 Am. St. 233, 88 P. 420.)

(2) Two conflicting lines of decision dealing with right to eminent domain. (a) Public use. (Brown v. Gerald, 100 Me. 351, 109 Am. St. 526, 61 A. 785, 70 L. R. A. 472.) (b) Public benefit. (Potlatch Lbr. Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 118 Am. St. 233, 88 P. 426; Blackwell Lbr. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 189, 153 P. 680; 20 C. J. 553.)

(3) Exercise of right of eminent domain in Idaho does not make company a public utility. (Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Briggs, 27 Idaho 84, 147 P. 75; Washington Water P. Co. v. Montana P. Co., P. U. R. 1916E, 144, 163; 3 I. P. U. C. 96, at p. 109; Headrick v. Larson, 152 F. 93, 81 C. C. A. 317.) Under sec. 5, art. 12, of constitution, defendant is not a public highway or public railroad. (1 Idaho Const. Convention, pp. 870-872; Herman Const. Co. v. Wabash R. Co., 206 Mo. 172, 121 Am. St. 649, 12 Ann. Cas. 630, 104 S.W. 67, 12 L. R. A., N. S., 112; C. S., Railroads, 2377; Blackwell Lbr. Co. v. Empire Mill Co., 28 Idaho 556, Ann. Cas. 1918A, 189, 155 P. 680; Moore on Carriers, p. 72, sec. 35.)

Term "railroad" refers to commercial railroads. ( Louisiana & A. Ry. Co. v. State Board of Appraisers, 135 La. 69, 64 So. 985; Amos Kent Lbr. & Brick Co. v. Tax Assessor, 114 La. 862, 38 So. 587; Murch v. Concord R. R. Corp., 29 N.H. 9, 61 Am. Dec. 631; Koelle v. Knecht, 99 Ill. 396.)

State cannot by mere legislative fiat convert log spur into a public utility and make defendant a common carrier. ( State v. Public Service Com., 117 Wash. 453, 201 P. 765, 203 P. 3; Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. R. R. Com. of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 47 A. L. R. 457, 46 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed. 1101; Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Com. of Cal., 251 U.S. 228, 40 S.Ct. 131, 64 L.Ed. 239.)

The court has no jurisdiction; the affidavit and petition do not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and plaintiffs have an adequate remedy at law. (C. S., secs. 2450, 2457; State v. Duluth St. Ry. Co., 153 Wis. 650, 142 N.W. 184; Fogelsville & Trexlertown Electric Co. v. Pennsylvania Power & Light Co., 271 Pa. 237, 114 A. 822; Commonwealth Telephone Co. v. Carley, 192 Wis. 464, 213 N.W. 469; State v. Flannelly, 96 Kan. 372, 152 P. 22; Baltimore & Ohio R. R. Co. v. United States, 215 U.S. 481, 54 L.Ed. 292; Wiltdering v. Green, 4 Idaho 773, 45 P. 134; Consumers Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 41 Idaho 418, 239 P. 730; Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 40 Idaho 690, 236 P. 525; Supreme Court Rule No. 60.)

The alternative writ fails to show any legal duty resting on the defendant with which it has failed to comply, and fails to show that the petitioners have been unlawfully precluded from the use and enjoyment of any rights to which they are entitled. (Frost & Frost Trucking Co. v. Railroad Com. of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 47 A. L. R. 457, 46 S.Ct. 605, 70 L.Ed. 1101; Producers Transp. Co. v. Railroad Com. of Cal., 251 U.S. 228, 40 S.Ct. 131, 64 L.Ed. 239; State v. Public Service Com., supra.)

The mandate of the alternative writ does not on its face show what acts the defendants must perform so that the court could ascertain that its order had been complied with, and the same is so general, vague and uncertain that it cannot be definitely replied to, performed or enforced. (State v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 53 Fla. 650, 12 Ann. Cas. 359, 44 So. 213, 13 L. R. A., N. S., 320; Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. State (Okl.), 150 P. 475; McAlester-Edwards Coal Co. v. State, 31 Okla. 629, 122 P. 194, 39 L. R. A., N. S., 810; 13 Ency. Ph & Pr. 497; State v. Brewer, 39 Wash. 65, 109 Am. St. 858, 4 Ann. Cas. 197, 80 P. 1001; Northern Pacific R. R. Co. v. Territory of Washington, 142 U.S. 492, 12 S.Ct. 283, 35 L.Ed. 1092.)

Statements of intentions in the future do not make one a common carrier. (4 R. C. L. 546; Stoehr v. Natatorium Co., 34 Idaho 217, 200 P. 132.)

Occupation of public streets is no criterion as to dedication to public use, and does not add to a corporation's duty. (Union Electric Light & Power Co. v. Tibbs Power Co. (Mo.), P. U. R. 1920B, 20; Southern California Edison Co. v. Railroad Com., 194 Cal. 757, 230 P. 661, 684; Public Utilities Com. v. Natatorium Co., 36 Idaho 287, 211 P. 533, 534.)

Without showing that defendant condemned land as a public utility, the fact that eminent domain proceedings were used is immaterial. (Headrick v. Larson, 152 F. 93, 81 C. C. A. 317; Nampa & Meridian Irr. Dist. v. Briggs, 27 Idaho 84, 147 P. 75; Washington Water Power Co. v. Montana P. Co., P. U. R. 1916E, 144; 3 P. U. C. 96; Potlatch Lbr. Co. v. Peterson, 12 Idaho 769, 88 P. 426.)

GIVENS, J. Budge and T. Bailey Lee, JJ., concur. TAYLOR, J., Dissenting.

OPINION

GIVENS, J.

Petitioners and plaintiffs seek a writ of mandate compelling defendant company to operate its logging railroad as a common carrier of lumber, logs and lumber products, the only service in issue. The essential question is whether defendant is a common carrier or public utility. Hence, while the matter in the affidavit or petition referred to in subds. (a) and (d), p. 2, of defendant's motion to strike as irrelevant, is perhaps not essential to the cause of action stated, it has some relevancy to the representations as to its future operations alleged to have been made by the defendant before and during construction. Therefore the motion to strike will be denied.

The question raised by defendant's demurrer is whether the petitioner sufficiently charges that defendant is a common carrier or public utility, which question the courts in the...